“He was underestimated by his opponents.” How far does this explain Stalin’s rise to
power? [30]
Stalin’s rise to power in the Party before 1929 was indeed contributed by his opponents
underestimating his true ability. However, this phenomenon has its roots in a vast
combination of factors all working in Stalin’s favour and benefit in the wider leadership
struggle, while depreciating the chances of success of other leading Bolsheviks in contention
for power.
Stalin’s road to victory in the leadership struggle after Lenin’s death in 1924 was paved by
his opponents–the other leading Bolsheviks, who severely underestimated him. It is because
of this that Stalin was able to discreetly gather a formidable base of support, preventing any
other opponent from gaining an upper hand, that only became apparent after his position in
the party was all but secured. Crucially, it is because of this sentiment that Stalin was not
dangerous to the other leading Bolsheviks in 1924 that they did not take advantage of
Lenin’s Testament to trigger Stalin’s would-be downfall. As a result, despite Lenin explicitly
laying out how Stalin’s position as General Secretary of the party made him a threat to future
party democracy, and how his misdemeanours made him unsuitable for leadership, the
Politburo nevertheless decided to classify Lenin’s Testament due to its criticisms on its
members, thus preventing it from ever being published and destroying the career of many
Politburo members, but especially Stalin’s. Besides this, Stalin’s unofficial triumvirate with
Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Party Congress in 1925 against Trotsky’s bid to gain influence
in the party also demonstrated how much he was underestimated by his future opponents.
Here, Kamenev and Zinoviev misjudged that Trotsky was still the favourite to gain power
when Stalin was able to pack the congress with his supporters who denied any support to
Trotsky. This was because Stalin’s role as General Secretary allowed him to influence
delegate selection for the congress, and supervise the Lenin Enrolment, which brought in
260k new party members since 1923 and enabled Stalin to create a strong power base from
local party level to the congress. In fact, he arguably did not need the support from Kamenev
and Zinoviev, who had particular influence as head of the city parties of Russia’s biggest
cities–Moscow and Leningrad, as Stalin himself already had consolidated his support in city
and provincial parties all across Russia. Furthermore, the formation of the United Opposition
in 1926, with Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky attempting to bring an end to NEP, was
another example of their short-sightedness when dealing with Stalin. This time, they were
again defeated by Stalin not only because he also filled the Party Congress in 1927 with his
supporters, but also because they could not foresee how the 1921 Ban on Factions by Lenin
could be used by Stalin against them, forcing them to renounce their claims or be expelled
from the party. Indeed, had the leading Bolsheviks been able to expose Stalin’s power of
patronage before 1924 and used Lenin’s Testament to denounce Stalin, he would have
never been able to gain the level of support he gathered by 1925 if the public was aware that
he did not have Lenin’s backing.
Importantly, Trotsky’s mistakes in the few years after Lenin’s death contributed to Stalin
coming out on top of the leadership struggle. This is because his mistakes cost him the base
of support in the party and the population that he desperately needed in the party
congresses, and allowed Stalin to, bit by bit, weaken his once well-established position in the
party. First of all, Trotsky’s absence at Lenin’s funeral in January 1924 allowed Stalin to take
power? [30]
Stalin’s rise to power in the Party before 1929 was indeed contributed by his opponents
underestimating his true ability. However, this phenomenon has its roots in a vast
combination of factors all working in Stalin’s favour and benefit in the wider leadership
struggle, while depreciating the chances of success of other leading Bolsheviks in contention
for power.
Stalin’s road to victory in the leadership struggle after Lenin’s death in 1924 was paved by
his opponents–the other leading Bolsheviks, who severely underestimated him. It is because
of this that Stalin was able to discreetly gather a formidable base of support, preventing any
other opponent from gaining an upper hand, that only became apparent after his position in
the party was all but secured. Crucially, it is because of this sentiment that Stalin was not
dangerous to the other leading Bolsheviks in 1924 that they did not take advantage of
Lenin’s Testament to trigger Stalin’s would-be downfall. As a result, despite Lenin explicitly
laying out how Stalin’s position as General Secretary of the party made him a threat to future
party democracy, and how his misdemeanours made him unsuitable for leadership, the
Politburo nevertheless decided to classify Lenin’s Testament due to its criticisms on its
members, thus preventing it from ever being published and destroying the career of many
Politburo members, but especially Stalin’s. Besides this, Stalin’s unofficial triumvirate with
Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Party Congress in 1925 against Trotsky’s bid to gain influence
in the party also demonstrated how much he was underestimated by his future opponents.
Here, Kamenev and Zinoviev misjudged that Trotsky was still the favourite to gain power
when Stalin was able to pack the congress with his supporters who denied any support to
Trotsky. This was because Stalin’s role as General Secretary allowed him to influence
delegate selection for the congress, and supervise the Lenin Enrolment, which brought in
260k new party members since 1923 and enabled Stalin to create a strong power base from
local party level to the congress. In fact, he arguably did not need the support from Kamenev
and Zinoviev, who had particular influence as head of the city parties of Russia’s biggest
cities–Moscow and Leningrad, as Stalin himself already had consolidated his support in city
and provincial parties all across Russia. Furthermore, the formation of the United Opposition
in 1926, with Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky attempting to bring an end to NEP, was
another example of their short-sightedness when dealing with Stalin. This time, they were
again defeated by Stalin not only because he also filled the Party Congress in 1927 with his
supporters, but also because they could not foresee how the 1921 Ban on Factions by Lenin
could be used by Stalin against them, forcing them to renounce their claims or be expelled
from the party. Indeed, had the leading Bolsheviks been able to expose Stalin’s power of
patronage before 1924 and used Lenin’s Testament to denounce Stalin, he would have
never been able to gain the level of support he gathered by 1925 if the public was aware that
he did not have Lenin’s backing.
Importantly, Trotsky’s mistakes in the few years after Lenin’s death contributed to Stalin
coming out on top of the leadership struggle. This is because his mistakes cost him the base
of support in the party and the population that he desperately needed in the party
congresses, and allowed Stalin to, bit by bit, weaken his once well-established position in the
party. First of all, Trotsky’s absence at Lenin’s funeral in January 1924 allowed Stalin to take
