2.1 Problem 6: Long Distance Zoom
Sternberg: Ch 7
Pictures in your mind: Mental Imagery
- Imagery = mental representation of things that are not currently seen or sensed by the
sense organs.
Kosslyn: to solve problems, we visualise objects by mentally representing images
- Differences (in ability to create mental images) are measurable w/functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI)
- Use of mental images can help to improve memory
- What form do we represent images in our minds?
Extreme view: all images of everything may be stored as exact copies of physical
images // not realistic, capacity not big enough
- Learning can take place just by using mental images
Dual-Code Theory: Images & Symbols
- We use both pictorial & verbal codes for representing info in our minds. These 2
codes organise info into knowledge that can be acted on, stored somehow and later
retrieved for subsequent use
- Paivio: mental images are analogue codes. Analogue codes resemble objects they are
representing, e.g., trees & rivers might be represented by analogue codes
- In contrast, mental representations for words are mostly represented in a symbolic
code. Symbolic code = form of knowledge representation that has been chosen
arbitrarily to stand for something that doesn’t perceptually resemble what is being
represented. E.g., we recognise 9 is a symbol for the concept of ‘nineness’. But
nothing about the symbol would suggest its meaning, we arbitrarily have designated
this symbol to represent the concept. But 9 only has meaning because we use it to
represent a deeper concept.
- Paivio: consistent w/dual-code theory; verbal info & pictorial info are processed
differently. Participants more easily recall pictures when they’re allowed to do so in
any order. But they more easily recall sequences in which the words were presented
than the sequence for the pictures
- Does visual perception interfere with simultaneous visual imagery & does the
need to produce a verbal response interfere with simultaneous mental
manipulation of words?
Brooks: participants performed either visual/verbal task.
Visual task = answering questions requiring judgments about a picture that was
briefly presented.
Verbal task = answering questions requiring judgments about a sentence that was
stated briefly.
Participants expressed responses verbally, visually or manually
There were 2 conditions in which Brooks expected inference: 1) a visual task
requiring a verbal (pointing) response, 2) a verbal task requiring a verbal response.
Results: confirmed; participants showed slower response times in performing visual
tasks when also doing other competing visual task, participants showed more
interference in performing verbal task when asked to respond while doing other verbal
task
, Storing Knowledge as Abstract Concepts: Propositional Theory
- Propositional Theory: suggests that we don’t store mental representations in the
form of images/words. We may experience our mental representations as images, but
these images are epiphenomena – secondary & derivative phenomena that occur as a
result of other, more basic cognitive processes
Images & verbal statements are mentally represented in terms of their deep meanings,
not as specific images/words (they are represented as propositions)
Our mental representations (‘mentalese’) more closely resemble the abstract form of a
proposition (= meaning underlying a particular relationship among concepts).
What is a Proposition?
- Propositional representation: ‘The table is above the cat’/’The cat is under the table’,
etc.
- [Relationship between elements]([Subject element], [Object element])
Using Propositions
- May be used to describe any kind of relationship: actions, attributes, positions, class
membership, etc.
Sternberg: Ch 7
Zooming in on Mental Images: Image Scaling
- We use mental images the same way we use our actual perceptions
- Our resolution is limited; seeing details of large objects is easier than seeing details of
small ones – similarly, we respond quicker to features of large imagined objects than
to features of small ones
- When we zoom in closer to objects to perceive details, we eventually reach a point
where we can no longer see the entire object. To see the whole object again, we have
to zoom out
Kosslyn: controlling size of people’s mental images. Participants imagine 4 pairs of
animals – an elephant & a rabbit, a rabbit & a fly, a rabbit and an elephant-sized fly, and a
rabbit & a rabbit-sized elephant. Then they answer questions about the features of the
rabbit, timed in their responses.
Took participants longer to describe details of smaller objects than to describe details of
larger objects – takes longer to respond to rabbits paired w/elephants or elephant-sized
flies than to respond to rabbits paired w/flies or w/fly-sized elephants
Kosslyn: asked participants whether animals can be characterised as having various
physical attributes: e.g., ‘Does a cat have claws?’ and ‘Does a cat have a head?’. In one
condition, participants were asked to visualise each animal and to use their mental image
to answer the questions. In the other condition, the participants were not asked to use
mental images. It was presumed that they used verbal-propositional knowledge to respond
to the verbal questions.
Sternberg: Ch 7
Pictures in your mind: Mental Imagery
- Imagery = mental representation of things that are not currently seen or sensed by the
sense organs.
Kosslyn: to solve problems, we visualise objects by mentally representing images
- Differences (in ability to create mental images) are measurable w/functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI)
- Use of mental images can help to improve memory
- What form do we represent images in our minds?
Extreme view: all images of everything may be stored as exact copies of physical
images // not realistic, capacity not big enough
- Learning can take place just by using mental images
Dual-Code Theory: Images & Symbols
- We use both pictorial & verbal codes for representing info in our minds. These 2
codes organise info into knowledge that can be acted on, stored somehow and later
retrieved for subsequent use
- Paivio: mental images are analogue codes. Analogue codes resemble objects they are
representing, e.g., trees & rivers might be represented by analogue codes
- In contrast, mental representations for words are mostly represented in a symbolic
code. Symbolic code = form of knowledge representation that has been chosen
arbitrarily to stand for something that doesn’t perceptually resemble what is being
represented. E.g., we recognise 9 is a symbol for the concept of ‘nineness’. But
nothing about the symbol would suggest its meaning, we arbitrarily have designated
this symbol to represent the concept. But 9 only has meaning because we use it to
represent a deeper concept.
- Paivio: consistent w/dual-code theory; verbal info & pictorial info are processed
differently. Participants more easily recall pictures when they’re allowed to do so in
any order. But they more easily recall sequences in which the words were presented
than the sequence for the pictures
- Does visual perception interfere with simultaneous visual imagery & does the
need to produce a verbal response interfere with simultaneous mental
manipulation of words?
Brooks: participants performed either visual/verbal task.
Visual task = answering questions requiring judgments about a picture that was
briefly presented.
Verbal task = answering questions requiring judgments about a sentence that was
stated briefly.
Participants expressed responses verbally, visually or manually
There were 2 conditions in which Brooks expected inference: 1) a visual task
requiring a verbal (pointing) response, 2) a verbal task requiring a verbal response.
Results: confirmed; participants showed slower response times in performing visual
tasks when also doing other competing visual task, participants showed more
interference in performing verbal task when asked to respond while doing other verbal
task
, Storing Knowledge as Abstract Concepts: Propositional Theory
- Propositional Theory: suggests that we don’t store mental representations in the
form of images/words. We may experience our mental representations as images, but
these images are epiphenomena – secondary & derivative phenomena that occur as a
result of other, more basic cognitive processes
Images & verbal statements are mentally represented in terms of their deep meanings,
not as specific images/words (they are represented as propositions)
Our mental representations (‘mentalese’) more closely resemble the abstract form of a
proposition (= meaning underlying a particular relationship among concepts).
What is a Proposition?
- Propositional representation: ‘The table is above the cat’/’The cat is under the table’,
etc.
- [Relationship between elements]([Subject element], [Object element])
Using Propositions
- May be used to describe any kind of relationship: actions, attributes, positions, class
membership, etc.
Sternberg: Ch 7
Zooming in on Mental Images: Image Scaling
- We use mental images the same way we use our actual perceptions
- Our resolution is limited; seeing details of large objects is easier than seeing details of
small ones – similarly, we respond quicker to features of large imagined objects than
to features of small ones
- When we zoom in closer to objects to perceive details, we eventually reach a point
where we can no longer see the entire object. To see the whole object again, we have
to zoom out
Kosslyn: controlling size of people’s mental images. Participants imagine 4 pairs of
animals – an elephant & a rabbit, a rabbit & a fly, a rabbit and an elephant-sized fly, and a
rabbit & a rabbit-sized elephant. Then they answer questions about the features of the
rabbit, timed in their responses.
Took participants longer to describe details of smaller objects than to describe details of
larger objects – takes longer to respond to rabbits paired w/elephants or elephant-sized
flies than to respond to rabbits paired w/flies or w/fly-sized elephants
Kosslyn: asked participants whether animals can be characterised as having various
physical attributes: e.g., ‘Does a cat have claws?’ and ‘Does a cat have a head?’. In one
condition, participants were asked to visualise each animal and to use their mental image
to answer the questions. In the other condition, the participants were not asked to use
mental images. It was presumed that they used verbal-propositional knowledge to respond
to the verbal questions.
