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Foundations of Mathematical Economics by Michael Carter | Complete Solutions Manual

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This document provides the complete Solutions Manual for Foundations of Mathematical Economics by Michael Carter. It includes detailed, step-by-step solutions to all textbook exercises, covering core mathematical methods used in economic theory. Topics include optimization, comparative statics, dynamic analysis, linear algebra applications, and formal modeling techniques. This comprehensive manual is ideal for students seeking deeper understanding and instructors requiring fully worked solutions.

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Solutions Manual#z



Foundations of Mathematical
#z #z #z



Economics
#z




Michael #zCarter

#z November #z15, #z2002

, c⃝ 2001 Michael Carter
Solutions for Foundations of Mathematical Economics All rights reserved




Chapter 1: Sets and Spaces

1.1
{ 1, 3, 5, 7 . . . } or { 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 : 𝑛 is odd }
1.2 Every 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 also belongs to 𝐵. Every 𝑥 ∈ 𝐵 also belongs to 𝐴. Hence 𝐴, 𝐵 have
precisely the same elements.
1.3 Examples of finite sets are
∙ the letters of the alphabet { A, B, C, . . . , Z }
∙ the set of consumers in an economy
∙ the set of goods in an economy
∙ the set of players in a game.
Examples of infinite sets are
∙ the real numbers ℜ
∙ the natural numbers 𝔑
∙ the set of all possible colors
∙ the set of possible prices of copper on the world market
∙ the set of possible temperatures of liquid water.
1.4 𝑆 = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 }, 𝐸 = { 2, 4, 6 }.
1.5 The player set is 𝑁 = { Jenny, Chris } . Their action spaces are
𝐴𝑖 = { Rock, Scissors, Paper } 𝑖 = Jenny, Chris
1.6 The set of players is 𝑁 = {1, 2 , . . . , 𝑛 .} The strategy space of each player is the set
of feasible outputs
𝐴𝑖 = { 𝑞𝑖 ∈ ℜ+ : 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝑄𝑖 }
where 𝑞𝑖 is the output of dam 𝑖.
1.7 The player set is 𝑁 = {1, 2, 3}. There are 23 = 8 coalitions, namely
𝒫(𝑁) = {∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}
10
There are 2 coalitions in a ten player game.
1.8 Assume that 𝑥 ∈ (𝑆 ∪ 𝑇 )𝑖. That is 𝑥 ∈ / 𝑆 ∪ 𝑇 . This implies 𝑥 ∈/ 𝑆 and 𝑥 ∈ / 𝑇,
or 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇 𝑖. Consequently, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∩ 𝑇 𝑖. Conversely, assume 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∩ 𝑇 𝑖.
This implies that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇 𝑖. Consequently 𝑥 ∈ / 𝑆 and 𝑥 ∈ / 𝑇 and therefore
𝑥∈/ 𝑆 ∪ 𝑇 . This implies that 𝑥 ∈ (𝑆 ∪ 𝑇 ) 𝑖 . The other identity is proved similarly.
1.9

𝑆=𝑁
𝑖∈𝒞

𝑆=∅
𝑖∈𝒞



1

, c⃝ # z 2001 #zMichael

Solutions #z for #zFoundations # z of # z Mathematical #z Carter
All # z rights
# z Economics # z reserved



𝑥2
1




𝑥1
-1 0 1




-1

Figure #z1.1: #zThe #zrelation #z{ #z(𝑥, #z𝑦) #z: #z𝑥2 #z+ #z𝑦2 #z= #z1 #z}


1.10 The #zsample #zspace #zof #za #zsingle #zcoin #ztoss{ #zis #}z 𝐻, #z𝑇 # z . # z The #zset #zof
#zpossible #zoutcomes #zin # z three #ztosses #zis #zthe #zproduct

{
{𝐻, #z𝑇#z} × #z{𝐻, #z𝑇#z} × #z{𝐻, #z𝑇#z} #z= # z (𝐻, #z𝐻, #z𝐻), #z(𝐻, #z𝐻, #z𝑇#z), #z(𝐻, #z𝑇, #z𝐻),
}
(𝐻, #z𝑇, #z𝑇 #z), #z(𝑇, #z𝐻, #z𝐻), #z(𝑇, #z𝐻, #z𝑇 #z), #z(𝑇, #z𝑇, #z𝐻), #z(𝑇, #z𝑇, #z𝑇 #z)


A # z typical # z outcome # z is # z the # z sequence # z (𝐻, #z𝐻, #z𝑇 #z) # z of # z two # z heads # z followed # z by # z a # z tail.
1.11

𝑌 #z ∩ #zℜ+𝑖 # z = #z{0}

where # z 0 # z = # z (0, #z0,.. . #z, #z0) # z is # z the # z production # z plan # z using # z no # z inputs # z and
# z producing # z no # z outputs. #zTo #z see # z this, # z first # z note # z that # z 0 # z is # z a # z feasible

# z production # z plan. # z Therefore, #z 0 # z ∈ # z 𝑌 #z. # z Also,

0 #z ∈ #z+ ℜ𝑖 # z and # z therefore # z 0 #z ∈+#z 𝑌 # z ∩ #zℜ𝑖 #z.
𝑖
To #zshow #zthat #zthere #zis #zno #zother #zfeasible #zproduction #zℜplan + #zin # z #z, #zwe #zassume
∈ #zℜ
#zthe #zcontrary. #zThat # z is, # z we # z assume # z there # z is # z some # z feasible
+ ##zz production # z plan
#zy # z # z # z
𝑖
# z # z 0 # z . # z This # z implies #zthe #zexistence #z z ∖#z
# of { #z#plan
#za z } #zproducing #za

#zpositive #zoutput #zwith #zno #zinputs. #zThis #ztechnological #zinfeasible, # z so # z that #z𝑦 # z ∈ /
# z 𝑌 #z.


1.12 1. # z Let # z x #z ∈ # z 𝑉 #z(𝑦). # z This # z implies # z that # z (𝑦, #z−x) #z ∈ #z 𝑌 #z. # z Let # z x′ # z ≥ #z x. # z Then # z (𝑦, #z−x′) #z ≤
(𝑦, #z−x) #zand #z free #z disposability #z implies # z that #z (𝑦, #z−x′) #z∈ #z𝑌 #z. #zTherefore #z x′ #z ∈ #z𝑉 #z(𝑦).
2. # z Again # z assume # z x # z ∈ # z 𝑉 #z(𝑦). # z This # z implies # z that # z (𝑦, #z−x) # z ∈
# z 𝑌 #z. # z By # z free # z disposal, #z(𝑦′, #z−x) #z∈ #z𝑌 # z for #zevery #z𝑦′ # z ≤ #z𝑦, #zwhich
# z implies # z that #zx #z∈ #z𝑉 #z(𝑦′). # z 𝑉 #z(𝑦′) #z⊇ #z𝑉 #z(𝑦).


1.13 The #z domain # z of # z “<” # z is # z {1, #z2} #z= #z𝑋 # z and # z the # z range # z is # z {2, #z3} #z⫋ #z𝑌 #z.
1.14 Figure # z 1.1.
1.15 The # z relation #z“is # z strictly #zhigher #zthan” # z is #ztransitive, # z antisymmetric #zand
# z asymmetric. #zIt #zis #znot #zcomplete, #zreflexive #zor #zsymmetric.




2

, c⃝ # z 2001 #zMichael

Solutions #z for #zFoundations # z of # z Mathematical #z Carter
All # z rights
# z Economics # z reserved


1.16 The # z following # z table # z lists # z their # z respective # z properties.
< ≤
√ =

reflexive ×
transitive √ √ √
√ √
symmetric ×
√ × ×
asymmetric √ √ √
anti-symmetric
√ √
complete ×
Note # z that # z the # z properties #z of # z symmetry # z and # z anti-symmetry # z are # z not # z mutually # z exclusive.
1.17 Let ~ # z be #zan #zequivalence #zrelation #zof #za∕ #zset ∅ #z𝑋 #z= # z . #zThat #zis, #z∼the #zrelation
# z is #zreflexive, #zsymmetric #zand #ztransitive. #zWe #zfirst ∈ #zshow #zthat #zevery #z𝑥 # z 𝑋
#zbelongs #zto #zsome #zequivalence #zclass. # ~ z Let # z 𝑎 # z be # z any # z element # z in # z 𝑋 # z and

# z let # z # z (𝑎) # z be # z the # z class # z of # z elements # z equivalent # z to

𝑎, #zthat #zis
∼(𝑎) #z≡ #z { #z𝑥 #z∈ #z 𝑋 # z : #z 𝑥 #z ∼ #z 𝑎 #z}
Since ∼ is #zreflexive, #z𝑎∼ 𝑎 #zand #zso #z∈𝑎 # z ∼
(𝑎). # z Every #z𝑎∈ 𝑋 #z belongs #zto #zsome
#zequivalence #zclass #zand #ztherefore

𝑋 #z = ∼(𝑎)
𝑖∈𝑖

Next, # z we # z show # z that # z the equivalence # z classes
# z # z are # z either # z disjoint # z or
identical, # z that # z is
# z

∼(𝑎) #z∕= #z∼(𝑏) # z if # z and # z only # z if # z f∼(𝑎) #z∩ #z∼(𝑏) #z= #z∅.
First, #zassume #z∼(𝑎) #z∩ #z∼(𝑏) #z= #z∅ . #zThen #z 𝑎 #z∈ #z∼(𝑎) #z but #z 𝑎 #z∈
/ # z ∼(𝑏). #zTherefore #z∼(𝑎) #z∕= #z∼(𝑏).
Conversely, #zassume #z∼(𝑎) #z∩ #z∼(𝑏) #z∕= #z∅ #zand #zlet #z𝑥 #z∈ #z∼(𝑎) #z∩ #z∼(𝑏). # z Then #z𝑥 #z∼
#z𝑎 #zand #zby #zsymmetry # z 𝑎 # z ∼ # z 𝑥. # z Also # z 𝑥 # z ∼ # z 𝑏 # z and # z so # z by

# z transitivity # z 𝑎 # z ∼ # z 𝑏. # z Let # z 𝑦 # z be # z any # z element #zin # z ∼(𝑎) # z so # z that # z 𝑦

# z ∼ # z 𝑎. # z Again # z by # z transitivity # z 𝑦 # z ∼ # z 𝑏 # z and # z therefore # z 𝑦 # z ∈ # z ∼(𝑏).

# z Hence

∼(𝑎) #z⊆ #z∼(𝑏). #zSimilar #zreasoning #zimplies #zthat #z∼(𝑏) #z⊆ #z∼(𝑎). #zTherefore
#z∼(𝑎) #z= #z∼(𝑏). #zWe #zconclude #zthat #zthe #zequivalence #zclasses #zpartition #z𝑋.
1.18 The #zset #zof #zproper #zcoalitions #zis #znot #za #zpartition #zof #zthe #zset #zof #zplayers, #zsince
#zany #zplayer #zcan #zbelong #zto #zmore #zthan #zone #zcoalition. #zFor #zexample, #zplayer #z1

#zbelongs #zto #zthe #zcoalitions

{1}, #z {1, #z2} # z and # z so # z on.
1.19

𝑥 #z≻ #z𝑦 # z =⇒ # z 𝑥 #z≿ #z𝑦 # z and #z 𝑦 #z ∕≿ #z𝑥
𝑦 # z ∼ #z 𝑧 # z =⇒ # z 𝑦 # z ≿ #z𝑧 # z and # z 𝑧 # z ≿ #z𝑦
Transitivity #zof #z≿ #zimplies # z 𝑥 #z≿ #z𝑧 . #zWe # z need # z to # z show #zthat #z𝑧 # z ∕≿ #z𝑥 . #zAssume
# z otherwise, #zthat #zis # z assume # z 𝑧 # z ≿ #z 𝑥 # z This # z implies # z 𝑧 # z ∼ # z 𝑥 # z and # z by
# z transitivity # z 𝑦 # z ∼ # z 𝑥. # z But # z this # z implies # z that

𝑦 #z≿ #z𝑥 #z which #zcontradicts #zthe #zassumption #zthat #z𝑥 #z≻ #z𝑦 . #zTherefore #zwe #zconclude #zthat #z𝑧 #z∕≿ #z𝑥
and # z therefore # z 𝑥 #z ≻ #z𝑧 . #zThe # z other # z result # z is # z proved # z in # z similar # z fashion.
1.20 asymmetric # z Assume # z 𝑥 # z ≻ # z 𝑦.


while Therefore
3

Connected book
 image
Publisher: 2001 ISBN: 9780262531924 Edition: Unknown

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