Vukeya v Ntshane and others [2020] JOL 49155 (SCA)
This case involved an appeal against the judgment of the Gauteng Division of the
High Court, Johannesburg, which declared the deed of transfer for a property null
and void. The property was sold by one spouse (the deceased) without the consent
of the other spouse (the first respondent), who was married in community of property
with the deceased. The appellant, a third- party purchaser, argued that the first
respondent's consent was deemed to have been given under the Matrimonial
Property Act (MPA), rendering the sale valid.
Reasoning: The court applied Section 15(9)(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act,
which provides that if a spouse enters into a transaction contrary to the provisions of
Section 15(2) or (3) without the knowledge or reasonable knowledge of a third party,
it is deemed that the transaction was entered into with the required consent. The
court emphasized the duty of the third-party purchaser to make reasonable inquiries
about the marital status and consent of the contracting spouse. In this case, the
appellant, unaware of the marriage and lack of consent, was found to have acted in
good faith and met the requirements of Section 15(9)(a).
Precedent Set: The precedent set by this case is that third-party purchasers who act
in good faith and have no knowledge, nor reasonable means of knowing, that a
spouse's consent is lacking when entering into a transaction with a married individual
in community of property, are protected under Section 15(9)(a) of the Matrimonial
Property Act. In such cases, the transaction is deemed to have been entered into
with the required consent, making it valid and enforceable.
Facts: In the case of Vukeya v Ntshane and Others (Case no. 518/2019), the first
respondent, Mrs. Shalate Nelly Ntshane, and the deceased, Mr. Wilson Mkhatshane
Ntshane, were married in community of property. They owned a residential property,
Erf 12103 Diepkloof, Soweto. After the children became adults and left the home, the
first respondent moved to Potgietersrus in Limpopo, while the deceased remained on
the property. In April 2009, without the knowledge or consent of the first respondent,
the deceased sold the property to the appellant, Mr. Mafemani Collet Vukeya, for
R50,000. The first respondent only discovered the sale when she became the
executrix of the deceased's estate in September 2013.
Issues: The main issue was whether the sale of the property by the deceased
without the first respondent's consent rendered the transaction null and void, or if the
appellant, as a third-party purchaser, was protected under Section 15(9)(a) of the
Matrimonial Property Act (MPA) and the transaction was deemed to have the
required consent.
Principles: Section 15(9)(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act stipulates that if a
spouse enters into a transaction contrary to the provisions of Section 15(2) or (3)
,without the knowledge or reasonable knowledge of a third party, it is deemed that the
transaction was entered into with the required consent.
Application: The court applied the principles of Section 15(9)(a) of the MPA to the
facts of the case. It considered whether the appellant, Mr. Vukeya, knew or could
have reasonably known about the first respondent's lack of consent to the property
sale. The court also examined the representations made by the deceased,
describing himself as unmarried, in the deed of transfer and the power of attorney to
pass transfer. It evaluated whether the appellant had made reasonable inquiries
about the deceased's marital status and consent.
Conclusion: The court concluded that the appellant, Mr. Vukeya, did not know and
could not reasonably have known about the first respondent's lack of consent to the
property sale. As a result, the transaction was deemed to have the required consent
under Section 15(9)(a) of the MPA. Thus, the sale of the property to the appellant
was valid and enforceable. The court upheld the appeal, set aside the high court's
order, and dismissed the application with costs.
,KT v AT and others [2019] JOL 46116 (WCC)
Facts:
-The applicant filed a rule 43 application seeking maintenance, contribution to her
costs, and ancillary relief in a divorce case.
- The affidavit for this application was 68 pages long, with supporting annexures
totalling 290 pages, and additional affidavits and notices.
- The first respondent filed an application under rule 30, arguing that the rule 43
application was irregular and an abuse of process, and should be struck from the
roll.
Issues:
-Whether the rule 43 application complied with the requirements of rule 43.
- Whether the length and content of the applicant's documents were excessive and
constituted an abuse of process.
- Whether the first respondent's application under rule 30 was justified.
Principles:
- Rule 43(2)(a) requires a party to seek interim relief in a matrimonial matter through
a sworn statement (affidavit) that is concise and in the nature of a declaration.
- The affidavits in rule 43 applications should contain only relevant material, and
excessive length and irrelevant content can be considered an abuse of process.
- The court has the authority to strike out an application that does not adhere to the
rules and to make appropriate cost orders.
- Parties must adhere to the spirit and intent of the rules to ensure expeditious and
fair proceedings.
Application:
-The applicant's rule 43 application did not comply with the requirements of rule 43,
as it contained excessive length and irrelevant content, such as personal details
unrelated to the relief sought.
-The court found that the applicant's documents constituted an egregious abuse of
process, as they included irrelevant and invasive personal information.
- The first respondent's application under rule 30 to strike the rule 43 application from
the roll was justified given the substantial non-compliance with the rules.
Conclusion:
The court ordered:
- The rule 43 application is declared irregular and an abuse of process and is struck
from the roll.
-The applicant may only re-enrol the application if it complies with the requirements
of rule 43.
, - The applicant's attorneys are held liable for costs of both the rule 30 and rule 43
applications, to be paid de bonis propriis (from their own resources).
-The applicant's attorneys are not entitled to recover any costs from the applicant.
This case underscores the importance of adhering to the rules of court and
maintaining relevance in legal documents to avoid abuse of process and
unnecessary costs.
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