IS SUBSTANCE DUALISM AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE MIND?
(25 marks)
Notes: LOA = line of argument, CR = crucial reason, paragraph structure: point,
argument (against), counter argument, (response), evaluation. (In some paragraphs I
included more arguments and counter arguments than necessary, and highlighted those
in grey. You can still include them all like I did, or choose which you prefer to write
about).
LOA: No, substance dualism is not a strong theory
CR: The interaction problems (suggest that physicalism is a better theory)
INTRO: Substance Dualism is the theory that two types of substances
exist: the mental and the physical. In Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism, he
calls these Res Extensa (which is the physical) and Res Cogitans (which is
the mental). This belief that the mind is separate and independent from
the body is common in religious belief, where the mind can live on after
the body dies. It is also supported by the indivisibility and conceivability
arguments. However, both of these arguments have strong objections,
and substance dualism as a whole, faces the challenge of explaining how
the mind and body can interact, as shown through the conceptual and
empirical interaction problems. Therefore, I will argue that substance
dualism is an unconvincing theory, and an inaccurate account of the mind.
The crucial reason for this is the interaction problems, which highlight how
mental causation threatens dualism, suggesting that physicalism is the
more probable and accurate account of the mind.
PARA 1 - PROBLEMS WITH INDIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT:
P) Outline indivisibility argument + Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibility of
identicals
A) The mind is divisible (mental disorders/conscious vs subconscious)
C) Descartes: This is functional, not spatial divisibility
A) Physical substance is not always divisible (e.g. magnetic/electric fields)
C) It is still conceptually divisible, even if not practically possible
A) Assumption that the mind is a substance (it could be a property) >
temperature example
E) Indivisibility argument fails due to the unjustified assumption that the
mind is a substance
PARA 2 – PROBLEMS WITH CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT:
P) Outline Descartes’ conceivability argument
A) Mind and body existing independently is NOT conceivable (e.g.
behaviourism)
C) Behaviourism is flawed and counter-intuitive (e.g. God is conceivable)
A) Conceivability doesn’t entail metaphysical possibility (H2O and Masked
Man examples)
C) Descartes: in the Masked Man example, the idea is not clear and
distinct
, E) Conceivability argument fails, since its inference from logical to
metaphysical possibility is not justified (shown through the H2O example)
PARA 3 – PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL
INTERACTION PROBLEMS (CR):
P) Outline conceptual interaction problem
A) Descartes: physical substances don’t always need push (e.g. gravity)
C) Physical substances still require a force in order to be put into motion
(+issue of pain)
P) Outline empirical interaction problem (law of conservation of mass)
E) Conceptual and empirical interaction problems are crucial counter
arguments, suggesting substance dualism is not an accurate account of
the mind
CONCLUSION: In conclusion, substance dualism is not a convincing
account of the mind, because both of Descartes’ arguments for it are
flawed. The indivisibility argument makes the unjustified assumption that
the mind is a substance, while the conceivability argument incorrectly
infers that conceivability (logical possibility) entails metaphysical
possibility. The crucial reason for the failure of substance dualism is the
interaction problem, where both the conceptual and empirical problem
show that mental causation is a crucial issue for substance dualism. The
theory fails to explain how it is possible that the mind could cause a
physical effect, which it clearly does. This suggests that physicalism is a
better account of the mind than Descartes’ substance dualism.
IS SUBSTANCE DUALISM AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE MIND?
(25 marks)
Substance Dualism is the theory that two types of substances exist: the
mental and the physical. In Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism, he calls these
Res Extensa (which is the physical) and Res Cogitans (which is the
mental). This belief that the mind is separate and independent from the
body is common in religious belief, where the mind can live on after the
body dies. It is also supported by the indivisibility and conceivability
arguments. However, both of these arguments have strong objections,
and substance dualism as a whole, faces the challenge of explaining how
the mind and body can interact, as shown through the conceptual and
empirical interaction problems. Therefore, I will argue that substance
dualism is an unconvincing theory, and an inaccurate account of the mind.
The crucial reason for this is the interaction problems, which highlight how
mental causation threatens dualism, suggesting that physicalism is the
more probable and accurate account of the mind.
Descartes’ indivisibility argument makes a case for substance dualism, by
using Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibility of identicals. Leibniz claims that
(25 marks)
Notes: LOA = line of argument, CR = crucial reason, paragraph structure: point,
argument (against), counter argument, (response), evaluation. (In some paragraphs I
included more arguments and counter arguments than necessary, and highlighted those
in grey. You can still include them all like I did, or choose which you prefer to write
about).
LOA: No, substance dualism is not a strong theory
CR: The interaction problems (suggest that physicalism is a better theory)
INTRO: Substance Dualism is the theory that two types of substances
exist: the mental and the physical. In Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism, he
calls these Res Extensa (which is the physical) and Res Cogitans (which is
the mental). This belief that the mind is separate and independent from
the body is common in religious belief, where the mind can live on after
the body dies. It is also supported by the indivisibility and conceivability
arguments. However, both of these arguments have strong objections,
and substance dualism as a whole, faces the challenge of explaining how
the mind and body can interact, as shown through the conceptual and
empirical interaction problems. Therefore, I will argue that substance
dualism is an unconvincing theory, and an inaccurate account of the mind.
The crucial reason for this is the interaction problems, which highlight how
mental causation threatens dualism, suggesting that physicalism is the
more probable and accurate account of the mind.
PARA 1 - PROBLEMS WITH INDIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT:
P) Outline indivisibility argument + Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibility of
identicals
A) The mind is divisible (mental disorders/conscious vs subconscious)
C) Descartes: This is functional, not spatial divisibility
A) Physical substance is not always divisible (e.g. magnetic/electric fields)
C) It is still conceptually divisible, even if not practically possible
A) Assumption that the mind is a substance (it could be a property) >
temperature example
E) Indivisibility argument fails due to the unjustified assumption that the
mind is a substance
PARA 2 – PROBLEMS WITH CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT:
P) Outline Descartes’ conceivability argument
A) Mind and body existing independently is NOT conceivable (e.g.
behaviourism)
C) Behaviourism is flawed and counter-intuitive (e.g. God is conceivable)
A) Conceivability doesn’t entail metaphysical possibility (H2O and Masked
Man examples)
C) Descartes: in the Masked Man example, the idea is not clear and
distinct
, E) Conceivability argument fails, since its inference from logical to
metaphysical possibility is not justified (shown through the H2O example)
PARA 3 – PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL
INTERACTION PROBLEMS (CR):
P) Outline conceptual interaction problem
A) Descartes: physical substances don’t always need push (e.g. gravity)
C) Physical substances still require a force in order to be put into motion
(+issue of pain)
P) Outline empirical interaction problem (law of conservation of mass)
E) Conceptual and empirical interaction problems are crucial counter
arguments, suggesting substance dualism is not an accurate account of
the mind
CONCLUSION: In conclusion, substance dualism is not a convincing
account of the mind, because both of Descartes’ arguments for it are
flawed. The indivisibility argument makes the unjustified assumption that
the mind is a substance, while the conceivability argument incorrectly
infers that conceivability (logical possibility) entails metaphysical
possibility. The crucial reason for the failure of substance dualism is the
interaction problem, where both the conceptual and empirical problem
show that mental causation is a crucial issue for substance dualism. The
theory fails to explain how it is possible that the mind could cause a
physical effect, which it clearly does. This suggests that physicalism is a
better account of the mind than Descartes’ substance dualism.
IS SUBSTANCE DUALISM AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE MIND?
(25 marks)
Substance Dualism is the theory that two types of substances exist: the
mental and the physical. In Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism, he calls these
Res Extensa (which is the physical) and Res Cogitans (which is the
mental). This belief that the mind is separate and independent from the
body is common in religious belief, where the mind can live on after the
body dies. It is also supported by the indivisibility and conceivability
arguments. However, both of these arguments have strong objections,
and substance dualism as a whole, faces the challenge of explaining how
the mind and body can interact, as shown through the conceptual and
empirical interaction problems. Therefore, I will argue that substance
dualism is an unconvincing theory, and an inaccurate account of the mind.
The crucial reason for this is the interaction problems, which highlight how
mental causation threatens dualism, suggesting that physicalism is the
more probable and accurate account of the mind.
Descartes’ indivisibility argument makes a case for substance dualism, by
using Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibility of identicals. Leibniz claims that
