Fundamentals of Corporate
Finance 13th Edition
ST
SOLUTIONS
UV
IA
MANUAL
_A
Stephen A. Ross
PP
Randolph Westerfield
Bradford D. Jordan
RO
────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Comprehensive Solutions Manual for Instructors
VE
and Students
D?
© Stephen A. Ross, Randolph Westerfield & Bradford D. Jordan. All rights reserved.
Reproduction or distribution without permission is prohibited.
?
© Successhands
, Solutions Manual for Fundamentals of Corporate Finance (13th Edition)
Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Bradford D. Jordan
ISBN: 9781265066833
ST
PART 1: OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE FINANCE
1. Introduction to Corporate Finance
2. Financial Statements, Taxes, and Cash Flow
PART 2: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL PLANNING
UV
3. Working with Financial Statements
4. Long-Term Financial Planning and Growth
PART 3: VALUATION OF FUTURE CASH FLOWS
5. Introduction to Valuation: The Time Value of Money
IA
6. Discounted Cash Flow Valuation
7. Interest Rates and Bond Valuation
8. Stock Valuation
_A
PART 4: CAPITAL BUDGETING
9. Net Present Value and Other Investment Criteria
10. Making Capital Investment Decisions
11. Project Analysis and Evaluation
PART 5: RISK AND RETURN
PP
12. Some Lessons from Capital Market History
13. Return, Risk, and the Security Market Line
PART 6: COST OF CAPITAL AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL POLICY
RO
14. Cost of Capital
15. Raising Capital
16. Financial Leverage and Capital Structure Policy
17. Dividends and Payout Policy
PART 7: SHORT-TERM FINANCIAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
VE
18. Short-Term Finance and Planning
19. Cash and Liquidity Management
20. Credit and Inventory Management
PART 8: TOPICS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
D?
21. International Corporate Finance
22. Behavioral Finance: Implications for Financial Management
23. Enterprise Risk Management
24. Options and Corporate Finance
25. Option Valuation
?
26. Mergers and Acquisitions
27. Leasing
© Successhands
, CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE
SMT
FINANCE
Answers to Concepts Review and Critical Thinking Questions
UEDV
1. Capital budgeting (deciding whether to expand a manufacturing plant), capital structure (deciding
whether to issue new equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt), and working capital
management (modifying the firm‘s credit collection policy with its customers).
2. Disadvantages: unlimited liability, limited life, difficulty in transferring ownership, difficulty in
ICAO
raising capital funds. Some advantages: simpler, less regulation, the owners are also the managers,
sometimes personal tax rates are better than corporate tax rates.
3. The primary disadvantage of the corporate form is the double taxation to shareholders of distributed
earnings and dividends. Some advantages include: limited liability, ease of transferability, ability to
_NA
raise capital, and unlimited life.
4. In response to Sarbanes-Oxley, small firms have elected to go dark because of the costs of
compliance. The costs to comply with Sarbox can be several million dollars, which can be a large
percentage of a small firm‘s profits. A major cost of going dark is less access to capital. Since the
PNPO
firm is no longer publicly traded, it can no longer raise money in the public market. Although the
company will still have access to bank loans and the private equity market, the costs associated with
raising funds in these markets are usually higher than the costs of raising funds in the public market.
5. The treasurer‘s office and the controller‘s office are the two primary organizational groups that
report directly to the chief financial officer. The controller‘s office handles cost and financial
RISO
accounting, tax management, and management information systems, while the treasurer‘s office is
responsible for cash and credit management, capital budgeting, and financial planning. Therefore,
the study of corporate finance is concentrated within the treasury group‘s functions.
6. To maximize the current market value (share price) of the equity of the firm (whether it‘s publicly
SVE
traded or not).
7. In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm. The shareholders
elect the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm‘s management. This separation of
EDU
ownership from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to
exist. Management may act in its own or someone else‘s best interests, rather than those of the
shareholders. If such events occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the
equity of the firm.
?R?
8. A primary market transaction.
, 2 SOLUTIONS MANUAL
9. In auction markets like the NYSE, brokers and agents meet at a physical location (the exchange) to
match buyers and sellers of assets. Dealer markets like NASDAQ consist of dealers operating at
dispersed locales who buy and sell assets themselves, communicating with other dealers either
electronically or literally over-the-counter.
SMT
10. Such organizations frequently pursue social or political missions, so many different goals are
conceivable. One goal that is often cited is revenue minimization; that is, provide whatever goods
and services are offered at the lowest possible cost to society. A better approach might be to observe
that even a not-for-profit business has equity. Thus, one answer is that the appropriate goal is to
UEDV
maximize the value of the equity.
11. Presumably, the current stock value reflects the risk, timing, and magnitude of all future cash flows,
both short-term and long-term. If this is correct, then the statement is false.
12. An argument can be made either way. At the one extreme, we could argue that in a market economy,
all of these things are priced. There is thus an optimal level of, for example, ethical and/or illegal
ICAO
behavior, and the framework of stock valuation explicitly includes these. At the other extreme, we
could argue that these are noneconomic phenomena and are best handled through the political
process. A classic (and highly relevant) thought question that illustrates this debate goes something
like this: ―A firm has estimated that the cost of improving the safety of one of its products is $30
_NA
million. However, the firm believes that improving the safety of the product will only save $20
million in product liability claims. What should the firm do?‖
13. The goal will be the same, but the best course of action toward that goal may be different because of
differing social, political, and economic institutions.
PNPO
14. The goal of management should be to maximize the share price for the current shareholders. If
management believes that it can improve the profitability of the firm so that the share price will
exceed $35, then they should fight the offer from the outside company. If management believes that
this bidder or other unidentified bidders will actually pay more than $35 per share to acquire the
company, then they should still fight the offer. However, if the current management cannot increase
RISO
the value of the firm beyond the bid price, and no other higher bids come in, then management is not
acting in the interests of the shareholders by fighting the offer. Since current managers often lose
their jobs when the corporation is acquired, poorly monitored managers have an incentive to fight
corporate takeovers in situations such as this.
15. We would expect agency problems to be less severe in countries with a relatively small percentage
SVE
of individual ownership. Fewer individual owners should reduce the number of diverse opinions
concerning corporate goals. The high percentage of institutional ownership might lead to a higher
degree of agreement between owners and managers on decisions concerning risky projects. In
EDU
addition, institutions may be better able to implement effective monitoring mechanisms on managers
than can individual owners, based on the institutions‘ deeper resources and experiences with their
own management. The increase in institutional ownership of stock in the United States and the
growing activism of these large shareholder groups may lead to a reduction in agency problems for
U.S. corporations and a more efficient market for corporate control.
?R?
Finance 13th Edition
ST
SOLUTIONS
UV
IA
MANUAL
_A
Stephen A. Ross
PP
Randolph Westerfield
Bradford D. Jordan
RO
────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Comprehensive Solutions Manual for Instructors
VE
and Students
D?
© Stephen A. Ross, Randolph Westerfield & Bradford D. Jordan. All rights reserved.
Reproduction or distribution without permission is prohibited.
?
© Successhands
, Solutions Manual for Fundamentals of Corporate Finance (13th Edition)
Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Bradford D. Jordan
ISBN: 9781265066833
ST
PART 1: OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE FINANCE
1. Introduction to Corporate Finance
2. Financial Statements, Taxes, and Cash Flow
PART 2: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL PLANNING
UV
3. Working with Financial Statements
4. Long-Term Financial Planning and Growth
PART 3: VALUATION OF FUTURE CASH FLOWS
5. Introduction to Valuation: The Time Value of Money
IA
6. Discounted Cash Flow Valuation
7. Interest Rates and Bond Valuation
8. Stock Valuation
_A
PART 4: CAPITAL BUDGETING
9. Net Present Value and Other Investment Criteria
10. Making Capital Investment Decisions
11. Project Analysis and Evaluation
PART 5: RISK AND RETURN
PP
12. Some Lessons from Capital Market History
13. Return, Risk, and the Security Market Line
PART 6: COST OF CAPITAL AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL POLICY
RO
14. Cost of Capital
15. Raising Capital
16. Financial Leverage and Capital Structure Policy
17. Dividends and Payout Policy
PART 7: SHORT-TERM FINANCIAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
VE
18. Short-Term Finance and Planning
19. Cash and Liquidity Management
20. Credit and Inventory Management
PART 8: TOPICS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
D?
21. International Corporate Finance
22. Behavioral Finance: Implications for Financial Management
23. Enterprise Risk Management
24. Options and Corporate Finance
25. Option Valuation
?
26. Mergers and Acquisitions
27. Leasing
© Successhands
, CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE
SMT
FINANCE
Answers to Concepts Review and Critical Thinking Questions
UEDV
1. Capital budgeting (deciding whether to expand a manufacturing plant), capital structure (deciding
whether to issue new equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt), and working capital
management (modifying the firm‘s credit collection policy with its customers).
2. Disadvantages: unlimited liability, limited life, difficulty in transferring ownership, difficulty in
ICAO
raising capital funds. Some advantages: simpler, less regulation, the owners are also the managers,
sometimes personal tax rates are better than corporate tax rates.
3. The primary disadvantage of the corporate form is the double taxation to shareholders of distributed
earnings and dividends. Some advantages include: limited liability, ease of transferability, ability to
_NA
raise capital, and unlimited life.
4. In response to Sarbanes-Oxley, small firms have elected to go dark because of the costs of
compliance. The costs to comply with Sarbox can be several million dollars, which can be a large
percentage of a small firm‘s profits. A major cost of going dark is less access to capital. Since the
PNPO
firm is no longer publicly traded, it can no longer raise money in the public market. Although the
company will still have access to bank loans and the private equity market, the costs associated with
raising funds in these markets are usually higher than the costs of raising funds in the public market.
5. The treasurer‘s office and the controller‘s office are the two primary organizational groups that
report directly to the chief financial officer. The controller‘s office handles cost and financial
RISO
accounting, tax management, and management information systems, while the treasurer‘s office is
responsible for cash and credit management, capital budgeting, and financial planning. Therefore,
the study of corporate finance is concentrated within the treasury group‘s functions.
6. To maximize the current market value (share price) of the equity of the firm (whether it‘s publicly
SVE
traded or not).
7. In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm. The shareholders
elect the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm‘s management. This separation of
EDU
ownership from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to
exist. Management may act in its own or someone else‘s best interests, rather than those of the
shareholders. If such events occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the
equity of the firm.
?R?
8. A primary market transaction.
, 2 SOLUTIONS MANUAL
9. In auction markets like the NYSE, brokers and agents meet at a physical location (the exchange) to
match buyers and sellers of assets. Dealer markets like NASDAQ consist of dealers operating at
dispersed locales who buy and sell assets themselves, communicating with other dealers either
electronically or literally over-the-counter.
SMT
10. Such organizations frequently pursue social or political missions, so many different goals are
conceivable. One goal that is often cited is revenue minimization; that is, provide whatever goods
and services are offered at the lowest possible cost to society. A better approach might be to observe
that even a not-for-profit business has equity. Thus, one answer is that the appropriate goal is to
UEDV
maximize the value of the equity.
11. Presumably, the current stock value reflects the risk, timing, and magnitude of all future cash flows,
both short-term and long-term. If this is correct, then the statement is false.
12. An argument can be made either way. At the one extreme, we could argue that in a market economy,
all of these things are priced. There is thus an optimal level of, for example, ethical and/or illegal
ICAO
behavior, and the framework of stock valuation explicitly includes these. At the other extreme, we
could argue that these are noneconomic phenomena and are best handled through the political
process. A classic (and highly relevant) thought question that illustrates this debate goes something
like this: ―A firm has estimated that the cost of improving the safety of one of its products is $30
_NA
million. However, the firm believes that improving the safety of the product will only save $20
million in product liability claims. What should the firm do?‖
13. The goal will be the same, but the best course of action toward that goal may be different because of
differing social, political, and economic institutions.
PNPO
14. The goal of management should be to maximize the share price for the current shareholders. If
management believes that it can improve the profitability of the firm so that the share price will
exceed $35, then they should fight the offer from the outside company. If management believes that
this bidder or other unidentified bidders will actually pay more than $35 per share to acquire the
company, then they should still fight the offer. However, if the current management cannot increase
RISO
the value of the firm beyond the bid price, and no other higher bids come in, then management is not
acting in the interests of the shareholders by fighting the offer. Since current managers often lose
their jobs when the corporation is acquired, poorly monitored managers have an incentive to fight
corporate takeovers in situations such as this.
15. We would expect agency problems to be less severe in countries with a relatively small percentage
SVE
of individual ownership. Fewer individual owners should reduce the number of diverse opinions
concerning corporate goals. The high percentage of institutional ownership might lead to a higher
degree of agreement between owners and managers on decisions concerning risky projects. In
EDU
addition, institutions may be better able to implement effective monitoring mechanisms on managers
than can individual owners, based on the institutions‘ deeper resources and experiences with their
own management. The increase in institutional ownership of stock in the United States and the
growing activism of these large shareholder groups may lead to a reduction in agency problems for
U.S. corporations and a more efficient market for corporate control.
?R?
