Is religious language meaningful? 25 marks
In this essay, I will argue that religious language is not meaningful in a cognitive sense (i.e. that
religious statements are not factually significant), as due to bliks, people will never be able to agree
on what counts as evidence to verify or falsify religious statements. However I will argue that
religious language is meaningful in a non-cognitive sense, as it allows people to express sentiments
that they hold to be fundamentally important, and which impact their day-to-day lives.
Ayer and the logical positivists believed that language should only be classed as meaningful in a
cognitive, factually significant sense if it could be analytically or synthetically proven to be true.
Ayer’s strong verification principle states that language can only be classed as cognitively meaningful
if it can be proved to be the case. Therefore, according to the strong verification principle, religious
language cannot be classified as cognitively meaningful, as statements such as “God is love” are not
true by definition, nor can they be empirically verified. However, as well as ruling out religious
language, Ayer’s strong verification principle also declares moral, aesthetic, emotional and historical
language as being cognitively meaningless. Additionally, the strong verification principle isn’t even
meaningful itself- it is a hypothetical assertion. The biggest flaw with the strong verification principle,
however, if the fact that despite aiming to take a scientific approach to language, the strong
verification principle actually eliminates scientific statements. For example, the statement “all water
boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level” wouldn’t be classed as cognitively meaningful, as you would
have to boil every single molecule of water at sea level to prove it. This is ultimately the biggest flaw
with the strong verification principle, and as such the principle doesn’t undermine or rule out
religious statements being meaningful. Ayer’s weak verification principle, however, proves to be a
fatal flaw for the claim that religious language is cognitively meaningful.
In “Language, Truth and Logic”, Ayer modifies his principle, altering it to the weak verification
principle. The weak verification principle states that a statement is cognitively meaningful/ factually
significant if A) You know what it would take to prove it, and B) it is likely to be true. The weak
verification principle, despite allowing for scientific and historical language, still doesn’t regard
religious language as meaningful. Unlike scientific statements in which there is a general consensus
as to what evidence is needed to prove a theory, there is no such agreement as to what it would take
to prove a statement such as “God exists”. Hick challenges this, and says that religious language can
be meaningful, by way of his eschatological verification. Hick argues that we will be able to verify
statements like “God exists” or “there is an afterlife” after death/at the end of time, which he lays
out in his parable of the celestial city. Hick’s replica theory states that when we die, it is possible that
an exact replica of us will be able to verify whether there is a God or an afterlife, and as such
religious statements can be classed as meaningful. There are a few issues with Hick’s eschatological
verification, the most considerable one being that our replica may be unable to recognise the
existence of God and an afterlife when faced with it, and even if it can recognise it, the replica cannot
report back that information, making it an impractical source of verification. A less concerning issue
is that regarding whether our replicas are even really ‘us’, however, theoretically, if our replica
contains all of our memories and beliefs, it is probably us. Additionally, some religious believers claim
that religious statements such as “God exists” pass the weak verification principle, pointing to
evidence such as miracles, complexity in the world or religious experiences. However, Ayer would
argue that religious language cannot be classed as cognitively meaningful, as there is still no real
agreement between atheists and theists as to what evidence would prove the existence of God.
Ayer’s weak verification principle is perhaps the most significant and successful challenge to the idea
that religious statements are meaningful. Hare agrees, saying that due to inherent biases/filters,
which he called “bliks”, there will never be sufficient agreement to prove religious language.
In this essay, I will argue that religious language is not meaningful in a cognitive sense (i.e. that
religious statements are not factually significant), as due to bliks, people will never be able to agree
on what counts as evidence to verify or falsify religious statements. However I will argue that
religious language is meaningful in a non-cognitive sense, as it allows people to express sentiments
that they hold to be fundamentally important, and which impact their day-to-day lives.
Ayer and the logical positivists believed that language should only be classed as meaningful in a
cognitive, factually significant sense if it could be analytically or synthetically proven to be true.
Ayer’s strong verification principle states that language can only be classed as cognitively meaningful
if it can be proved to be the case. Therefore, according to the strong verification principle, religious
language cannot be classified as cognitively meaningful, as statements such as “God is love” are not
true by definition, nor can they be empirically verified. However, as well as ruling out religious
language, Ayer’s strong verification principle also declares moral, aesthetic, emotional and historical
language as being cognitively meaningless. Additionally, the strong verification principle isn’t even
meaningful itself- it is a hypothetical assertion. The biggest flaw with the strong verification principle,
however, if the fact that despite aiming to take a scientific approach to language, the strong
verification principle actually eliminates scientific statements. For example, the statement “all water
boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level” wouldn’t be classed as cognitively meaningful, as you would
have to boil every single molecule of water at sea level to prove it. This is ultimately the biggest flaw
with the strong verification principle, and as such the principle doesn’t undermine or rule out
religious statements being meaningful. Ayer’s weak verification principle, however, proves to be a
fatal flaw for the claim that religious language is cognitively meaningful.
In “Language, Truth and Logic”, Ayer modifies his principle, altering it to the weak verification
principle. The weak verification principle states that a statement is cognitively meaningful/ factually
significant if A) You know what it would take to prove it, and B) it is likely to be true. The weak
verification principle, despite allowing for scientific and historical language, still doesn’t regard
religious language as meaningful. Unlike scientific statements in which there is a general consensus
as to what evidence is needed to prove a theory, there is no such agreement as to what it would take
to prove a statement such as “God exists”. Hick challenges this, and says that religious language can
be meaningful, by way of his eschatological verification. Hick argues that we will be able to verify
statements like “God exists” or “there is an afterlife” after death/at the end of time, which he lays
out in his parable of the celestial city. Hick’s replica theory states that when we die, it is possible that
an exact replica of us will be able to verify whether there is a God or an afterlife, and as such
religious statements can be classed as meaningful. There are a few issues with Hick’s eschatological
verification, the most considerable one being that our replica may be unable to recognise the
existence of God and an afterlife when faced with it, and even if it can recognise it, the replica cannot
report back that information, making it an impractical source of verification. A less concerning issue
is that regarding whether our replicas are even really ‘us’, however, theoretically, if our replica
contains all of our memories and beliefs, it is probably us. Additionally, some religious believers claim
that religious statements such as “God exists” pass the weak verification principle, pointing to
evidence such as miracles, complexity in the world or religious experiences. However, Ayer would
argue that religious language cannot be classed as cognitively meaningful, as there is still no real
agreement between atheists and theists as to what evidence would prove the existence of God.
Ayer’s weak verification principle is perhaps the most significant and successful challenge to the idea
that religious statements are meaningful. Hare agrees, saying that due to inherent biases/filters,
which he called “bliks”, there will never be sufficient agreement to prove religious language.
