Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on
the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set
for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was
deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an
order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the
Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7
, On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978
with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an
order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal
premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of
Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the
Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having
been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer
can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary
of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as
without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978
at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining
order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the
accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion
for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February
19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing
his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring
the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to
dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to
the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss,
within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on
the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set
for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was
deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an
order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the
Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7
, On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978
with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an
order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal
premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of
Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the
Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having
been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer
can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary
of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as
without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978
at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining
order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the
accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion
for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February
19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing
his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring
the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to
dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to
the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss,
within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends
