Russell Problems of Philosophy Summary:
Chapter 1: Appearance and Reality
(Russell’s primary and secondary quality distinction)
In seeking certainty, we discover vagueness and confusion in many common ideas. The search for
certainty launches us into the study of philosophy.
One area that seems to grant us certainty is our immediate experience. Russell describes his
immediate experience as he sits in a sunny room at his desk. He focuses on the sensatons he
experiences of the table before him. In a precise descripton of its visual appearance Russell notes
that although he believes the table to be all one color, that part of the table appears almost white
due to the refected light. He knows that if he moves that the apparent whiteness of the part of the
table will move, too. Although this diference in appearance is unimportant for most practcal
purposes, the artst must learn to see and portray things as they appear, rather than as they "really"
are. Philosophy too, guides us to examine closely what we experience.
Examining the color of the table, we are lead to the conclusion that there is no color which is
preeminently the color of the table. The color depends on the presence and kind of articial light,
the tme of day and the conditon of the viewers eyes, among many other factors.
The texture of the table presents a similar result. Although to the unaided eye the table appears
smooth, with a magnifying glass, ridges and rough spots become evident. More powerful
magniicaton would reveal an even more elaborate texture. Which is the true texture?e There is no
reason to pick one over the other.
The sense of touch does not give us any more certainty about the real nature of the table. Examining
the sensatons we experience about the table we must conclude that we only know about its
appearance. "The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an
inference from what is immediately known."
Russell then introduces us to Bishop Berkley, who showed that mater can be denied without
absurdity. He concludes the chapter by pointng out that philosophy guides us to from the common
place to the amazing in quick order. Our inquiry into the certainty provided by our immediate
experience leads us to realize that the appearance of mater cannot be the same as its reality. The
next queston Russell addresses is does mater exist?e
Chapter 2: The Existence of Mater
(Stuff existing independently of my perception)
Since our immediate experience gives us no certainty about the existence of mater and since it is
possible to deny the existence of mater without logical fallacy, should we assume that mater does
not exist?e Russell answers no. The existence of mater is the simplest explanaton of our experience.
Russell asks us to consider a cat. He asks to imagine that he sees a cat at one moment in one part of
the room and in another somewhere else. Our simplest assumpton is that the cat has moved. But if
there is no mater and nothing but Russell's sensatons, then the cat cannot have been anywhere he
did not see it. It must have ceased to exist when it passed out of his view and reappeared when he
saw it in its new locaton. Now imagine that his cat is actng hungry. How could this be accounted
for?e No hunger can exist except his own sensaton of hunger. Any explanaton of this behavior that
does not suppose the existence of a real cat is bound to be more complicated than assuming that
the cat does exist outside the sensatons Russell is experiencing.
Chapter 1: Appearance and Reality
(Russell’s primary and secondary quality distinction)
In seeking certainty, we discover vagueness and confusion in many common ideas. The search for
certainty launches us into the study of philosophy.
One area that seems to grant us certainty is our immediate experience. Russell describes his
immediate experience as he sits in a sunny room at his desk. He focuses on the sensatons he
experiences of the table before him. In a precise descripton of its visual appearance Russell notes
that although he believes the table to be all one color, that part of the table appears almost white
due to the refected light. He knows that if he moves that the apparent whiteness of the part of the
table will move, too. Although this diference in appearance is unimportant for most practcal
purposes, the artst must learn to see and portray things as they appear, rather than as they "really"
are. Philosophy too, guides us to examine closely what we experience.
Examining the color of the table, we are lead to the conclusion that there is no color which is
preeminently the color of the table. The color depends on the presence and kind of articial light,
the tme of day and the conditon of the viewers eyes, among many other factors.
The texture of the table presents a similar result. Although to the unaided eye the table appears
smooth, with a magnifying glass, ridges and rough spots become evident. More powerful
magniicaton would reveal an even more elaborate texture. Which is the true texture?e There is no
reason to pick one over the other.
The sense of touch does not give us any more certainty about the real nature of the table. Examining
the sensatons we experience about the table we must conclude that we only know about its
appearance. "The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an
inference from what is immediately known."
Russell then introduces us to Bishop Berkley, who showed that mater can be denied without
absurdity. He concludes the chapter by pointng out that philosophy guides us to from the common
place to the amazing in quick order. Our inquiry into the certainty provided by our immediate
experience leads us to realize that the appearance of mater cannot be the same as its reality. The
next queston Russell addresses is does mater exist?e
Chapter 2: The Existence of Mater
(Stuff existing independently of my perception)
Since our immediate experience gives us no certainty about the existence of mater and since it is
possible to deny the existence of mater without logical fallacy, should we assume that mater does
not exist?e Russell answers no. The existence of mater is the simplest explanaton of our experience.
Russell asks us to consider a cat. He asks to imagine that he sees a cat at one moment in one part of
the room and in another somewhere else. Our simplest assumpton is that the cat has moved. But if
there is no mater and nothing but Russell's sensatons, then the cat cannot have been anywhere he
did not see it. It must have ceased to exist when it passed out of his view and reappeared when he
saw it in its new locaton. Now imagine that his cat is actng hungry. How could this be accounted
for?e No hunger can exist except his own sensaton of hunger. Any explanaton of this behavior that
does not suppose the existence of a real cat is bound to be more complicated than assuming that
the cat does exist outside the sensatons Russell is experiencing.
