Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
Intention in criminal law:
why is it so difficult to find?
Simon Parsons l
In Woollin' the House of Lords attempted to clarifY the law of
indirect intent by holding that if a consequence is a virtually certain result
of an act and the actor foresaw it as such then that result may be found
by a jury to be intended, even though it was not the actor's purpose to
cause it. This article will examine the case law leading to Woollin and
consider whether the House was right to leave a question of law (the
meaning of intention) to be decided by ajury as an issue offact.
What is the meaning of intention in criminal law?
There is one meaning of intention that is agreed upon and that is
where a defendant wants something to happen as a result of his
conduct. For example, the defendant wants to kill the victim and to do
so he puts a gun to the victim's head and pulls the trigger. This is
known as direct intent as it is the defendant's purpose to kill the victim.
In such cases, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the defendant wanted, when he pulled the trigger, to kill the victim, ie he
had malice aforethought-an intention to kill the victim. 3 The
prosecution will do this by calling evidence, for example, a witness
testifies that he saw the defendant put the gun to the victim's head and
pull the trigger. This is direct evidence that the defendant killed the
victim and circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to kill:
It is immaterial that the chances of the result occurring were low, for
example, the defendant was half a mile away from the victim when he
Senior Lecturer, Southampton Institute.
[1998] 4 All ER 103.
Malice aforethought is also present if the defendant has an intention to cause grevious
bodily harm. Cunningham [1982] AC 566.
See Smith JC, Criminal Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995 p 5.
- 5-
, Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
fired the gun. The defendant still intended to kill because that is what he
wanted to do. 5 In such cases a judge should refrain from giving a jury
guidance as what intention means,6 other than to tell them, it is a
question of fact for the jury to decide whether a defendant intended a
result," and in doing so they must use their common sense based on all
the relevant circumstances given in evidence.
In addition to this meaning of intention based on purpose or desire,
the courts have put forward a second meaning to intention where the
actor's purpose is not to cause a result, but he realises that by his act
that result is very likely. This is because a single act can have two quite
separate outcomes, for example, the actor insures the cargo on an
areoplane and places a bomb on it timed to go off when the plane is in
flight. The actor's purpose is to claim the insurance money but he
foresees it as very likely that aircrew will be killed. In this example, a
distinction can be made between his direct intent to claim the insurance
money, and his indirect (or oblique) intent (based on foresight) to kill the
aircrew. The question the courts have struggled with is whether such
an actor is guilty of murder.
One possible starting point of an examination of the decisions that
attempt to deal with the problem of indirect intent is the House of Lords
decision in Hyam v DPP.8 In Hyam, Mrs Hyam's lover, a Mr Jones,
discarded her in favour of a Mrs Booth. Mrs Hyam's reaction was to
pour petrol through the letterbox of her rival's house which she ignited
by using a newspaper and a match. Two'ofMrs Booth's children died
as the result of asphyxia caused by the fumes generated by the fire.
Mrs Hyam maintained that she had not wanted to kill anyone, but rather
that she merely wanted to frighten her rival away from Jones. The
House, by a majority of three to two, upheld Mrs Hyam's conviction for
murder. Lord Diplock stated:
A defendant can only intend a result if he believes it is achievable. However the
prosecution could point out that if the result is objectively po~sible then it is very
likely that the defendant intended it.
Fallon [1994] CrimLR519; Smith [1998] CrimLR896.
Section 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967.
[1974] 2 All ER 41.
- 6-
Intention in criminal law:
why is it so difficult to find?
Simon Parsons l
In Woollin' the House of Lords attempted to clarifY the law of
indirect intent by holding that if a consequence is a virtually certain result
of an act and the actor foresaw it as such then that result may be found
by a jury to be intended, even though it was not the actor's purpose to
cause it. This article will examine the case law leading to Woollin and
consider whether the House was right to leave a question of law (the
meaning of intention) to be decided by ajury as an issue offact.
What is the meaning of intention in criminal law?
There is one meaning of intention that is agreed upon and that is
where a defendant wants something to happen as a result of his
conduct. For example, the defendant wants to kill the victim and to do
so he puts a gun to the victim's head and pulls the trigger. This is
known as direct intent as it is the defendant's purpose to kill the victim.
In such cases, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the defendant wanted, when he pulled the trigger, to kill the victim, ie he
had malice aforethought-an intention to kill the victim. 3 The
prosecution will do this by calling evidence, for example, a witness
testifies that he saw the defendant put the gun to the victim's head and
pull the trigger. This is direct evidence that the defendant killed the
victim and circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to kill:
It is immaterial that the chances of the result occurring were low, for
example, the defendant was half a mile away from the victim when he
Senior Lecturer, Southampton Institute.
[1998] 4 All ER 103.
Malice aforethought is also present if the defendant has an intention to cause grevious
bodily harm. Cunningham [1982] AC 566.
See Smith JC, Criminal Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995 p 5.
- 5-
, Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
fired the gun. The defendant still intended to kill because that is what he
wanted to do. 5 In such cases a judge should refrain from giving a jury
guidance as what intention means,6 other than to tell them, it is a
question of fact for the jury to decide whether a defendant intended a
result," and in doing so they must use their common sense based on all
the relevant circumstances given in evidence.
In addition to this meaning of intention based on purpose or desire,
the courts have put forward a second meaning to intention where the
actor's purpose is not to cause a result, but he realises that by his act
that result is very likely. This is because a single act can have two quite
separate outcomes, for example, the actor insures the cargo on an
areoplane and places a bomb on it timed to go off when the plane is in
flight. The actor's purpose is to claim the insurance money but he
foresees it as very likely that aircrew will be killed. In this example, a
distinction can be made between his direct intent to claim the insurance
money, and his indirect (or oblique) intent (based on foresight) to kill the
aircrew. The question the courts have struggled with is whether such
an actor is guilty of murder.
One possible starting point of an examination of the decisions that
attempt to deal with the problem of indirect intent is the House of Lords
decision in Hyam v DPP.8 In Hyam, Mrs Hyam's lover, a Mr Jones,
discarded her in favour of a Mrs Booth. Mrs Hyam's reaction was to
pour petrol through the letterbox of her rival's house which she ignited
by using a newspaper and a match. Two'ofMrs Booth's children died
as the result of asphyxia caused by the fumes generated by the fire.
Mrs Hyam maintained that she had not wanted to kill anyone, but rather
that she merely wanted to frighten her rival away from Jones. The
House, by a majority of three to two, upheld Mrs Hyam's conviction for
murder. Lord Diplock stated:
A defendant can only intend a result if he believes it is achievable. However the
prosecution could point out that if the result is objectively po~sible then it is very
likely that the defendant intended it.
Fallon [1994] CrimLR519; Smith [1998] CrimLR896.
Section 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967.
[1974] 2 All ER 41.
- 6-
