Indirect realism 25 marker
Do we perceive the external world indirectly?
Indirect realism claims the immediate objects of perception are sense data. This sense data
represents, and are caused by, the mind independent world and its objects. A successful theory of
perception should be able to explain how we can know about the world. I would argue that indirect
realism cannot fulfil this purpose and therefore it fails as a theory.
An argument in favour of indirect realism would be that it is able to overcome criticisms applied to
direct realism, such as the criticism of illusions. The example is of a pencil half immersed in a glass of
water that looks crooked, when we can be confident that the pencil itself isn’t. From this we must
conclude that the way the world appears to us, is not actually how it is. So reality must be different
to our perception of it. we must be perceiving something other than the mind independent world,
and this can be explained as sense data. Therefore we are perceiving sense data, as this represents
and is caused by physical objects in the external world.
Berkeley, an idealist, proposes the criticism that we cannot know the nature of mind independent
objects because mind independent ideas cannot be like mind independent objects. This means to
say that ideas cannot be like material objects. He argues that my idea of e.g. a tree has certain
properties, such as being green, being tree shaped, etc. But these sensible properties depend on my
mind. It seems absurd to say that my idea of a tree resembles a tree in reality. This would be like
saying something visible can resemble something invisible. Berkeley adds that ideas are ‘fleeting and
changing,’ whereas external objects are supposed to be permanent and unchanging. This means that
anything outside the mind cannot have any such qualities, and so my ideas cannot resemble or be
like any material objects. However, this is one of indirect realisms claims and so if this is false,
indirect realism fails.
Locke can respond using his primary and secondary quality distinction. He argues we can distinguish
the qualities we perceive into two kinds. He argues that when I look at a tree, my sense data of its
size, shape, position, etc. correspond fairly accurately with it in reality. This is due to the qualities
that we perceive via sense data. The first are primary qualities which are inseparable from the object
and include size, shape and number. Primary qualities are objective, since they are inherent in the
object itself. Locke argues that if we were to continually divide an object, the parts retain the
primary qualities even when too small to be conceived, so they must exist mind independently.
Secondary qualities, on the other hand, have the power to produce various sensations in us. He
includes colours, taste and sounds. They are subjective. He uses these qualities to argue that sense
data helps us to perceive the external world.
Considering Locke’s response, it seems as though Berkeley is wrong to assume that representation
requires resemblance. This means to say that we have other methods of identifying things, such as
linguistic representation. We can read the word ‘dog’ and know that we are talking about a dog. For
the reason, indirect realism can overcome this issue.
The most substantial criticism of indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and
existence of the external world. According to IR we are directly aware of sense data and must infer
the existence of objects beyond the mind (in the external world). However if we only experience
sense data and never the objects themselves, how can we know anything about the external world
or even if there is one? It is conceivable that I am simply a brain in a vat, or there is a demon
deceiving me. We can't get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world
Do we perceive the external world indirectly?
Indirect realism claims the immediate objects of perception are sense data. This sense data
represents, and are caused by, the mind independent world and its objects. A successful theory of
perception should be able to explain how we can know about the world. I would argue that indirect
realism cannot fulfil this purpose and therefore it fails as a theory.
An argument in favour of indirect realism would be that it is able to overcome criticisms applied to
direct realism, such as the criticism of illusions. The example is of a pencil half immersed in a glass of
water that looks crooked, when we can be confident that the pencil itself isn’t. From this we must
conclude that the way the world appears to us, is not actually how it is. So reality must be different
to our perception of it. we must be perceiving something other than the mind independent world,
and this can be explained as sense data. Therefore we are perceiving sense data, as this represents
and is caused by physical objects in the external world.
Berkeley, an idealist, proposes the criticism that we cannot know the nature of mind independent
objects because mind independent ideas cannot be like mind independent objects. This means to
say that ideas cannot be like material objects. He argues that my idea of e.g. a tree has certain
properties, such as being green, being tree shaped, etc. But these sensible properties depend on my
mind. It seems absurd to say that my idea of a tree resembles a tree in reality. This would be like
saying something visible can resemble something invisible. Berkeley adds that ideas are ‘fleeting and
changing,’ whereas external objects are supposed to be permanent and unchanging. This means that
anything outside the mind cannot have any such qualities, and so my ideas cannot resemble or be
like any material objects. However, this is one of indirect realisms claims and so if this is false,
indirect realism fails.
Locke can respond using his primary and secondary quality distinction. He argues we can distinguish
the qualities we perceive into two kinds. He argues that when I look at a tree, my sense data of its
size, shape, position, etc. correspond fairly accurately with it in reality. This is due to the qualities
that we perceive via sense data. The first are primary qualities which are inseparable from the object
and include size, shape and number. Primary qualities are objective, since they are inherent in the
object itself. Locke argues that if we were to continually divide an object, the parts retain the
primary qualities even when too small to be conceived, so they must exist mind independently.
Secondary qualities, on the other hand, have the power to produce various sensations in us. He
includes colours, taste and sounds. They are subjective. He uses these qualities to argue that sense
data helps us to perceive the external world.
Considering Locke’s response, it seems as though Berkeley is wrong to assume that representation
requires resemblance. This means to say that we have other methods of identifying things, such as
linguistic representation. We can read the word ‘dog’ and know that we are talking about a dog. For
the reason, indirect realism can overcome this issue.
The most substantial criticism of indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and
existence of the external world. According to IR we are directly aware of sense data and must infer
the existence of objects beyond the mind (in the external world). However if we only experience
sense data and never the objects themselves, how can we know anything about the external world
or even if there is one? It is conceivable that I am simply a brain in a vat, or there is a demon
deceiving me. We can't get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world
