UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA (UNISA)
College of Law — Department of Criminology and Security Science
⋄
Industrial Security in Practice
Assignment 2 — Semester 2, 2026
⋄
Module Code: SEP2602
Module Name: Industrial Security in Practice
Assignment No.: Assignment 2
Due Date: 1 September 2026
Semester: Semester 2, 2026
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for SEP2602: Industrial Security in Practice
at the University of South Africa.
, UNISA | SEP2602 Industrial Security in Practice — Assignment 2
Question 1: The Security Setup at ISAGO Tobacco Company
The presence of security equipment at a facility does not, by itself, secure that facility. A
device only reduces risk when it functions reliably, covers the areas that actually matter, and
is supported by personnel who act on the information it produces. Sennewald and Baillie
(2016) describe this as layered security: several complementary controls working together to
prevent, detect, delay and respond to incidents, so that the failure of any single measure does
not leave the site exposed. The ISAGO case is a useful illustration of this principle because
it forces an assessment of four separate control types, namely CCTV, alarms, turnstiles and
access control, rather than treating "security" as one undifferentiated system.
1.1 CCTV
Closed-circuit television performs four related functions at ISAGO: deterrence, real-time mon-
itoring, detection of suspicious behaviour, and the creation of evidence after an incident has
already occurred. Cameras stationed at entrances, exits, production areas and storage points
extend the visual reach of the security department to locations that officers cannot watch in
person at every moment.
The system becomes ineffective under three conditions that are common in poorly managed
installations: blind spots created by incomplete coverage, ageing or malfunctioning hardware,
and footage that is recorded but never actively watched. A camera pointed at the wrong angle
has no preventive value even if it is technically operational, and recorded footage of a theft
is of limited use if no one reviews it until long after the offender has left the premises. Where
any of these conditions apply at ISAGO, the CCTV function should be treated as a paper exer-
cise rather than a working control.
Improvement requires a formal coverage audit to identify blind spots, replacement of out-
dated cameras with higher-resolution units at vulnerable points, a maintenance and testing
schedule, continuous or risk-based monitoring from the control room, an adequate footage
retention period to support later investigation, and integration with the alarm and access-
control systems so that an alarm trigger automatically calls up the relevant camera feed. The
underlying lesson is that CCTV is a surveillance process, not a piece of hardware that can be
installed once and forgotten.
Page 1 of 12
College of Law — Department of Criminology and Security Science
⋄
Industrial Security in Practice
Assignment 2 — Semester 2, 2026
⋄
Module Code: SEP2602
Module Name: Industrial Security in Practice
Assignment No.: Assignment 2
Due Date: 1 September 2026
Semester: Semester 2, 2026
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for SEP2602: Industrial Security in Practice
at the University of South Africa.
, UNISA | SEP2602 Industrial Security in Practice — Assignment 2
Question 1: The Security Setup at ISAGO Tobacco Company
The presence of security equipment at a facility does not, by itself, secure that facility. A
device only reduces risk when it functions reliably, covers the areas that actually matter, and
is supported by personnel who act on the information it produces. Sennewald and Baillie
(2016) describe this as layered security: several complementary controls working together to
prevent, detect, delay and respond to incidents, so that the failure of any single measure does
not leave the site exposed. The ISAGO case is a useful illustration of this principle because
it forces an assessment of four separate control types, namely CCTV, alarms, turnstiles and
access control, rather than treating "security" as one undifferentiated system.
1.1 CCTV
Closed-circuit television performs four related functions at ISAGO: deterrence, real-time mon-
itoring, detection of suspicious behaviour, and the creation of evidence after an incident has
already occurred. Cameras stationed at entrances, exits, production areas and storage points
extend the visual reach of the security department to locations that officers cannot watch in
person at every moment.
The system becomes ineffective under three conditions that are common in poorly managed
installations: blind spots created by incomplete coverage, ageing or malfunctioning hardware,
and footage that is recorded but never actively watched. A camera pointed at the wrong angle
has no preventive value even if it is technically operational, and recorded footage of a theft
is of limited use if no one reviews it until long after the offender has left the premises. Where
any of these conditions apply at ISAGO, the CCTV function should be treated as a paper exer-
cise rather than a working control.
Improvement requires a formal coverage audit to identify blind spots, replacement of out-
dated cameras with higher-resolution units at vulnerable points, a maintenance and testing
schedule, continuous or risk-based monitoring from the control room, an adequate footage
retention period to support later investigation, and integration with the alarm and access-
control systems so that an alarm trigger automatically calls up the relevant camera feed. The
underlying lesson is that CCTV is a surveillance process, not a piece of hardware that can be
installed once and forgotten.
Page 1 of 12
