, CRW2601 Assignment 1 (COMPLETE ANSWERS)
Semester 2 2026 - DUE 27 August 2026; 100% Correct
solutions and explanations.
(a) Whether X committed an act [3]
For criminal liability, there must generally be a voluntary human act. Conduct
performed while a person is unconscious or in a state of automatism may be
regarded as involuntary and therefore does not constitute an act for purposes of
criminal liability.
In R v Schoonwinkel 1953 (3) SA 136 (C), the accused suffered an epileptic fit
while driving and his mind became a blank. The court held that, because he could
not control his conduct during the fit and there was insufficient evidence that he
should reasonably have foreseen the danger, he was not criminally responsible.
The facts concerning X, however, are different. X had knowingly suffered epileptic
fits for five years. Although she had been free from seizures for six months, she
knew that she was epileptic and that another fit was possible. Her decision to take
and drive the motor vehicle was a conscious and voluntary act. The subsequent
seizure may have rendered her driving involuntary at that particular moment, but
her earlier voluntary decision to drive is relevant. This situation is closer to R v
Victor 1943 TPD 77, where the accused's known physical condition made driving
dangerous.
Therefore, X did commit a voluntary act capable of giving rise to criminal
liability, although her ultimate liability will depend on the other elements of the
offence.
(b) Factual and legal causation [7]
The factual causation enquiry is determined by the conditio sine qua non or “but-
for” test. The question is whether Y would have died but for X's conduct. But for
X's driving and the collision, Y would not have sustained the injuries requiring
hospital treatment. Therefore, X's conduct was a factual cause of Y's death.
However, legal causation requires a sufficiently close link between the accused's
conduct and the ultimate consequence. In S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A), the
victim had recovered after being injured and was given medical instructions, but
unreasonably failed to follow them. He subsequently developed pressure sores and
Semester 2 2026 - DUE 27 August 2026; 100% Correct
solutions and explanations.
(a) Whether X committed an act [3]
For criminal liability, there must generally be a voluntary human act. Conduct
performed while a person is unconscious or in a state of automatism may be
regarded as involuntary and therefore does not constitute an act for purposes of
criminal liability.
In R v Schoonwinkel 1953 (3) SA 136 (C), the accused suffered an epileptic fit
while driving and his mind became a blank. The court held that, because he could
not control his conduct during the fit and there was insufficient evidence that he
should reasonably have foreseen the danger, he was not criminally responsible.
The facts concerning X, however, are different. X had knowingly suffered epileptic
fits for five years. Although she had been free from seizures for six months, she
knew that she was epileptic and that another fit was possible. Her decision to take
and drive the motor vehicle was a conscious and voluntary act. The subsequent
seizure may have rendered her driving involuntary at that particular moment, but
her earlier voluntary decision to drive is relevant. This situation is closer to R v
Victor 1943 TPD 77, where the accused's known physical condition made driving
dangerous.
Therefore, X did commit a voluntary act capable of giving rise to criminal
liability, although her ultimate liability will depend on the other elements of the
offence.
(b) Factual and legal causation [7]
The factual causation enquiry is determined by the conditio sine qua non or “but-
for” test. The question is whether Y would have died but for X's conduct. But for
X's driving and the collision, Y would not have sustained the injuries requiring
hospital treatment. Therefore, X's conduct was a factual cause of Y's death.
However, legal causation requires a sufficiently close link between the accused's
conduct and the ultimate consequence. In S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A), the
victim had recovered after being injured and was given medical instructions, but
unreasonably failed to follow them. He subsequently developed pressure sores and
