-
01
1. Introduction to Corporate Law
1
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What is corporate law?
1
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02
Types of business organisations
1
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-Sole trader / proprietor
1
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-Partnership
1
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03
1.4 Private Company
2
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04
1.5 Public Company
2
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05
2. Main Legal Characteristics of a Corporation
3
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06
2.1 Legal Personality
3
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Nexus of contracts
3
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Separate patrimony
3
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07
Entity shielding
4
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1.Priority rule
4
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2.Liquidation protection rule
4
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08
3.Authority rule
4
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09
4.Procedure rule
4
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10
Separate legal personality
4
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11
2.2 Limited Liability
5
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12
Difference between entity shielding and limited liability
5
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-Entity shielding
5
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-Limited liability
5
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13
2.3 Transferable Shares
5
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14
Transferable ≠ freely tradable
5
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Transferable shares
5
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Freely tradable shares
5
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15
-
5
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16
-Public vs private corporations
6
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Public / open corporation
6
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Private / closed corporation
6
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17
-Closely held vs widely held corporations
6
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Closely held corporation
6
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Widely held corporation
6
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18
Importance of transferability
6
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19
2.4 Delegated Management with Board Structure
6
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20
Board of directors
7
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21
Separation between board and management
7
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-Board of directors
7
-
-Officers/managers
7
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22
2.5 Investor Ownership
7
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23
Other ownership forms
8
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-Partnerships
8
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24
3. Sources of Corporate Law
8
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25
3.1 National Corporate Codes
8
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26
3.2 Special and Partial Corporate Forms
8
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27
Quasi-corporate form
8
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28
3.3 Other Bodies of Law
9
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Securities law
9
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Stock exchange rules
9
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Bankruptcy / insolvency law
9
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Tax law
9
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Labour law
9
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29
4. Law vs Contract – Corporate Charter
9
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30
4.1 Mandatory Rules vs Default Rules
10
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Default rules
10
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Mandatory rules
10
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31
Either-or provisions
10
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32
4.2 Benefits of Legal Rules
10
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33
5. Choice of Legal Regime
11
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34
Incorporation doctrine (U.S.)
11
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35
Real seat doctrine
11
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36
Regulatory competition
11
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-Race to the bottom: Countries weaken protections to attract businesses.
11
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-Race to the top: Competition improves legal quality and protections.
11
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37
6.1 Goal of Corporate Law
11
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38
6.2 Forces Shaping Corporate Law
12
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39
Ownership structures
12
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U.S. and UK
12
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Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
12
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40
Institutional investors
12
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-Hedge funds
12
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41
1. Three Agency Problems
13
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42
Agency Problem – Definition
13
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43
Three Generic Agency Problems
13
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44
1.1 Shareholders vs Managers
13
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Agency relationship
13
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45
Goal of corporate law here
14
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Agency relationship
14
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46
Private Benefits of Control
14
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47
Important idea
14
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48
1.3 Corporation vs Other Stakeholders
14
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Agency relationship
14
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49
Multiple Principals
15
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50
Coordination Costs
15
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51
Important trade-off
15
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52
2. Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs
15
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53
Legal Strategy – Definition
15
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54
Two Categories of Legal Strategies
16
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1.Regulatory strategies
16
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2.Governance strategies
16
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55
2.1 Regulatory Strategies
16
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56
Characteristics
16
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57
Disclosure Requirement
16
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58
2.2 Governance Strategies
17
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59
Problem of coordination costs
17
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60
Difference Between Regulatory and Governance Strategies
17
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Regulatory strategies
17
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Governance strategies
17
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61
Important insight
17
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62
3. Legal Strategies Overview
17
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63
3.1 Rules and Standards
18
-
64
Rules
18
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65
Standards
18
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66
Characteristics of standards
18
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67
Insider Self-Dealing
18
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68
3.2 Setting the Terms of Entry and Exit
18
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69
-Entry Strategies: Aim → screen out opportunistic agents before investment occurs.
19
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70
-Exit Strategies: Allow principals to withdraw from the relationship.
19
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71
Appraisal Right: The right of shareholders to withdraw and receive the value of their shares under certain circumstances.
19
-
72
Transfer Rights: Shareholders may protect themselves by → selling their shares.
19
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73
3.3 Incentive Alignment Strategies
19
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74
Trusteeship Strategy
19
-
75
High-Powered vs Low-Powered Incentives
19
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-High-powered incentives
19
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-Low-powered incentives: Non-financial motivations.
19
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76
Independent Director
20
-
77
Auditors as Trustees
20
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78
Courts as Trustees
20
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79
Reward Strategy
20
-
80
Sharing Rule
20
-
81
Pay-for-Performance
20
-
82
Tension Between Trusteeship and Reward
20
-
83
3.4 Appointment Right Strategies – Selection and Removal
20
-
84
Importance of Appointment Rights
21
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85
Appointment rights help address:
21
-
86
3.5 Decision Right Strategies – Initiation and Ratification
21
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87
Ratification Rights
21
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88
Important limitation
21
-
89
4. Disclosure
21
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90
Prospectus Disclosure
21
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91
Periodic Financial Disclosure
22
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92
Ad Hoc Disclosure
22
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93
Related-Party Transactions
22
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94
Importance of Compliance
22
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95
Non-Disclosure
22
-
96
5.1 Compliance and Enforcement
22
-
97
Relationship Between Compliance and Enforcement
23
-
98
5.2 Enforcement and Intervention
23
-
99
-Regulatory Strategies
23
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100
-Governance Strategies
23
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101
5.3 Initiators of Enforcement
23
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102
5.3.1 Public Enforcement
24
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103
SEC: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC):
24
-
104
Limitation of Public Enforcement
24
-
105
5.3.2 Private Enforcement
24
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106
Private Enforcement Depends on Deterrence
24
-
107
5.3.3 Gatekeeper Control
24
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108
Role of Gatekeepers
24
-
109
Delegated Intervention
25
-
110
Ex Ante Constraint
25
-
111
6. Penalties
25
-
112
→ Types of Penalties:
25
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-Monetary penalties
25
-
113
-Important issue
25
-
114
Annulment of Corporate Decisions
25
-
115
Criminal Penalties
26
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116
Regulatory Penalties
26
-
117
Reputational Consequences
26
-
118
1. The Basic Governance Structure
26
-
119
-Investor Ownership
26
-
120
-
26
-
121
-Delegated Management
26
-
122
Governance vs Regulatory Strategies
27
-
123
Jurisdictions with Controlling Shareholders
27
-
124
Jurisdictions with Dispersed Ownership
27
-
125
Institutional Investors
27
-
126
1. Delegated Management and Corporate Boards
28
-
127
Why Delegation Exists
28
-
128
Main Task of the Board
28
-
129
1.1 One-Tier vs Two-Tier Board
28
-
130
One-Tier Board Structure
28
-
131
Characteristics
28
-
132
Two-Tier Board Structure
29
-
133
Supervisory Board
29
-
134
Management Board
29
-
135
Examples of Two-Tier Systems
29
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136
German Codetermination
29
-
137
Board Size
29
-
138
1.2 Appointment and Decision Rights
30
-
139
Appointment Rights
30
-
140
Decision Rights
30
-
141
1.2.1 Appointing Directors
30
-
142
Nomination of Directors
30
-
143
Typical Situation
30
-
144
Minority Representation
31
-
145
Contested Elections
31
-
146
U.S. – Plurality Vote
31
-
147
Proxy Access
31
-
148
Proxy Materials
31
-
149
1.2.2 Removing Directors
31
-
150
Importance: Combined with the ability to call shareholder meetings→ removal rights strongly reduce agency costs.
32
-
151
Germany
32
-
152
U.S.
32
-
153
Staggered Boards
32
-
154
Importance of Director Terms
32
-
155
Examples of Director Terms
32
-
156
1.3 Decision Rights
32
-
157
Shareholders Receive Mandatory Decision Rights When:
33
-
1. Directors have conflicts of interest
33
-
2. Governance structure changes
33
-
3. Fundamental transactions occur
33
-
158
Shareholder Approval
33
-
159
EU Rules
33
-
160
UK
33
-
161
Brazil
33
-
162
Continental Europe and Japan
34
-
163
Delaware (U.S.)
34
-
164
Private Companies
34
-
165
GmbH Example
34
-
166
Derivative Actions
34
-
167
1.4 Shareholder Coordination
34
-
168
2. Agent Incentives
35
-
169
2.1 Trusteeship Strategy – Independent Directors
35
-
170
Why Independent Directors Matter
35
-
171
→ Executive vs Non-Executive Directors
35
-
-Executive directors
35
-
-Non-executive directors
35
-
172
Independent Director – Definition
35
-
173
Board Committees
36
-
174
U.S. Approach
36
-
175
Sarbanes-Oxley & Dodd-Frank
36
-
176
EU Approach
36
-
177
Corporate Governance Codes
36
-
178
2.2 Reward Strategy – Executive Compensation
37
-
179
Important Idea
37
-
180
Equity-Based Compensation
37
-
181
U.S. Approach
37
-
182
Say on Pay
37
-
183
Other Jurisdictions
37
-
184
Reasons
38
-
-UK
38
-
-Japan
38
-
-Continental Europe
38
-
185
3. Legal Constraints and Affiliation Rights
38
-
186
Fiduciary Duties
38
-
187
Affiliation Rights
38
-
188
3.1 Constraints Strategy – Duty of Care
38
-
189
Difficulty of Defining Reasonable Care
39
-
190
Judicial Deference
39
-
191
Business Judgment Rule
39
-
192
U.S. Approach
39
-
193
D&O Insurance
39
-
194
Why Courts Show Deference: 2 main reasons:
39
-
195
1. Judges lack business expertise: Risk of hindsight bias.
39
-
2.Excessive liability discourages risk-taking: Managers may avoid profitable but risky projects.
39
-
196
3.2 Corporate Governance Related Disclosure
40
-
197
Governance-Related Disclosure Includes:
40
-
198
-Direct Contribution of Disclosure
40
-
199
-Indirect Contribution of Disclosure
40
-
200
4. Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies
40
-
201
Trade-Off
40
-
202
4.1 Protecting Minority Shareholders
41
-
203
Minority Appointment Rights
41
-
204
Techniques Protecting Minority Shareholders
41
-
205
Cumulative Voting
41
-
206
One-Share-One-Vote Principle
41
-
207
Deviations from One-Share-One-Vote
41
-
208
Germany and Brazil
42
-
209
Fidelity Shares
42
-
210
Purpose of Fidelity Shares
42
-
211
Vote Capping
42
-
212
1. Protecting Minority Shareholders
43
-
213
1.2 Protecting Minority Shareholders – Decision Rights
43
-
Why?
43
-
Derivative Actions
43
-
Fundamental Corporate Decisions
44
-
Blocking Rights
44
-
U.S. and Brazil
44
-
214
1.3 Protecting Minority Shareholders – Incentive Strategies
44
-
215
1.3.1 Trusteeship Strategy and Independent Directors
44
-
Why Independent Directors Are Used
45
-
Reality: Independent Directors Are Not Fully Independent
45
-
Meaning of Independence
45
-
Important Trusteeship Mechanism: Board Approval
45
-
216
1.3.2 Equal Treatment Norm
46
-
Applies To
46
-
-Why Is Equal Treatment Important?
46
-
Jurisdictional Differences
46
-
217
1.4 Protecting Minority Shareholders – Constraints and Affiliation Rights
46
-
Duty of Loyalty
46
-
Oppression Standard
47
-
Abuse of Majority Voting: Occurs when majority shareholders use voting power to unfairly harm minority shareholders.
47
-
Affiliation Strategy – Mandatory Disclosure
47
-
218
1.5 Protecting Minority Shareholders – Exit Strategy
47
-
Limitation (This protection is incomplete)
47
-
219
2. Protecting Employees
47
-
Firm-Specific Human Capital
48
-
Hold-Up Problem
48
-
Employee Protection Strategies
48
-
-Disclosure Example
48
-
220
2.1 Appointment and Decision Rights Strategies
48
-
France: Employee board representation exists in some situations.
48
-
Germany – Quasi-Parity Codetermination
49
-
221
Work Councils
49
-
Germany
49
-
EU Approach
49
-
222
2.2 Incentives and Constraints Strategies
50
-
Incentives Are Less Important
50
-
Independent Directors
50
-
Equal Sharing Norm: Provides no significant direct protection to employees.
50
-
Employee Stock Ownership: Employees may become shareholders.
50
-
Main Insight: Most employee protection comes from: labour law, not corporate law.
50
-
223
3. Protecting External Constituencies
50
-
Why Protection Is Needed
50
-
Corporate Form and Social Harm
51
-
Role of Limited Liability
51
-
Why Third Parties Need Protection
51
-
Main Insight
51
-
224
3.1 Affiliation Strategies
51
-
Non-Financial Disclosure = Disclosure of information that is socially important but not necessarily financially important.
51
-
Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Rule
51
-
EU Non-Financial Disclosure
52
-
Japan
52
-
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure
52
-
225
3.2 Appointment and Decision Rights Strategies
52
-
Exception: Golden Shares: (Special shares granting governments special powers.)
52
-
Diversity Requirements: Some jurisdictions impose board quotas.
52
-
State Decision Rights: Governments may receive special veto powers.
52
-
226
3.3 Incentives and Constraints Strategies
53
-
Duties to Consider Stakeholders
53
-
Oversight Liability
53
-
Personal Liability of Directors
53
-
227
1. Transactions with Creditors
53
-
228
Creditors' Dual Role
54
-
-Normal Situation
54
-
229
1.1 Asset Partitioning and Corporate Creditors
54
-
1.Entity Shielding
54
-
2.Limited Liability (Owner Shielding)
54
-
→ Why Is Asset Partitioning Important?
54
-
Corporate Groups
54
-
230
1.2.1 Shareholder-Creditor Agency Problems
55
-
Ex Ante Problems
55
-
Ex Post Problems
55
-
What Influences These Agency Problems?
55
-
Debt Covenants
55
-
Using Entity Shielding
55
-
231
1.2.2 Vicinity of Insolvency
56
-
Goal of the Law
56
-
232
1.2.3 Groups
56
-
-Benefits: Groups allow efficient allocation of credit risk.
56
-
-Problems: Groups create additional shareholder-creditor agency problems.
56
-
233
1.2.4 Externalities
56
-
Non-Adjusting Creditors
56
-
Why Is This A Problem?
56
-
Solution
57
-
234
2. Creditor-Creditor Coordination Problems
57
-
Problem
57
-
Individual Action
57
-
Collective Action
57
-
Core Function of Bankruptcy Law
57
-
235
2.1 Bankruptcy Basics
57
-
Main Effect: Individual rights become part of a collective procedure.
57
-
During Bankruptcy
57
-
Crisis Manager
58
-
236
2.2 Different Types of Bankruptcy
58
-
-Liquidation
58
-
-Reorganisation
58
-
237
2.3 Choosing the Bankruptcy Procedure
58
-
Why?
58
-
238
PART I – SOLVENT FIRMS
59
-
1. Solvent Firms
59
-
239
1.1 The Affiliation Strategy – Mandatory Disclosure
59
-
Why is disclosure important?
59
-
Large Creditors vs Small Creditors
59
-
Corporate Law Disclosure
60
-
Why Is Disclosure More Important for Public Investors?
60
-
240
1.1.1 Closely Held Corporations
60
-
Main Source of Finance (usually banks)
60
-
U.S.
61
-
Europe
61
-
241
1.1.2 Publicly Traded Corporations
61
-
Material Information
61
-
U.S.
61
-
EU
61
-
242
1.1.3 Groups
61
-
Why Are Groups Problematic?
61
-
Solution: Consolidated Accounts
62
-
243
1.1.4 The Role of Gatekeepers
62
-
Gatekeepers
62
-
Auditors
62
-
Enron Scandal
62
-
Credit Bureaus
62
-
Credit Rating Agencies
63
-
Financial Crisis Lesson
63
-
244
1.2 The Rules Strategy – Legal Capital
63
-
245
1.2.1 Minimum Capital
63
-
EU
63
-
Limitation
63
-
Private Companies
63
-
246
1.2.2 Distribution Restrictions
64
-
Asset Dilution
64
-
Distribution Restrictions
64
-
Opt-In Theory
64
-
Disguised Distributions
64
-
247
1.2.3 Loss of Capital
64
-
EU Rule
64
-
France
64
-
Italy
65
-
Germany
65
-
248
PART II – RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS
65
-
249
What Are Related-Party Transactions?
65
-
-Type 1: Direct Transactions with the Corporation
65
-
250
Traditional Self-Dealing
66
-
Examples
66
-
Company Guarantees
66
-
251
Compensation Agreements
66
-
Why Can Excessive Compensation Occur?
66
-
252
Corporate Opportunities
66
-
253
Insider Trading
66
-
254
Why Are Related-Party Transactions Allowed?
66
-
Reasons
67
-
Exam Note
67
-
255
2.Legal Strategies for Related-Party Transactions
67
-
256
2.1 Affiliation Strategy – Mandatory Disclosure
67
-
Why Is Disclosure Effective?
67
-
Additional Benefit
67
-
257
Disclosure of Self-Dealing
68
-
258
Disclosure of Compensation
68
-
259
Disclosure of Share Trading
68
-
260
2.2 Affiliation Strategy – Dissolution and Exit Rights
68
-
Dissolution Rights
68
-
Exit Rights
68
-
261
2.3 Agent Incentive Strategies
68
-
Letting the Board Decide
68
-
Possible Mechanisms
69
-
Executive Compensation
69
-
Corporate Opportunities
69
-
262
2.4 Decision Rights Strategy – Shareholder Voting
69
-
Problem
69
-
Majority of the Minority
69
-
Say-on-Pay
69
-
263
2.5 Rules Strategy – Prohibiting Conflicted Transactions
70
-
Loans to Directors
70
-
→Insider Trading Restrictions
70
-
Sanctions
70
-
264
2.6 Standards Strategy – Duty of Loyalty
70
-
Duty of Loyalty
70
-
Delaware Approach
71
-
Italy
71
-
→ Connection with Trusteeship
71
-
Controlling Shareholders
71
-
265
Groups
71
-
France
71
-
266
Introduction
72
-
Why Are Fundamental Changes Regulated?
72
-
267
1. What Are Fundamental Changes?
72
-
Three Characteristics of Fundamental Changes
72
-
1.Size of the Transaction
72
-
Transactions Receiving Special Scrutiny
73
-
268
2. Charter Amendments
73
-
What Is the Corporate Charter?
73
-
Why Are Charter Amendments Important?
74
-
Main Regulatory Strategy:
74
-
269
-Delaware System requires:
74
-
Board Initiative AND Majority of Outstanding Shares
74
-
270
-European and Japanese System requires:
74
-
Supermajority Shareholder Vote
74
-
Entrenchment
74
-
Why Is Entrenchment Valuable?
75
-
271
Scope of the Charter
75
-
Examples
75
-
272
2.1 Management–Shareholder Conflict
75
-
Managerial Entrenchment
75
-
273
2.2 Majority–Minority Shareholder Conflict
75
-
-Class Voting
76
-
→ Why Important?
76
-
-Standards Strategy
76
-
-Appraisal Rights
76
-
-Dual-Class Capital Structure
76
-
274
3. Share Issuance
76
-
Why Is Share Issuance Important?
76
-
275
3.1 Management–Shareholder Conflict
77
-
-Dilution
77
-
-Authorized Capital
77
-
-Issued and Outstanding Shares
77
-
276
3.2 Majority–Minority Shareholder Conflict
77
-
-Sharing Strategy – Pre-Emptive Rights
77
-
277
4. Mergers and Divisions
78
-
-Merger
78
-
→ Problems Created by Mergers
78
-
Exchange Ratio
78
-
Why Important?
78
-
Main Protection: Decision Rights Strategy
79
-
278
4.1 Management–Shareholder Conflict in Mergers
79
-
279
4.1.1 Managerial Entrenchment
79
-
Solutions:
79
-
280
4.1.2 Managerial Nest-Feathering
79
-
Solutions:
79
-
Appraisal Remedy
79
-
281
4.2 Majority–Minority Shareholder Conflict in Mergers
80
-
Solution:
80
-
282
4.3 Protection of Non-Shareholder Constituencies
80
-
283
4.3.1 Protection of Creditors
80
-
Brazil: Creditors harmed by the merger may seek annulment.
80
-
EU and Japan: Creditors may demand: Adequate Safeguards
80
-
284
4.3.2 Protection of Employees
80
-
1. Voice; Can employees participate in the merger process?
81
-
2. Protection of Acquired Rights: Do employees keep their existing rights after the merger?
81
-
-Voice
81
-
-Protection of Acquired Rights
81
-
285
4.4 Corporate Divisions
81
-
Protection of Creditors
81
-
Protection of Employees
81
-
286
5. Reincorporation
81
-
Why Is It Important?
82
-
EU Protection
82
-
Important Principle
82
-
287
6. Conversion
82
-
Examples
82
-
Why Is It Important?
82
-
Main Protection
83
-
288
Introduction – What Are Control Transactions?
83
-
Why Is This Chapter Different?
83
-
289
Ways Control Can Be Acquired
83
-
290
1.Sale of Control
83
-
2. Market Purchases
83
-
3. Public Takeover Offer (Tender Offer)
83
-
Friendly Takeover
83
-
Hostile Takeover
84
-
291
1. Regulatory Problems in Control Transactions
84
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1.Agency Problems: conflicts of interest
84
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2. Coordination Problems: Difficulties for shareholders to coordinate their decisions.
84
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292
1.2.1 Agency Conflicts
84
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293
A. Widely Held Corporation
84
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Why?
84
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294
Defensive Measures
84
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Examples
85
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295
Opposite Problem
85
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296
B. Controlled Corporation
85
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297
1.2.2 Coordination Problems
85
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Why? Shareholders act individually.
85
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298
1.2.3 Non-Shareholder Agency Problems
86
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Three Responses
86
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299
2. Agency Problems in Control Transactions
86
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300
2.2 The No Frustration Rule
86
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Board Neutrality Rule
87
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What Cannot Be Done?
87
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301
Important Exam Point
87
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What the Board May Still Do:
87
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302
-White Knight (One of the most tested concepts.)
87
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303
2.3 Joint Decision-Making
88
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Result
88
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304
Poison Pill
88
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Result: massive dilllution
88
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305
Controlling Management's Defensive Powers
88
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306
2.3.2 Standards Strategy
89
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307
2.3.3 Removal Rights
89
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Proxy Fight
89
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308
2.3.4 Trusteeship Strategy
89
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Examples
89
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-Independent Advice / Fairness Opinion(Very important concept)
89
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309
2.3.5 Rewards Strategy
89
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How?
89
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Purpose: Reduce management's incentive to block the takeover.
90
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310
2.4 Pre-Bid Defensive Measures
90
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Examples:
90
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311
3. Coordination Problems Among Shareholders
91
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312
3.1 Disclosure
91
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Why? : Shareholders need information.
91
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→ Disclosure by Both Parties:
91
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Purpose: Reduce information asymmetry.
91
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313
Offer Period
91
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314
3.2 Trusteeship Strategy
91
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Purpose
92
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315
3.3 Sharing Strategy – Equal Treatment Principle
92
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Consequences
92
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Purpose: Prevent pressure and discrimination.
92
-
316
3.4 Mandatory Bid Rule
92
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Control Threshold
92
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Purpose: Allow minority shareholders to share in the control premium.
92
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Typical Rule: Offer must be made at: the highest price paid by the acquirer.
92
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317
3.5 Acquisitions of Non-Accepting Minorities
92
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318
-Squeeze-Out
93
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Purpose: Prevent holdout behaviour.
93
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319
-Sell-Out Right: The opposite protection.
93
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Purpose: Protect minority shareholders from being trapped under a new controller.
93
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320
WHAT I THINK IS MOST LIKELY TO APPEAR ON THE REAL EXAM
93
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Lecture 1
93
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Lecture 2
93
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Lecture 4
94
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Lecture 5
94
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Lecture 6–7
94