THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MEMORY AND FORGETTING
John Shotter (1992)
Summary:
In this chapter we present a social-constructivist approach to non-cognitive memory and forgetting, based on the early work of
Bartlett (1923). This approach focuses on our ways of speaking and their rhetorical nature, highlighting how individual responses
are formed in interaction with the group. Bartlett postulated that basic human tendencies, oriented towards construction and
conservation, give rise to social institutions that perpetuate themselves. In addition, he stated that behaviors are not determined
by a single tendency, but by the conflict and mutual reinforcement between multiple tendencies.
Our goal is to recover the concept of remembrance from Bartlett's early work, focusing on the social and institutional determinants
of remembrance and forgetting. Current cognitive explanations of memory, which ignore the social processes of forgetting, do not
adequately explain recall. Bartlett was right to stress the importance of social processes in memory, although his approach was
later absorbed into experimental psychology. In the review of works such as those of Gleitman and Neisser, the social context of
memory is omitted, although these authors claim to follow a Bartlettian approach.
THE NUCLEARITY OF OUR "EXPLANATORY PRACTICES"
In this non-cognitive approach that we adopt, our ways of speaking are fundamental, since it is assumed that the main function of
our discourse is to shape different social actions and coordinate them. We do not represent the world with our words, but these
words acquire meaning in the social context in which they are used.
This approach challenges the idea that our lived experience is basic, suggesting that our ways of talking about our experiences
serve to maintain and promote certain modalities of social order. Our discourse on remembrance and the process of remembering
or forgetting also serves this function, shaping our understanding and action in the social world.
Bartlett suggested that memory initially involves vague feelings or affects, which are formalized through language. Our discourse
not only reflects our experiences, but also shapes them in ways that conform to established social norms. Ultimately, our way of
speaking reproduces the social order in which we are immersed, both in everyday life and in the professional sphere.
THE DOUBLE RHETORICAL NATURE OF LANGUAGE
Here the primacy of the social-constructivist approach over the formative aspect of language rather than its direct reference is
emphasized. This approach highlights two aspects of rhetoric.
First, the persuasive function of language, explored by Billig, reveals how our words have the power to mysteriously affect people's
perceptions and behaviors, beyond the cognitive. This power to move others emotionally will be crucial to explore later how it
influences the formation of memories and forgetting, an aspect that we will see in detail.
Second, the poetic powers of language according to Vico and Nietzsche highlight how words give shape and meaning to feelings
and activities, structuring a shared reality before being explicitly formulated. This view highlights the ability of language not only
to describe or represent reality, but to create and shape shared meanings that shape our collective experiences.
This analysis underscores the inversions and stabilities in our linguistic constructs and experiences. De Man suggests that our reality
is intrinsically constructed by language, not simply reflected by it. This idea highlights the inherent instability of our ways of
speaking and thinking, influenced by both facts of the world and linguistic structures.
It is crucial to recognize and unravel these interdependent influences in order to understand how they shape our social experiences
and practices. This approach invites us to consider how our ways of speaking not only express pre-existing realities, but also actively
constitute them within specific social contexts.
JUSTIFICATION OF MEMORIES
Here the prevailing view in cognitive psychology is contrasted, which assumes that we clearly understand terms such as
"remembering," "thinking," and "knowing," and seeks to investigate internal phenomena such as mnemonic traces and sensory
records. This perspective confronts the social constructivist approach, which questions the existence of underlying entities as the
basis of memory. Wittgenstein and C.W. Mills suggest that the assumption of understanding these inner activities must be
1
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John Shotter (1992)
Summary:
In this chapter we present a social-constructivist approach to non-cognitive memory and forgetting, based on the early work of
Bartlett (1923). This approach focuses on our ways of speaking and their rhetorical nature, highlighting how individual responses
are formed in interaction with the group. Bartlett postulated that basic human tendencies, oriented towards construction and
conservation, give rise to social institutions that perpetuate themselves. In addition, he stated that behaviors are not determined
by a single tendency, but by the conflict and mutual reinforcement between multiple tendencies.
Our goal is to recover the concept of remembrance from Bartlett's early work, focusing on the social and institutional determinants
of remembrance and forgetting. Current cognitive explanations of memory, which ignore the social processes of forgetting, do not
adequately explain recall. Bartlett was right to stress the importance of social processes in memory, although his approach was
later absorbed into experimental psychology. In the review of works such as those of Gleitman and Neisser, the social context of
memory is omitted, although these authors claim to follow a Bartlettian approach.
THE NUCLEARITY OF OUR "EXPLANATORY PRACTICES"
In this non-cognitive approach that we adopt, our ways of speaking are fundamental, since it is assumed that the main function of
our discourse is to shape different social actions and coordinate them. We do not represent the world with our words, but these
words acquire meaning in the social context in which they are used.
This approach challenges the idea that our lived experience is basic, suggesting that our ways of talking about our experiences
serve to maintain and promote certain modalities of social order. Our discourse on remembrance and the process of remembering
or forgetting also serves this function, shaping our understanding and action in the social world.
Bartlett suggested that memory initially involves vague feelings or affects, which are formalized through language. Our discourse
not only reflects our experiences, but also shapes them in ways that conform to established social norms. Ultimately, our way of
speaking reproduces the social order in which we are immersed, both in everyday life and in the professional sphere.
THE DOUBLE RHETORICAL NATURE OF LANGUAGE
Here the primacy of the social-constructivist approach over the formative aspect of language rather than its direct reference is
emphasized. This approach highlights two aspects of rhetoric.
First, the persuasive function of language, explored by Billig, reveals how our words have the power to mysteriously affect people's
perceptions and behaviors, beyond the cognitive. This power to move others emotionally will be crucial to explore later how it
influences the formation of memories and forgetting, an aspect that we will see in detail.
Second, the poetic powers of language according to Vico and Nietzsche highlight how words give shape and meaning to feelings
and activities, structuring a shared reality before being explicitly formulated. This view highlights the ability of language not only
to describe or represent reality, but to create and shape shared meanings that shape our collective experiences.
This analysis underscores the inversions and stabilities in our linguistic constructs and experiences. De Man suggests that our reality
is intrinsically constructed by language, not simply reflected by it. This idea highlights the inherent instability of our ways of
speaking and thinking, influenced by both facts of the world and linguistic structures.
It is crucial to recognize and unravel these interdependent influences in order to understand how they shape our social experiences
and practices. This approach invites us to consider how our ways of speaking not only express pre-existing realities, but also actively
constitute them within specific social contexts.
JUSTIFICATION OF MEMORIES
Here the prevailing view in cognitive psychology is contrasted, which assumes that we clearly understand terms such as
"remembering," "thinking," and "knowing," and seeks to investigate internal phenomena such as mnemonic traces and sensory
records. This perspective confronts the social constructivist approach, which questions the existence of underlying entities as the
basis of memory. Wittgenstein and C.W. Mills suggest that the assumption of understanding these inner activities must be
1
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