Week 1
Philips (2020) Chapter 2
17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi sets himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. This
sparked vast protests throughout the city and eventually spread to Tunis, the capital of Tunisia.
- Was a protest against humiliations by authorities (police)
- This led to the Tunisian military to end the rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who
had been in autocratic power for 24 years.
- Eventually, further protests erupted in Jordan, Oman, Egypt, and Sudan
- Eventually also Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, and Eastern Saudi
Arabia.
- All this within 3 months of the death of Bouazizi.
- Bashar al-Assad believed that Syria would be “immune” to
these protests.
- In March, a group of teenagers were arrested in Daraa in southern Syria for
anti-regime graffiti, with messages resembling those of earlier protests in Egypt.
- Protests grew and eventually the people were on the streets demanding
change, and many foreign governments eventually saw that the Syrian
regime would soon collapse.
Syria’s troubles - The image of Assad’s Syria
- Assad saw himself to be genuinely popular prior to 2011
- Many believed that he would have won a genuine democratic election if he had
allowed for it.
- Syrian GDP more than doubled between 2005 and 2010.
The murky reality
- Below the surface, Syria did experience problems
- Syrians had political, economical, and social complaints to the regime
- Politically, power still remained concentrated from the doings of Assad’s
father.
- Security, military and intelligence institutions were loyalists to
Assad’s father Hafez and these institutions were dominated by
members of the Alawites, who protected his regime and the power
holders.
- Bashar al-Assad made several changes to this autocratic structure
in Syria
- “Authoritarian upgrading” (Hinnebusch) (P44)
- Assad promoted family members to positions within the security
domain, and gave an increasing amount of key security positions
to Alawites, even more than his father had done
- Independent opposition to the regime remained forbidden
- Membership of the Muslim Brotherhood was punishable by death.
- If one insulted the president, they would disappear
,- To protect the state was the Mukhabarat, a set of intelligence agencies, who had
originally been provided training by East German Stasi, through interrogation and
torture techniques.
- Economically, Syria's population grew immensely between the 70’s and
the 90’s, where 55% of the population was under 24 in 2010.
- Hafez’s socialist educational policies resulted in vast state-funded
universities which resulted in higher qualifications for the youth,
but the country could offer no suitables jobs.
- Necessary annual economic growth for sufficient jobs to
arise was between 6-7%, but in reality it was 4.9%,
resulting in persistent unemployment.
- In reality it was estimated to be close to 20%
among the youth (p46)
- Assad’s shift to a social market economy was not too successful
- He wanted to gradually adopt market-led economics
without brutal abandonment of the welfare state
- State employment continued to employ 20-30% of
the population, but manufacturing was damaged by
the availability of Turkish goods that were available
from a new free trade agreement.
- Subsidies for manufacturing were removed
- Cost of diesel tripled overnight in May of
2008
- Rural decline was also increased by
a long-lasting drought between 2006
and 2010, which resulted from
mismanagement of water resources
for over 50 years prior.
- Lack of governmental
response
- Mass migration was a result of these economic problems,
and it is estimated that between 2001 and 2010, between
1.2 and 1.5 million Syrians migrated and settled in
unofficial camps or smaller cities.
- In 2010, 30% of Syrians lived below the poverty line, and 11%
below the subsistence level
- Only bare necessities in life.
- Wealth splits grew immensely, as more and more people migrated
to slums, and the rich became visibly richer.
- Corruption and nepotism (relative favoritism) grew more
and more blatant
- Socially, Syria's ethnic and sect diversity increased the complexity of the
social situation relative to that of other affected Arab states.
, - While Sunni peasants were suffering in shanty towns and slums,
Alawi migrants were rewarded with government jobs.
- Huge Sunni-Alawi division
- Fueled anti-Assad protests
Unrest Begins
- Technology was a contributing factor which allowed for instant information
- Allowed people to communicate “under the radar” or repressive regimes.
- Instant information led to knowledge about protests in for example Egypt,
and a group of teenagers were arrested for writing messages inspired by
Egyptian protests on their school in Daraa.
- Taken to Damascus and tortured
- Led to further protests resulting in 4 deaths
- These deaths led to further protests
The regime fights back
- Middle-class Syrians benefitted from Assad’s many reforms
- Lower class was negatively impacted as they were indirectly forced to live in
slums
- Some Alawites experienced material benefits from the regime’s patronage
- While many countries “coup-proofed” their countries, preventing military or security
services from overthrowing the government, officer corps remained loyal to the Regime
in Syria, from “coup-proofing” attempts from Assad’s father.
- Officer corps linked to the Assads or indebted.
- Prominent in Elite divisions.
- Military investments were focused on and reserved for these
loyalist divisions, to promote the regime.
- Mukhabarat
- Agencies within the Mukhabarat spied on each other and members of the
regime as well as the population and therefore, anyone who conspired
against the regime feared to be discovered.
- Key officials mysteriously disappeared throughout the years, some
suddenly retired, or were killed in mysterious circumstances.
- Even after 2011.
- Construction of a climate of fear from Assad.
Regime Violence
- Regime claimed that peaceful protesters were “armed gangs” to justify the use of force
- Maximum casualties per day was 109, as security forces and loyal military units
were deployed.
- Opposition demonstrators were killed, sparking more protests, resulting in more and
more deaths
- Protestors called the movement a revolution
- Arrests were usually arbitrary, in order to intimidate the general population
- The regime did however respond non-violently as well, through various meetings with
key figures
, - Assad lacked the ruthless decisiveness of his father, which was apparent in his ways of
dealing with the conflict, as experts have called “schizophrenic”.
The only option?
- 2 options available to Assad
- Following recommendations by hardliners
- Following recommendations of compromisers of his inner circle
- Although Assad claimed Syria would be immune to events in other Arab Spring nations,
Syria did in fact share many similar political, economical, and social problems that other
states experienced.
- Therefore, the unrest that emerged in 2011 was not completely surprising.
- Syrian regime was structured differently from those of Egypt and Tunisia who proved to
be weak with similar issues and therefore fell quickly
- Military was “coup-proofed”
- The uprising in Syria had spread sufficiently enough so that it could not be easily
contained by force, such as the uprising in Bahrain.
- Indecisiveness of Assad and his regime resulted in the deterrence of an
immediate hardline option (strict)
Conclusion
- Although Assad’s regime has not been able to reestablish the “wall of fear”, and the fact
that protests are out of control, it can still be argued that Assad has been able to
restructure his regime in the sense that he has gained the neutrality and loyalty of a
large portion of the population through “buy-ins”. The economic buy-ins include the fact
that Assad gave supporters of his regime economic benefits as well as threatened that
opposition would be executed or punished otherwise.
Van Dam (2017) Chapter 1
How was it possible that Syria ended up in a bloody sectarian war?
- Similarities between the Syrian war and earlier periods in which the Ba’th regime
repressed opposition, such as the split of the Mujahideen
- The scale of violence before and after the Syrian Revolution was different
- Before the revolution, opposition movements and insurgencies were centrally
suppressed in cities such as Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus
- After the revolution, most of the country has been involved in the conflict with the
regime.
- After the revolution, opposition started to receive assistance from abroad in
financial and military assets as well as political assistance.
- This developed the conflict into a proxy war
- Origins of the Syrian Revolution
- Structure and composition of the regime
- Dictatorship
- Strong domination by Alawi minority
- Their corruption
Philips (2020) Chapter 2
17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi sets himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. This
sparked vast protests throughout the city and eventually spread to Tunis, the capital of Tunisia.
- Was a protest against humiliations by authorities (police)
- This led to the Tunisian military to end the rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who
had been in autocratic power for 24 years.
- Eventually, further protests erupted in Jordan, Oman, Egypt, and Sudan
- Eventually also Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, and Eastern Saudi
Arabia.
- All this within 3 months of the death of Bouazizi.
- Bashar al-Assad believed that Syria would be “immune” to
these protests.
- In March, a group of teenagers were arrested in Daraa in southern Syria for
anti-regime graffiti, with messages resembling those of earlier protests in Egypt.
- Protests grew and eventually the people were on the streets demanding
change, and many foreign governments eventually saw that the Syrian
regime would soon collapse.
Syria’s troubles - The image of Assad’s Syria
- Assad saw himself to be genuinely popular prior to 2011
- Many believed that he would have won a genuine democratic election if he had
allowed for it.
- Syrian GDP more than doubled between 2005 and 2010.
The murky reality
- Below the surface, Syria did experience problems
- Syrians had political, economical, and social complaints to the regime
- Politically, power still remained concentrated from the doings of Assad’s
father.
- Security, military and intelligence institutions were loyalists to
Assad’s father Hafez and these institutions were dominated by
members of the Alawites, who protected his regime and the power
holders.
- Bashar al-Assad made several changes to this autocratic structure
in Syria
- “Authoritarian upgrading” (Hinnebusch) (P44)
- Assad promoted family members to positions within the security
domain, and gave an increasing amount of key security positions
to Alawites, even more than his father had done
- Independent opposition to the regime remained forbidden
- Membership of the Muslim Brotherhood was punishable by death.
- If one insulted the president, they would disappear
,- To protect the state was the Mukhabarat, a set of intelligence agencies, who had
originally been provided training by East German Stasi, through interrogation and
torture techniques.
- Economically, Syria's population grew immensely between the 70’s and
the 90’s, where 55% of the population was under 24 in 2010.
- Hafez’s socialist educational policies resulted in vast state-funded
universities which resulted in higher qualifications for the youth,
but the country could offer no suitables jobs.
- Necessary annual economic growth for sufficient jobs to
arise was between 6-7%, but in reality it was 4.9%,
resulting in persistent unemployment.
- In reality it was estimated to be close to 20%
among the youth (p46)
- Assad’s shift to a social market economy was not too successful
- He wanted to gradually adopt market-led economics
without brutal abandonment of the welfare state
- State employment continued to employ 20-30% of
the population, but manufacturing was damaged by
the availability of Turkish goods that were available
from a new free trade agreement.
- Subsidies for manufacturing were removed
- Cost of diesel tripled overnight in May of
2008
- Rural decline was also increased by
a long-lasting drought between 2006
and 2010, which resulted from
mismanagement of water resources
for over 50 years prior.
- Lack of governmental
response
- Mass migration was a result of these economic problems,
and it is estimated that between 2001 and 2010, between
1.2 and 1.5 million Syrians migrated and settled in
unofficial camps or smaller cities.
- In 2010, 30% of Syrians lived below the poverty line, and 11%
below the subsistence level
- Only bare necessities in life.
- Wealth splits grew immensely, as more and more people migrated
to slums, and the rich became visibly richer.
- Corruption and nepotism (relative favoritism) grew more
and more blatant
- Socially, Syria's ethnic and sect diversity increased the complexity of the
social situation relative to that of other affected Arab states.
, - While Sunni peasants were suffering in shanty towns and slums,
Alawi migrants were rewarded with government jobs.
- Huge Sunni-Alawi division
- Fueled anti-Assad protests
Unrest Begins
- Technology was a contributing factor which allowed for instant information
- Allowed people to communicate “under the radar” or repressive regimes.
- Instant information led to knowledge about protests in for example Egypt,
and a group of teenagers were arrested for writing messages inspired by
Egyptian protests on their school in Daraa.
- Taken to Damascus and tortured
- Led to further protests resulting in 4 deaths
- These deaths led to further protests
The regime fights back
- Middle-class Syrians benefitted from Assad’s many reforms
- Lower class was negatively impacted as they were indirectly forced to live in
slums
- Some Alawites experienced material benefits from the regime’s patronage
- While many countries “coup-proofed” their countries, preventing military or security
services from overthrowing the government, officer corps remained loyal to the Regime
in Syria, from “coup-proofing” attempts from Assad’s father.
- Officer corps linked to the Assads or indebted.
- Prominent in Elite divisions.
- Military investments were focused on and reserved for these
loyalist divisions, to promote the regime.
- Mukhabarat
- Agencies within the Mukhabarat spied on each other and members of the
regime as well as the population and therefore, anyone who conspired
against the regime feared to be discovered.
- Key officials mysteriously disappeared throughout the years, some
suddenly retired, or were killed in mysterious circumstances.
- Even after 2011.
- Construction of a climate of fear from Assad.
Regime Violence
- Regime claimed that peaceful protesters were “armed gangs” to justify the use of force
- Maximum casualties per day was 109, as security forces and loyal military units
were deployed.
- Opposition demonstrators were killed, sparking more protests, resulting in more and
more deaths
- Protestors called the movement a revolution
- Arrests were usually arbitrary, in order to intimidate the general population
- The regime did however respond non-violently as well, through various meetings with
key figures
, - Assad lacked the ruthless decisiveness of his father, which was apparent in his ways of
dealing with the conflict, as experts have called “schizophrenic”.
The only option?
- 2 options available to Assad
- Following recommendations by hardliners
- Following recommendations of compromisers of his inner circle
- Although Assad claimed Syria would be immune to events in other Arab Spring nations,
Syria did in fact share many similar political, economical, and social problems that other
states experienced.
- Therefore, the unrest that emerged in 2011 was not completely surprising.
- Syrian regime was structured differently from those of Egypt and Tunisia who proved to
be weak with similar issues and therefore fell quickly
- Military was “coup-proofed”
- The uprising in Syria had spread sufficiently enough so that it could not be easily
contained by force, such as the uprising in Bahrain.
- Indecisiveness of Assad and his regime resulted in the deterrence of an
immediate hardline option (strict)
Conclusion
- Although Assad’s regime has not been able to reestablish the “wall of fear”, and the fact
that protests are out of control, it can still be argued that Assad has been able to
restructure his regime in the sense that he has gained the neutrality and loyalty of a
large portion of the population through “buy-ins”. The economic buy-ins include the fact
that Assad gave supporters of his regime economic benefits as well as threatened that
opposition would be executed or punished otherwise.
Van Dam (2017) Chapter 1
How was it possible that Syria ended up in a bloody sectarian war?
- Similarities between the Syrian war and earlier periods in which the Ba’th regime
repressed opposition, such as the split of the Mujahideen
- The scale of violence before and after the Syrian Revolution was different
- Before the revolution, opposition movements and insurgencies were centrally
suppressed in cities such as Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus
- After the revolution, most of the country has been involved in the conflict with the
regime.
- After the revolution, opposition started to receive assistance from abroad in
financial and military assets as well as political assistance.
- This developed the conflict into a proxy war
- Origins of the Syrian Revolution
- Structure and composition of the regime
- Dictatorship
- Strong domination by Alawi minority
- Their corruption
