WGU C843 KOP1 TASK 1: MANAGING INFORMATION
SECURITY ACCURATE AND VERIFIED 2026 UPDATE
Western Governor’s University
Managing Information Security C843
Max Anderson
C843 KOP1 Task 1
, KOP1 Task 1: Managing Information Security
A. Vulnerabilities and Attack Success
There were a few flagrant violations of standard and routine security practices through sloppy
and irresponsible auditing and inevitably doomed practices from their foundation. Quite simply, Azumer
Water failed to separate its internal confidential information through a screened subnet, or DMZ, while
haphazardly stuffing all outlets and facets of its network and infrastructure into a single location without
any protection separating the database of customer information from any potential intruders. The
careless employee opened up a link within an obviously malicious email which led to the infiltration and
manipulation of Azumer Water’s sole database of volunteer customer information. The database was
harvested and was employed in a petty scheme to secure funds from past customers in unusual and
unorthodox ways, with numerous individuals raising their concerns on the subject. The lack of any
intrusion detection or suitable encryption on the network made the attack simple and easy, as the wired
equivalency protocol was being implemented instead of a more suitable and durable encryption
standard, such as the wireless common practice WPA2
B. CIA Compromises
Confidentiality was the first and foremost element broken in the theft of the database. The
volunteer’s confidentiality was tarnished and exploited for fraudulent financial and political progressors.
The single copy of the database of the hundreds of volunteer’s was stored solely on a physical platform
within the confines of Azumer Water’s network, which was again all confined into the same physical and
logical topicality. The ISMS should be set up and ready to defend and annihilate intrusions such as this,
with a very simple set up, which is the foundation of a network (Calder and Watkins, 2019).
Integrity and availability go hand in hand with this infraction, as does the whole triad truthfully.
The malicious misplacement of the database not only compromised the ability to access that
information but it also fractures the quality of the possibility of integrity, since this was a single based
system with no redundancies. Calder and Wakins cover the ISO infractions once again around 110, but
truthfully there were more than a few mistakes made for this attack to be possible.
C. Federal Regulation
SECURITY ACCURATE AND VERIFIED 2026 UPDATE
Western Governor’s University
Managing Information Security C843
Max Anderson
C843 KOP1 Task 1
, KOP1 Task 1: Managing Information Security
A. Vulnerabilities and Attack Success
There were a few flagrant violations of standard and routine security practices through sloppy
and irresponsible auditing and inevitably doomed practices from their foundation. Quite simply, Azumer
Water failed to separate its internal confidential information through a screened subnet, or DMZ, while
haphazardly stuffing all outlets and facets of its network and infrastructure into a single location without
any protection separating the database of customer information from any potential intruders. The
careless employee opened up a link within an obviously malicious email which led to the infiltration and
manipulation of Azumer Water’s sole database of volunteer customer information. The database was
harvested and was employed in a petty scheme to secure funds from past customers in unusual and
unorthodox ways, with numerous individuals raising their concerns on the subject. The lack of any
intrusion detection or suitable encryption on the network made the attack simple and easy, as the wired
equivalency protocol was being implemented instead of a more suitable and durable encryption
standard, such as the wireless common practice WPA2
B. CIA Compromises
Confidentiality was the first and foremost element broken in the theft of the database. The
volunteer’s confidentiality was tarnished and exploited for fraudulent financial and political progressors.
The single copy of the database of the hundreds of volunteer’s was stored solely on a physical platform
within the confines of Azumer Water’s network, which was again all confined into the same physical and
logical topicality. The ISMS should be set up and ready to defend and annihilate intrusions such as this,
with a very simple set up, which is the foundation of a network (Calder and Watkins, 2019).
Integrity and availability go hand in hand with this infraction, as does the whole triad truthfully.
The malicious misplacement of the database not only compromised the ability to access that
information but it also fractures the quality of the possibility of integrity, since this was a single based
system with no redundancies. Calder and Wakins cover the ISO infractions once again around 110, but
truthfully there were more than a few mistakes made for this attack to be possible.
C. Federal Regulation
