SECOND READING
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-02_Issue-4/
lauterbach_e.pdf
According to constructivists, the United States went to war in Iraq because the dominant strategic
cultural norm, that of seeking geopolitical stability through multilateral deterrence, appeared
bankrupt to the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11)
For constructivists, a proposed normative shift in American strategic cultural ideas played a causal
role in the US invasion of Iraq
revolutionary strategy stressing preventive war as part of a larger strategic cultural vision advocating
the hegemonic promotion of democracy through force. Thus, the newly proposed norm of
preventive hegemonic war and forceful democratization sought to alter American national security
policy making by replacing the dominant Cold War normative paradigm. This endeavor appears to
have failed.
For those constructivists who take an ambitious perspective, the attempt to shift the norms of
America’s strategic culture—and thus its national security policy—precipitated that invasion.
A more cautious analyst would contend that the normative shift advocated by the Bush
administration worked in tandem with interest-based calculations, such as geopolitical logic, in
leading to that military action.
The Iraq War was supposed to prove the viability of a new norm—unilateral preventive war
DEFINING STRATEGIC CULTURE
Stratefic culture as a cause of Iraq war
For constructivists, cultural influences that constitute strategic culture are thus a set of norms.
Kerry Longhurst’s definition of strategic culture is of great utility to constructivists in particular: “a
distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective
[usually a nation] and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process.”
For constructivists, his definition identifies the relationship in strategic culture between the key actor
of norm entrepreneurs and the sets of norms that constitute strategic culture. Moreover, Longhurst
believes that strategic culture “is not permanent or static,” + opens the door to the means by which
normative strategic cultural ideas ensure both continuity (in foreign policy) in and define attempts to
change national security policies, as with the effort to replace the Cold War paradigm with the
messianic Wilsonian option offered by neoconservatives in the run-up to the Iraq War
CONSTRUCTISM + STRATEGIC CULTURE
The first central proposition of the constructivist vision of strategic culture is that, contrary to
materialist analyses of international security, ideals in the form of norms like those that constitute
strategic culture create and define interests. That is, norm entrepreneurs build a coalition of support
that advocates the diffusion of new proposed norms.
For constructivists, their study of international relations and foreign policy concentrates on both
“international normative structures and their effects” and the “interaction between international
structures and local agents of change” in regard to the formulative “origins and dynamics of these
norms.” For these scholars, “ideational, rather than material factors, explain particular national
, security policies.” Specifically, “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural
factors.”
interest formation stems from a “logic of appropriateness” as opposed to “logic of consequences”;
before people can maximize benefits and minimize costs, they must first know either what they
want or what they believe they should do
Norms and sets of norms that compose social structures determine the proper means for pursuing
interests and defining what should constitute ends. Consequently, independent variables associated
with interests, such as the neorealist conception of anarchy, are actually dependent variables that
can be created, modified, and replaced by variables representing the rise of new strategic cultural
norms (CONTRIBUTION)
- CONTRIBUTION The ideas of strategic culture expressed in norms play a central role in
national security outcomes for constructivists, a factor they view as neglected by interest-
based analyses like those of the neorealists
the norms that make up strategic culture are dynamic and malleable, making them responsive to
catalytic or traumatic changes in the larger normative social structures that make up
international society. Diffusion of fresh normative suggestions:
- is made possible by “ecological processes result[ing] from the patterned interaction of actors
and their environment,” and “social process arguments [where] norm building take[s] the
form of generalizations about the way [actors] interact,” like “social diffusion.”
- also possible through catalytic events that discredit old social systems and allow for the rise
of new ones sponsored by norm entrepreneurs
Which proposed norms succeed and which fail depend upon “norm prominence” like
sponsorship by powerful states, “how well [the prospective norm] interacts with other prevailing
norms [in the] ‘normative environment’ and . . . what external environmental conditions
confront [it].” (THE ONE OF UNILATERAL PREVENTIVE WAR FAILED)
A potential international norm becomes a norm at the state or unit level when the “negotiated
reality” among elites and important groups leads to its acceptance via persuasive discourse.18
International pressure in support of the proposed international norm then builds over time as
state and nonstate actors who support the prospective norm try to convince other states to
follow the new norm, leading to a “norm cascade” in which “norm internalization occurs” in
international society
For constructivists, attempts to change the norms that compose strategic culture are not just an
evolutionary process. A rapid normative shift in the strategic cultural paradigm is also possible if
international conditions lead to powerful actors becoming receptive to radical paradigm shifts in
national security policies, such as may have been the case among senior policy makers in the
Bush administration after 9/11
Constructivism and the Iraq War: A Starting Point for Analysis
Flibbert case is flawed no regard for role of policy makers higher ranks – neoconservative vs
senior policy makers (also proactive not only acceptiong what neoconservatives say –
geopolitical interests important too - lead to 1% policy of cheney i.e.)
Prior constructivist work explains the causes of the Iraq War in terms of the role played by
neoconservatives as policy entrepreneurs after 9/11
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-02_Issue-4/
lauterbach_e.pdf
According to constructivists, the United States went to war in Iraq because the dominant strategic
cultural norm, that of seeking geopolitical stability through multilateral deterrence, appeared
bankrupt to the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11)
For constructivists, a proposed normative shift in American strategic cultural ideas played a causal
role in the US invasion of Iraq
revolutionary strategy stressing preventive war as part of a larger strategic cultural vision advocating
the hegemonic promotion of democracy through force. Thus, the newly proposed norm of
preventive hegemonic war and forceful democratization sought to alter American national security
policy making by replacing the dominant Cold War normative paradigm. This endeavor appears to
have failed.
For those constructivists who take an ambitious perspective, the attempt to shift the norms of
America’s strategic culture—and thus its national security policy—precipitated that invasion.
A more cautious analyst would contend that the normative shift advocated by the Bush
administration worked in tandem with interest-based calculations, such as geopolitical logic, in
leading to that military action.
The Iraq War was supposed to prove the viability of a new norm—unilateral preventive war
DEFINING STRATEGIC CULTURE
Stratefic culture as a cause of Iraq war
For constructivists, cultural influences that constitute strategic culture are thus a set of norms.
Kerry Longhurst’s definition of strategic culture is of great utility to constructivists in particular: “a
distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective
[usually a nation] and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process.”
For constructivists, his definition identifies the relationship in strategic culture between the key actor
of norm entrepreneurs and the sets of norms that constitute strategic culture. Moreover, Longhurst
believes that strategic culture “is not permanent or static,” + opens the door to the means by which
normative strategic cultural ideas ensure both continuity (in foreign policy) in and define attempts to
change national security policies, as with the effort to replace the Cold War paradigm with the
messianic Wilsonian option offered by neoconservatives in the run-up to the Iraq War
CONSTRUCTISM + STRATEGIC CULTURE
The first central proposition of the constructivist vision of strategic culture is that, contrary to
materialist analyses of international security, ideals in the form of norms like those that constitute
strategic culture create and define interests. That is, norm entrepreneurs build a coalition of support
that advocates the diffusion of new proposed norms.
For constructivists, their study of international relations and foreign policy concentrates on both
“international normative structures and their effects” and the “interaction between international
structures and local agents of change” in regard to the formulative “origins and dynamics of these
norms.” For these scholars, “ideational, rather than material factors, explain particular national
, security policies.” Specifically, “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural
factors.”
interest formation stems from a “logic of appropriateness” as opposed to “logic of consequences”;
before people can maximize benefits and minimize costs, they must first know either what they
want or what they believe they should do
Norms and sets of norms that compose social structures determine the proper means for pursuing
interests and defining what should constitute ends. Consequently, independent variables associated
with interests, such as the neorealist conception of anarchy, are actually dependent variables that
can be created, modified, and replaced by variables representing the rise of new strategic cultural
norms (CONTRIBUTION)
- CONTRIBUTION The ideas of strategic culture expressed in norms play a central role in
national security outcomes for constructivists, a factor they view as neglected by interest-
based analyses like those of the neorealists
the norms that make up strategic culture are dynamic and malleable, making them responsive to
catalytic or traumatic changes in the larger normative social structures that make up
international society. Diffusion of fresh normative suggestions:
- is made possible by “ecological processes result[ing] from the patterned interaction of actors
and their environment,” and “social process arguments [where] norm building take[s] the
form of generalizations about the way [actors] interact,” like “social diffusion.”
- also possible through catalytic events that discredit old social systems and allow for the rise
of new ones sponsored by norm entrepreneurs
Which proposed norms succeed and which fail depend upon “norm prominence” like
sponsorship by powerful states, “how well [the prospective norm] interacts with other prevailing
norms [in the] ‘normative environment’ and . . . what external environmental conditions
confront [it].” (THE ONE OF UNILATERAL PREVENTIVE WAR FAILED)
A potential international norm becomes a norm at the state or unit level when the “negotiated
reality” among elites and important groups leads to its acceptance via persuasive discourse.18
International pressure in support of the proposed international norm then builds over time as
state and nonstate actors who support the prospective norm try to convince other states to
follow the new norm, leading to a “norm cascade” in which “norm internalization occurs” in
international society
For constructivists, attempts to change the norms that compose strategic culture are not just an
evolutionary process. A rapid normative shift in the strategic cultural paradigm is also possible if
international conditions lead to powerful actors becoming receptive to radical paradigm shifts in
national security policies, such as may have been the case among senior policy makers in the
Bush administration after 9/11
Constructivism and the Iraq War: A Starting Point for Analysis
Flibbert case is flawed no regard for role of policy makers higher ranks – neoconservative vs
senior policy makers (also proactive not only acceptiong what neoconservatives say –
geopolitical interests important too - lead to 1% policy of cheney i.e.)
Prior constructivist work explains the causes of the Iraq War in terms of the role played by
neoconservatives as policy entrepreneurs after 9/11
