VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Partial defences
Loss of self-control- D kills V while out of control owing to fear of serious violence or a justifiable sense
of being seriously wrong (Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss54-55)
Diminished responsibility- D's recognised medical condition led to an abnormality of mind and caused
her to kill V (Homicide Act 1957, s2 as substituted by s52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009)
Suicide pact- D kills V in pursuance of an agreement that they will both die together (Homicide Act 1957,
s4)
Loss of self-control
Comes from the old defence of provocation (s3, of the Homicide Act 1957) which followed the
rationale that the killing was in ‘hot blood’ and may be undeserving of the label ‘murder’ and the
consequent capital punishment
Historically, a defence of ‘honour’ (often from being challenged to a duel)
‘...a series of recognised anger-based killings which attracted the excusing eye of the law. A
grossly insulting assault; an attack upon a kinsman or friend, the sight of an Englishman
unlawfully deprived of his liberty and seeing a man in the act of adultery with one’s life’
(Provocation: The Case for Abolition, Celia Wells)
Welsh [1869] shifted the perspective so that it must be an act which ‘might naturally cause
an ordinary and reasonably minded man to lose his self-control and commit such an act’
Eruption of violence in the courtroom resulting in a death after a civil case for debt returned
an undesired result
The rationale follows that either any angry reaction in defence of one’s honour was the ‘correct’
response (justification), or (as in Welsh), the introduction of the reasonable man test is ‘compassion
for human infirmity’ (Hayward [1908]- excuse)
However, Celia Wells argues that both rationales are problematic and that the old defence
contained ‘an unappealing message condoning anger over self-restraint'
Also exists in order to avoid the mandatory life sentence for murder where it may be unfair
(labelled the ‘raison d’être’ by the Law Com 304- likely would not exist if the sentence was
not so strict)
Overall, the Law Commission suggested reform of homicide (first-degree and second-degree
murder)
Referenced Camplin [1978]- would not serve social justice to see a 15-year-old imprisoned
for life when he had not realised that his actions would result in murder and he had been
abused by the victim
Criticised by Prof Ormerod (in Smith and Hogan)- ‘for the appellate courts to fluctuate so
often and so significantly on the interpretations of a defence in cases of such seriousness led
to confusion and presented a disappointing spectacle’
, Coroners and Justice Act 2009 restructured (not abolished) provocation as a partial defence, however there
was a lack of consensus between the Law Commission and the Government about the terms of
restructuring
Law Commission (‘Partial Defences to Murder’ (Law Com No 290 [2004]))
Law Commission (‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide’ (Law Com No 204 [2006]))
Ministry of Justice (‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law’
(Consultation Paper CP19/08 [2008]))
Priorities for reform included
(a) a new partial defence to those who killed out of fear of serious violence (broadened the
defence)
(b) a ‘filter’ to enable a judge to rule that a low degree of provocation was an insufficient
‘trigger’ for killing and to limit the historic defence to ‘gross’ provocation (narrowed the
defence)
(c) clarity over what personal characteristics/circumstances of D could be taken into account
in applying the ‘reasonable man’ test to make a clearer ‘boundary’ with diminished
responsibility (narrowed the defence)
‘The reforms sought to address a long-standing criticism that the English law of homicide
had failed adequately to accommodate the contexts in which women kill an abusive male
partner, whilst simultaneously all too readily accommodating the excuses of jealous and
controlling men who kill a female intimate partner’ (When sexual infidelity triggers murder:
examining the impact of homicide law reform on judicial sentencing, Horder and Fitz-Gibbon)
Referenced the case of Ahluwalia [1993]- planned and premeditated killing of abusive
husband which failed to meet the ‘loss of (immediate) control’ element (retrial later ordered)
Similar criticisms on the ‘gender agenda’ for sentencing guidelines for manslaughter which
largely ‘disadvantage’ women who kill their abusers as ‘the guidelines does not address the
impact of power imbalances on (D)’s decision to carry a weapon for the purposes of
assessing culpability... there is a lack of guidance relating to the relevance of domestic
abuse as aggravating/mitigating factors’ (Manslaughter by loss of control: sentencing
primary victims who kill, Wake)
Partial defences
Loss of self-control- D kills V while out of control owing to fear of serious violence or a justifiable sense
of being seriously wrong (Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss54-55)
Diminished responsibility- D's recognised medical condition led to an abnormality of mind and caused
her to kill V (Homicide Act 1957, s2 as substituted by s52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009)
Suicide pact- D kills V in pursuance of an agreement that they will both die together (Homicide Act 1957,
s4)
Loss of self-control
Comes from the old defence of provocation (s3, of the Homicide Act 1957) which followed the
rationale that the killing was in ‘hot blood’ and may be undeserving of the label ‘murder’ and the
consequent capital punishment
Historically, a defence of ‘honour’ (often from being challenged to a duel)
‘...a series of recognised anger-based killings which attracted the excusing eye of the law. A
grossly insulting assault; an attack upon a kinsman or friend, the sight of an Englishman
unlawfully deprived of his liberty and seeing a man in the act of adultery with one’s life’
(Provocation: The Case for Abolition, Celia Wells)
Welsh [1869] shifted the perspective so that it must be an act which ‘might naturally cause
an ordinary and reasonably minded man to lose his self-control and commit such an act’
Eruption of violence in the courtroom resulting in a death after a civil case for debt returned
an undesired result
The rationale follows that either any angry reaction in defence of one’s honour was the ‘correct’
response (justification), or (as in Welsh), the introduction of the reasonable man test is ‘compassion
for human infirmity’ (Hayward [1908]- excuse)
However, Celia Wells argues that both rationales are problematic and that the old defence
contained ‘an unappealing message condoning anger over self-restraint'
Also exists in order to avoid the mandatory life sentence for murder where it may be unfair
(labelled the ‘raison d’être’ by the Law Com 304- likely would not exist if the sentence was
not so strict)
Overall, the Law Commission suggested reform of homicide (first-degree and second-degree
murder)
Referenced Camplin [1978]- would not serve social justice to see a 15-year-old imprisoned
for life when he had not realised that his actions would result in murder and he had been
abused by the victim
Criticised by Prof Ormerod (in Smith and Hogan)- ‘for the appellate courts to fluctuate so
often and so significantly on the interpretations of a defence in cases of such seriousness led
to confusion and presented a disappointing spectacle’
, Coroners and Justice Act 2009 restructured (not abolished) provocation as a partial defence, however there
was a lack of consensus between the Law Commission and the Government about the terms of
restructuring
Law Commission (‘Partial Defences to Murder’ (Law Com No 290 [2004]))
Law Commission (‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide’ (Law Com No 204 [2006]))
Ministry of Justice (‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law’
(Consultation Paper CP19/08 [2008]))
Priorities for reform included
(a) a new partial defence to those who killed out of fear of serious violence (broadened the
defence)
(b) a ‘filter’ to enable a judge to rule that a low degree of provocation was an insufficient
‘trigger’ for killing and to limit the historic defence to ‘gross’ provocation (narrowed the
defence)
(c) clarity over what personal characteristics/circumstances of D could be taken into account
in applying the ‘reasonable man’ test to make a clearer ‘boundary’ with diminished
responsibility (narrowed the defence)
‘The reforms sought to address a long-standing criticism that the English law of homicide
had failed adequately to accommodate the contexts in which women kill an abusive male
partner, whilst simultaneously all too readily accommodating the excuses of jealous and
controlling men who kill a female intimate partner’ (When sexual infidelity triggers murder:
examining the impact of homicide law reform on judicial sentencing, Horder and Fitz-Gibbon)
Referenced the case of Ahluwalia [1993]- planned and premeditated killing of abusive
husband which failed to meet the ‘loss of (immediate) control’ element (retrial later ordered)
Similar criticisms on the ‘gender agenda’ for sentencing guidelines for manslaughter which
largely ‘disadvantage’ women who kill their abusers as ‘the guidelines does not address the
impact of power imbalances on (D)’s decision to carry a weapon for the purposes of
assessing culpability... there is a lack of guidance relating to the relevance of domestic
abuse as aggravating/mitigating factors’ (Manslaughter by loss of control: sentencing
primary victims who kill, Wake)
