International Relations and International Organization Political Science
Summaries - Readings Week 2
1. Korobkin and Ulen: The uses and shortcomings of rational choice theory Online article 2
2. Hindmoor: Introduction Reader: 10-21 4
3. Hindmoor: Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party Competition Reader: 22-25 7
4. Hindmoor: William Riker and the Theory of Coalitions Reader: 26-31 8
5. Hindmoor: Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action Reader 32-45 10
6. Downs and Barsoom: Arms Control - A formal approach Reader: 54-58 13
,International Relations and International Organization Political Science
1. Korobkin and Ulen: The uses and shortcomings of rational choice theory
Rational choice theory is the heart of modern microeconomic theory. Apart from its main application
in economics, it is also used in political science, history, IR, sociology and law. Unfortunately, there is
no single, widely accepted definition; the various assumptions that are made are often implicit.
The different conceptions of rational choice theory can be understood as points along a continuum
of how specific and precise predictions of the theory are. The authors understand “thin” conceptions
as conceptions in which the theory is relatively undemanding and in which it is relatively easy for the
behavior of actors to be consistent with the theory. “Thick” conceptions are conceptions with more
robust behavioral prediction that are more easily falsifiable by empirical evidence. According to the
authors, a spectrum of rational choice theory may look as follows:
Rational choice theory spectrum:
“Thin” conceptions “Thick” conceptions
----------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------→
Definitional Expected Utility Self-Interest Wealth Maximizing
Version Version Version Version
Different conceptions of rational choice theory:
1. The definitional version
- This conception postulates only that “man is a rational maximizer of his ends”, without providing
predictions regarding what ends an individual might attempt to maximize. Rationality is understood
as suiting means to ends.
- It is not difficult to think of a situation in which this version would not hold: when an individual
chooses an action contrary to his goals. But in practice the definitional version is non-falsifiable,
because both the means and the ends of the behavior are defined by observing the behavior itself.
Thus, on this thin understanding, everything confirms rationality of behavior, and nothing refutes it.
2. The expected utility version
- This version is the most dominant in modern microeconomics. It is “thin” in the sense that it does
not specify what preferences or goals decision makers will pursue.
- The assumption that economic decision making can be shown to be the result of the maximization
of expected utility is a thicker model of human behavior in that it posits a more formal model of
individual decision making than does the previous version.
- The basic requirement of expected utility theory is that decision makers conduct an explicit or
implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method.
- Because it is impossible to know what choices are optimal without knowing the contours of utility
function, behavioral predictions of expected utility theory are often not directly verifiable/falsifiable.
- There are some necessary conditions of rational behavior under the expected utility model:
(1) Commensurability: utility consequences of alternatives should be comparable;
(2) Transitivity: if an actor prefers A to B and B to C, he should then prefer A to C
(3) Invariance: preference between two or more choices should not depend on how the
choice is presented or structured, so long as the outcome possibilities are constant;
(4) Cancellation: choice between options shouldn’t depend on features of identical options;
(5) Dominance: actor should never choose option in which every feature is only as good as
the features of a competing option, and at least one feature is not as good.
3. The self-interest version
- Still thicker versions start from expected utility theory’s prediction about the manner in which
actors will attempt to achieve their utility, add prediction about the actors’ goals and preferences:
actors will seek to maximize what is in their self-interest, which can be traced back to Adam Smith.
2
, International Relations and International Organization Political Science
- The implication is that if we can figure out what course of action will most profit the decision
maker, we will be able to predict his course of action. This is an advance over the thin conceptions in
that it suggests falsifiable predictions, not just predictions about decision-making procedures.
- Such thick versions of rational choice theory dominate the law-and-economics literature, although
the assumption is almost always implicit rather than explicit.
- Defenders of rational choice theory at this point observe that it is plausible to hypothesize that a
decision maker’s “self-interest” might be served by taking account of the well-being of others, not
just his or her own wants and desires. Unfortunately, expanding the conception of “self-interest”
would rob the notion of “self-interest” of all of its predictive value.
- If “self-interest” is defined to include anything that produces satisfaction for the decision maker,
then self-interest version of rational choice theory is no different from thin expected utility version.
4. The wealth maximization version
- The thickest conceptions provide even more specific predictions about the ends of decision makers
than does the self-interest version. The most common of these is “wealth maximization”: the
prediction that actors will attempts to maximize their financial well-being or monetary situation.
- Nearly all law-and-economics literature on business organizations (and individuals), is built on the
explicit or implicit assumption that firms (and individuals) seek to maximize profits.
3
Summaries - Readings Week 2
1. Korobkin and Ulen: The uses and shortcomings of rational choice theory Online article 2
2. Hindmoor: Introduction Reader: 10-21 4
3. Hindmoor: Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party Competition Reader: 22-25 7
4. Hindmoor: William Riker and the Theory of Coalitions Reader: 26-31 8
5. Hindmoor: Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action Reader 32-45 10
6. Downs and Barsoom: Arms Control - A formal approach Reader: 54-58 13
,International Relations and International Organization Political Science
1. Korobkin and Ulen: The uses and shortcomings of rational choice theory
Rational choice theory is the heart of modern microeconomic theory. Apart from its main application
in economics, it is also used in political science, history, IR, sociology and law. Unfortunately, there is
no single, widely accepted definition; the various assumptions that are made are often implicit.
The different conceptions of rational choice theory can be understood as points along a continuum
of how specific and precise predictions of the theory are. The authors understand “thin” conceptions
as conceptions in which the theory is relatively undemanding and in which it is relatively easy for the
behavior of actors to be consistent with the theory. “Thick” conceptions are conceptions with more
robust behavioral prediction that are more easily falsifiable by empirical evidence. According to the
authors, a spectrum of rational choice theory may look as follows:
Rational choice theory spectrum:
“Thin” conceptions “Thick” conceptions
----------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------→
Definitional Expected Utility Self-Interest Wealth Maximizing
Version Version Version Version
Different conceptions of rational choice theory:
1. The definitional version
- This conception postulates only that “man is a rational maximizer of his ends”, without providing
predictions regarding what ends an individual might attempt to maximize. Rationality is understood
as suiting means to ends.
- It is not difficult to think of a situation in which this version would not hold: when an individual
chooses an action contrary to his goals. But in practice the definitional version is non-falsifiable,
because both the means and the ends of the behavior are defined by observing the behavior itself.
Thus, on this thin understanding, everything confirms rationality of behavior, and nothing refutes it.
2. The expected utility version
- This version is the most dominant in modern microeconomics. It is “thin” in the sense that it does
not specify what preferences or goals decision makers will pursue.
- The assumption that economic decision making can be shown to be the result of the maximization
of expected utility is a thicker model of human behavior in that it posits a more formal model of
individual decision making than does the previous version.
- The basic requirement of expected utility theory is that decision makers conduct an explicit or
implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method.
- Because it is impossible to know what choices are optimal without knowing the contours of utility
function, behavioral predictions of expected utility theory are often not directly verifiable/falsifiable.
- There are some necessary conditions of rational behavior under the expected utility model:
(1) Commensurability: utility consequences of alternatives should be comparable;
(2) Transitivity: if an actor prefers A to B and B to C, he should then prefer A to C
(3) Invariance: preference between two or more choices should not depend on how the
choice is presented or structured, so long as the outcome possibilities are constant;
(4) Cancellation: choice between options shouldn’t depend on features of identical options;
(5) Dominance: actor should never choose option in which every feature is only as good as
the features of a competing option, and at least one feature is not as good.
3. The self-interest version
- Still thicker versions start from expected utility theory’s prediction about the manner in which
actors will attempt to achieve their utility, add prediction about the actors’ goals and preferences:
actors will seek to maximize what is in their self-interest, which can be traced back to Adam Smith.
2
, International Relations and International Organization Political Science
- The implication is that if we can figure out what course of action will most profit the decision
maker, we will be able to predict his course of action. This is an advance over the thin conceptions in
that it suggests falsifiable predictions, not just predictions about decision-making procedures.
- Such thick versions of rational choice theory dominate the law-and-economics literature, although
the assumption is almost always implicit rather than explicit.
- Defenders of rational choice theory at this point observe that it is plausible to hypothesize that a
decision maker’s “self-interest” might be served by taking account of the well-being of others, not
just his or her own wants and desires. Unfortunately, expanding the conception of “self-interest”
would rob the notion of “self-interest” of all of its predictive value.
- If “self-interest” is defined to include anything that produces satisfaction for the decision maker,
then self-interest version of rational choice theory is no different from thin expected utility version.
4. The wealth maximization version
- The thickest conceptions provide even more specific predictions about the ends of decision makers
than does the self-interest version. The most common of these is “wealth maximization”: the
prediction that actors will attempts to maximize their financial well-being or monetary situation.
- Nearly all law-and-economics literature on business organizations (and individuals), is built on the
explicit or implicit assumption that firms (and individuals) seek to maximize profits.
3
