LPL4802
October Nvember PORTFOLIO 2026
Unique number:
Due date: 29 October 2026
QUESTION 1: PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND DAMAGES
1.1 Prohibited conduct under the Competition Act
Section 8(d)(i) is concerned with an abuse of dominance by inducing other market participants to
withhold their business from competitors. SAA’s sales incentives therefore had to be assessed
1
according to their exclusionary results in domestic aviation. SAA was dominant in both travel-agent
services for domestic ticket sales and scheduled domestic air transport. Between 1 June 2001 and 31
March 2005 it used third-generation override agreements and additional TRUST payments. Travel
agents received rewards for meeting and exceeding SAA sales targets. Some override commissions
applied back to the first rand of sales after the target had been reached. The payment structure made
agents more likely to direct discretionary customers to SAA, even when those customers might
otherwise have booked with Nationwide.
, QUESTION 1: PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND DAMAGES
1.1 Prohibited conduct under the Competition Act
Section 8(d)(i) is concerned with an abuse of dominance by inducing other market
participants to withhold their business from competitors. SAA’s sales incentives
therefore had to be assessed according to their exclusionary results in domestic
1
aviation. SAA was dominant in both travel-agent services for domestic ticket sales
and scheduled domestic air transport. Between 1 June 2001 and 31 March 2005 it
used third-generation override agreements and additional TRUST payments. Travel
agents received rewards for meeting and exceeding SAA sales targets. Some
override commissions applied back to the first rand of sales after the target had been
reached. The payment structure made agents more likely to direct discretionary
customers to SAA, even when those customers might otherwise have booked with
Nationwide.
In Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd the
court accepted the Tribunal finding that this practice induced agents to favour SAA
2
and impeded competitors from expanding. Travel agents handled about 70% of
domestic ticket sales during the relevant period. The Tribunal found substantial
foreclosure, including travel-agent outlets covering 56% to 76% by number and 70%
to 90% when weighted by revenue or passengers. The conduct was unlawful
because the incentive arrangements reduced rivals’ access to this important
distribution channel and reinforced SAA’s dominant position. Nationwide did not
3
have to show that it had been completely excluded from domestic aviation.
In Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd, the
court accepted the competition authorities’ finding that travel agents remained
important in the domestic market even while other ticket channels developed. travel
agents remained important in the domestic market even while other ticket channels
developed.4
1
Competition Act 89 of 1998 s 8(d)(i).
2
Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 (6) SA 19
(GJ) (hereinafter Nationwide Airlines) [4]–[11], [20]–[26].
3
Nationwide Airlines [5]–[10].
4
Nationwide Airlines [5]–[10].
October Nvember PORTFOLIO 2026
Unique number:
Due date: 29 October 2026
QUESTION 1: PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND DAMAGES
1.1 Prohibited conduct under the Competition Act
Section 8(d)(i) is concerned with an abuse of dominance by inducing other market participants to
withhold their business from competitors. SAA’s sales incentives therefore had to be assessed
1
according to their exclusionary results in domestic aviation. SAA was dominant in both travel-agent
services for domestic ticket sales and scheduled domestic air transport. Between 1 June 2001 and 31
March 2005 it used third-generation override agreements and additional TRUST payments. Travel
agents received rewards for meeting and exceeding SAA sales targets. Some override commissions
applied back to the first rand of sales after the target had been reached. The payment structure made
agents more likely to direct discretionary customers to SAA, even when those customers might
otherwise have booked with Nationwide.
, QUESTION 1: PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND DAMAGES
1.1 Prohibited conduct under the Competition Act
Section 8(d)(i) is concerned with an abuse of dominance by inducing other market
participants to withhold their business from competitors. SAA’s sales incentives
therefore had to be assessed according to their exclusionary results in domestic
1
aviation. SAA was dominant in both travel-agent services for domestic ticket sales
and scheduled domestic air transport. Between 1 June 2001 and 31 March 2005 it
used third-generation override agreements and additional TRUST payments. Travel
agents received rewards for meeting and exceeding SAA sales targets. Some
override commissions applied back to the first rand of sales after the target had been
reached. The payment structure made agents more likely to direct discretionary
customers to SAA, even when those customers might otherwise have booked with
Nationwide.
In Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd the
court accepted the Tribunal finding that this practice induced agents to favour SAA
2
and impeded competitors from expanding. Travel agents handled about 70% of
domestic ticket sales during the relevant period. The Tribunal found substantial
foreclosure, including travel-agent outlets covering 56% to 76% by number and 70%
to 90% when weighted by revenue or passengers. The conduct was unlawful
because the incentive arrangements reduced rivals’ access to this important
distribution channel and reinforced SAA’s dominant position. Nationwide did not
3
have to show that it had been completely excluded from domestic aviation.
In Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd, the
court accepted the competition authorities’ finding that travel agents remained
important in the domestic market even while other ticket channels developed. travel
agents remained important in the domestic market even while other ticket channels
developed.4
1
Competition Act 89 of 1998 s 8(d)(i).
2
Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 (6) SA 19
(GJ) (hereinafter Nationwide Airlines) [4]–[11], [20]–[26].
3
Nationwide Airlines [5]–[10].
4
Nationwide Airlines [5]–[10].
