Henry VII practice essay 6
‘Henry VII’s main aim in foreign affairs was to avoid war.’ How far do you agree?
Henry VII’s position as a usurper after the Battle of Bosworth made a foreign policy of non-
intervention an absolute necessity if England was to recover politically and economically after the
Wars of the Roses. Certainly, Henry’s isolationist policies as king suggest that he never diverted from
achieving his aim of avoiding war in spite of riches available elsewhere on the continent.
Henry’s decision not to enter the Italian Wars can be seen as a clear indication that his main
aim in foreign policy was to avoid war. Increasing instability in the Italian micro-states opened up
lucrative opportunities to Europe’s three Great Powers in the late-1400s – namely, Spain, France and
the Holy Roman Empire. The policy of non-intervention adopted by Henry in Italy demonstrates the
defensive nature of his foreign policy, whereby he wished to facilitate economic recovery in the
kingdom at the expense of the superior powers on the continent, who would waste valuable
resources fighting expensive campaigns in Italy. Avoiding war therefore had the double benefit of
not only stabilising England’s relations with the warring nations but also enriching the crown so that
by 1509, England was the fourth richest kingdom in Europe. Further evidence of Henry’s defensive
aims in foreign policy can be found in the signing of the Treaty of Medina del Campo with Spain;
such an agreement gave Henry recognition of his kingship from one of Europe’s greatest powers,
which would always be lacking for a usurping monarch. This recognition in turn would discourage
other European nations from invading England in the hope of deposing an unstable throne, since
Spanish protection would be a strong deterrence against a possible invasion of England by France
through Scotland. The treaty demonstrates how avoiding war and protecting the dynasty were
Henry’s main aims in foreign policy, since another stipulation of the agreement was that Prince
Arthur would marry Catherine of Aragon. This can again be seen in the context of avoiding war as
Henry’s heir would also have Spanish backing upon his succession to the throne, which would deter
a Yorkist incursion and thus prevent a repeat of the Wars of the Roses. Henry’s alliance with the
Spanish Empire led to the entrance of England into the Holy League in 1496 – another shrewd
defensive move on the king’s part. The League did not commit Henry to war as he only joined on the
condition that England was not bound to go to war with France, which supports the view of the
contemporary historian, Polydore Vergil that ‘Henry was more inclined to peace than war’.
Undoubtedly, the king was reluctant to commit English resources in war, correctly recognising the
catastrophic consequences this could have to his position domestically. Peace and avoiding war was
subsequently the best option available to Henry VII.
This is not to say, however, that Henry did not fight wars without provocation on several
occasions. When a chance to either protect or strengthen the dynasty, Henry pursued a more active
role in foreign policy which disputes the view that his main aim was avoiding war. The role played by
the kingdom in the Brittany Crisis acts as strong evidence of this fact; the war was arguably unrelated
to domestic concerns and generally concerned the maintenance of England’s position in Europe as a
formidable power. Perhaps with the dream of emulating Henry V, the king raised a strong English
force of 26,000 men with the sole aim of invading France. The campaign was largely unprovoked and
could be seen as evidence that Henry, just like his predecessors and successors, pursued the same
policy of gaining the French throne. This policy by nature involved engaging in war, and so it is
important that we challenge the accepted view of Henry among historians that he intended to
‘Henry VII’s main aim in foreign affairs was to avoid war.’ How far do you agree?
Henry VII’s position as a usurper after the Battle of Bosworth made a foreign policy of non-
intervention an absolute necessity if England was to recover politically and economically after the
Wars of the Roses. Certainly, Henry’s isolationist policies as king suggest that he never diverted from
achieving his aim of avoiding war in spite of riches available elsewhere on the continent.
Henry’s decision not to enter the Italian Wars can be seen as a clear indication that his main
aim in foreign policy was to avoid war. Increasing instability in the Italian micro-states opened up
lucrative opportunities to Europe’s three Great Powers in the late-1400s – namely, Spain, France and
the Holy Roman Empire. The policy of non-intervention adopted by Henry in Italy demonstrates the
defensive nature of his foreign policy, whereby he wished to facilitate economic recovery in the
kingdom at the expense of the superior powers on the continent, who would waste valuable
resources fighting expensive campaigns in Italy. Avoiding war therefore had the double benefit of
not only stabilising England’s relations with the warring nations but also enriching the crown so that
by 1509, England was the fourth richest kingdom in Europe. Further evidence of Henry’s defensive
aims in foreign policy can be found in the signing of the Treaty of Medina del Campo with Spain;
such an agreement gave Henry recognition of his kingship from one of Europe’s greatest powers,
which would always be lacking for a usurping monarch. This recognition in turn would discourage
other European nations from invading England in the hope of deposing an unstable throne, since
Spanish protection would be a strong deterrence against a possible invasion of England by France
through Scotland. The treaty demonstrates how avoiding war and protecting the dynasty were
Henry’s main aims in foreign policy, since another stipulation of the agreement was that Prince
Arthur would marry Catherine of Aragon. This can again be seen in the context of avoiding war as
Henry’s heir would also have Spanish backing upon his succession to the throne, which would deter
a Yorkist incursion and thus prevent a repeat of the Wars of the Roses. Henry’s alliance with the
Spanish Empire led to the entrance of England into the Holy League in 1496 – another shrewd
defensive move on the king’s part. The League did not commit Henry to war as he only joined on the
condition that England was not bound to go to war with France, which supports the view of the
contemporary historian, Polydore Vergil that ‘Henry was more inclined to peace than war’.
Undoubtedly, the king was reluctant to commit English resources in war, correctly recognising the
catastrophic consequences this could have to his position domestically. Peace and avoiding war was
subsequently the best option available to Henry VII.
This is not to say, however, that Henry did not fight wars without provocation on several
occasions. When a chance to either protect or strengthen the dynasty, Henry pursued a more active
role in foreign policy which disputes the view that his main aim was avoiding war. The role played by
the kingdom in the Brittany Crisis acts as strong evidence of this fact; the war was arguably unrelated
to domestic concerns and generally concerned the maintenance of England’s position in Europe as a
formidable power. Perhaps with the dream of emulating Henry V, the king raised a strong English
force of 26,000 men with the sole aim of invading France. The campaign was largely unprovoked and
could be seen as evidence that Henry, just like his predecessors and successors, pursued the same
policy of gaining the French throne. This policy by nature involved engaging in war, and so it is
important that we challenge the accepted view of Henry among historians that he intended to
