How successful was Henry VIII’s foreign policy in the years 1509 to 1529?
To argue that Henry VIII’s foreign policy was successful in the years 1515-1529 is to suggest that
Henry fulfilled his principal aim of international prestige and glory – through military outlets in the
years 1509-1515, diplomatic means from 1515-1521, and a combination of pacifism and militarism
from 1521 to 1529. Proponents of this view would point to Henry’s successes in capturing
Therouanne and Tournai, the establishment of England as a leading diplomatic force in the 1510s,
and further success in treaties up to 1529. Conversely, those challenging this view would argue that
Henry’s early ostensible successes engendered little strategic and financial benefits, that alliances
such as the Treaty of London failed to ensure lasting peace, and that Henry’s alliance with Charles
from 1521 onwards was skewed. Overall, the most convincing view is that Henry’s foreign policy was
largely unsuccessful, as although the late 1510s marked an era of success, Henry failed to
meaningfully bolster England’s international prestige.
Henry’s foreign policy stemmed primarily from a desire to recapture the glories of the Hundred
Years War, and a plausible, if ultimately flawed, case can be made that he was successful in the
pursuit of military glory in the years 1509 to 1515. Allied to Ferdinand, Henry personally led an army
of 25,000 into Northern France in 1513, and was successful in seizing the towns of Therouanne and
Tournai. Equally, Henry was also successful in emerging as the victor of the Battle of Spurs, which
proved fruitful propaganda, allowing him to exploit in his success. Although Henry sought peace with
France in August 1514, under the agreement he retained Therouanne and Tournai, further marking
his military expeditions in the years 1509 to 1515 as a considerable success. Alongside propaganda
garnering Henry domestic support, Henry also gained the approval of the nobility, who were drawn
to his chivalric and militaristic foreign policy. Indeed, his force was drawn from retinues of leading
courtier peers such as the Marquis of Dorset, illustrating how Henry’s foreign policy successfully
consolidated his domestic support. Whilst it is clear that Henry’s early foreign policy was marked
with by a certain degree of success, we should not take this argument too far. In practice, Henry’s
endeavours in France were of little strategic gain: the captured towns were on the Burgundian
French border, thus primarily benefiting Maximillian rather than Henry. Furthermore, the Battle of
Spurs was little more than a skirmish, and the June 1512 expedition revealed Henry’s naivety in
international diplomacy: his army of 10,000 achieved little, and the English battle was used by
Ferdinand as a diversionary tactic while he conquered Navarre. War with France had also drained
England’s financial resources: Henry exhausted the £300,000 in plate and jewels and 10,000 in cash
bequeathed to him by his father, and Tournai was eventually resold to France for less than the cost
of repairing England’s defences after the siege. So, whilst Henry’s expeditions perhaps allowed him
to cultivate an image of militaristic glory, in practice they were largely unsuccessful as they yielded
limited strategic and financial benefits. Henry was unable to even maintain his pursuit of chivalrous
military glory – peace was not his primary aim. Indeed, he had agreed with Maximilian to continue
the campaign in France the following summer, but only sought peace after the new Pope Leo X
forged amicable relations with France. Elsewhere, Henry’s success was also limited: although he
defeated James IV at the Battle of Flodden in September 1513, he was unable to exploit the
weakness of Scotland in the aftermath of the conflict. Overall, then, whilst Henry’s early foreign
policy was successful in minor military victories and in earning the favour of the nobility, the
strategic and financial drawbacks of his actions justifies the view that his policy was largely
unsuccessful.
The period 1515 to 1521 marked a new era of international diplomacy, yet Henry was seemingly
unsuccessful in his pursuit of international prestige for England through less militaristic outlets. The
1518 Treaty of London failed to prevent future conflicts, with armed conflict reopening between
Francis I and Charles V in August 1521. Equally, the June 1520 Field of Cloth of Gold, although an
extravagant and lavish meeting between Henry VIII and Francis, achieved little in diplomatic terms:
To argue that Henry VIII’s foreign policy was successful in the years 1515-1529 is to suggest that
Henry fulfilled his principal aim of international prestige and glory – through military outlets in the
years 1509-1515, diplomatic means from 1515-1521, and a combination of pacifism and militarism
from 1521 to 1529. Proponents of this view would point to Henry’s successes in capturing
Therouanne and Tournai, the establishment of England as a leading diplomatic force in the 1510s,
and further success in treaties up to 1529. Conversely, those challenging this view would argue that
Henry’s early ostensible successes engendered little strategic and financial benefits, that alliances
such as the Treaty of London failed to ensure lasting peace, and that Henry’s alliance with Charles
from 1521 onwards was skewed. Overall, the most convincing view is that Henry’s foreign policy was
largely unsuccessful, as although the late 1510s marked an era of success, Henry failed to
meaningfully bolster England’s international prestige.
Henry’s foreign policy stemmed primarily from a desire to recapture the glories of the Hundred
Years War, and a plausible, if ultimately flawed, case can be made that he was successful in the
pursuit of military glory in the years 1509 to 1515. Allied to Ferdinand, Henry personally led an army
of 25,000 into Northern France in 1513, and was successful in seizing the towns of Therouanne and
Tournai. Equally, Henry was also successful in emerging as the victor of the Battle of Spurs, which
proved fruitful propaganda, allowing him to exploit in his success. Although Henry sought peace with
France in August 1514, under the agreement he retained Therouanne and Tournai, further marking
his military expeditions in the years 1509 to 1515 as a considerable success. Alongside propaganda
garnering Henry domestic support, Henry also gained the approval of the nobility, who were drawn
to his chivalric and militaristic foreign policy. Indeed, his force was drawn from retinues of leading
courtier peers such as the Marquis of Dorset, illustrating how Henry’s foreign policy successfully
consolidated his domestic support. Whilst it is clear that Henry’s early foreign policy was marked
with by a certain degree of success, we should not take this argument too far. In practice, Henry’s
endeavours in France were of little strategic gain: the captured towns were on the Burgundian
French border, thus primarily benefiting Maximillian rather than Henry. Furthermore, the Battle of
Spurs was little more than a skirmish, and the June 1512 expedition revealed Henry’s naivety in
international diplomacy: his army of 10,000 achieved little, and the English battle was used by
Ferdinand as a diversionary tactic while he conquered Navarre. War with France had also drained
England’s financial resources: Henry exhausted the £300,000 in plate and jewels and 10,000 in cash
bequeathed to him by his father, and Tournai was eventually resold to France for less than the cost
of repairing England’s defences after the siege. So, whilst Henry’s expeditions perhaps allowed him
to cultivate an image of militaristic glory, in practice they were largely unsuccessful as they yielded
limited strategic and financial benefits. Henry was unable to even maintain his pursuit of chivalrous
military glory – peace was not his primary aim. Indeed, he had agreed with Maximilian to continue
the campaign in France the following summer, but only sought peace after the new Pope Leo X
forged amicable relations with France. Elsewhere, Henry’s success was also limited: although he
defeated James IV at the Battle of Flodden in September 1513, he was unable to exploit the
weakness of Scotland in the aftermath of the conflict. Overall, then, whilst Henry’s early foreign
policy was successful in minor military victories and in earning the favour of the nobility, the
strategic and financial drawbacks of his actions justifies the view that his policy was largely
unsuccessful.
The period 1515 to 1521 marked a new era of international diplomacy, yet Henry was seemingly
unsuccessful in his pursuit of international prestige for England through less militaristic outlets. The
1518 Treaty of London failed to prevent future conflicts, with armed conflict reopening between
Francis I and Charles V in August 1521. Equally, the June 1520 Field of Cloth of Gold, although an
extravagant and lavish meeting between Henry VIII and Francis, achieved little in diplomatic terms:
