PHIL347 FINAL EXAM PRACTICE
QUESTIONS AND CORRECT
ANSWERS
does the simple free will defense solve the problem of evil and how does
Plantinga deal with this? (4)
- no, the problem of evil wants to square the vast EXTENT of evil with God
- the simple free will defense only covers theism being consistent with evil
- step 2: extend the free will defense to cover the vast amount of evil
- step 3: extend it to cover "natural evil"
how is the simple free will defense extended to cover the vast amount of evil
in the world? (5)
- transworld depravity: whether there is evil in a world including free agents
depends on the free agents
- in all possible worlds, there will be different amounts / ratios of good and
evil (axiological value)
- it is possible that our world has the best proportion of good and evil (the
best actualizable world) --> we aren't able to compare because we are not
omniscient, but God is
- we have a limited perspective in time
- we have a limited perspective even in our CURRENT time
outline Plantinga's extended free will defense for the amount of evil in the
world (3)
,- it is consistent with God's attributes to create a world with this amount of
goodness
- it is possible that this amount of goodness can not be had without this
amount of evil
- hence it is consistent with God's attributes to create a world with this
amount of evil
outline the free will defense without omniscience
- it sis consistent with God to create a world and "see how it goes"
outline the Hume-Kraal objection to Plantinga's free will defence
- it is not clear that it is consistent with God's attributes to create a world
with this level of good
outline Plantinga's extended free will defense for natural evil in the world (2)
- possibility of satanic agents / malevolent entities or human beings
- bringing "natural evils" under the umbrella of moral evils with a possibility
claim
outline Mackie's objection to Plantinga's free will argument, and Plantinga's
response (6)
- omnipotence means God can do anything that is logically possible
- there are possible worlds (non-contradictory scenarios) in which free agents
do only good things
- hence God could bring about such worlds
,Plantinga's response
- this depends on the agents ability to do things freely
- the propositions "it is possible that free agents do only good things in W"
and "it is possible that God makes free agents do only good things" are
contradictory
outline the Snyder-Hawthorne objection to Plantinga's free will argument (6)
- transworld sanctity: the property of always doing what is right in every
world in which the carrier of the property exists
- it does not seem possible that everyone can have TWD and TWS at the
same time
- it is possible that X does not exist in every world and hence is not sanctified
in every possible world
- instantiated essences = set of properties that OBTAINS in every possible
world whether or not they are instantiated
- hence it is possible that in every world, if E is instantiatiated E would go
wrong / right wrt A
- hence TWD and TWS are contradictory but "equally possible"
What is Plantinga's response to Snyder-Hawthorne (2)
- need to appeal to first person, is TWD or TWS more believable
- TWD is more consistent with what we KNOW
what is Plantinga's view on the resurrection? (2)
, - every possible world containing incarnation and atonement must
necessarily contain a lot of evil
- a possible world in which people DO only good things is a possible world in
which people COULD do only good things if the world was actualized
outline the quantitative free will defense (3)
1. it is consistent with God's goodness to create a world with as much good
as the actual world
2. it is possible that a world with that amount of good couldn't be had
without this amount of evil given TWD
3. It is consistent with God's goodness (attributes) to create a world with this
amount of evil
outline the Hume-Kraal objection to Plantinga (4)
- it is not clear that this proportion of good / evil (let alone ANY proportion) is
consistent with God's attributes (would God create the world at all)
- the world may contain overwhelming evil compared to good (the Amount of
Goodness assumption aims to show that good > evil)
1. we don't know the proportion of good vs evil
2. we don't know how much evil comes at the price of this amount of good
What is Plantinga's response to the Hume-Kraal objection (4)
- appeal to the possibility of the Christian story
- the amount of goodness in the act of the resurrection overcomes the
amount of evil
QUESTIONS AND CORRECT
ANSWERS
does the simple free will defense solve the problem of evil and how does
Plantinga deal with this? (4)
- no, the problem of evil wants to square the vast EXTENT of evil with God
- the simple free will defense only covers theism being consistent with evil
- step 2: extend the free will defense to cover the vast amount of evil
- step 3: extend it to cover "natural evil"
how is the simple free will defense extended to cover the vast amount of evil
in the world? (5)
- transworld depravity: whether there is evil in a world including free agents
depends on the free agents
- in all possible worlds, there will be different amounts / ratios of good and
evil (axiological value)
- it is possible that our world has the best proportion of good and evil (the
best actualizable world) --> we aren't able to compare because we are not
omniscient, but God is
- we have a limited perspective in time
- we have a limited perspective even in our CURRENT time
outline Plantinga's extended free will defense for the amount of evil in the
world (3)
,- it is consistent with God's attributes to create a world with this amount of
goodness
- it is possible that this amount of goodness can not be had without this
amount of evil
- hence it is consistent with God's attributes to create a world with this
amount of evil
outline the free will defense without omniscience
- it sis consistent with God to create a world and "see how it goes"
outline the Hume-Kraal objection to Plantinga's free will defence
- it is not clear that it is consistent with God's attributes to create a world
with this level of good
outline Plantinga's extended free will defense for natural evil in the world (2)
- possibility of satanic agents / malevolent entities or human beings
- bringing "natural evils" under the umbrella of moral evils with a possibility
claim
outline Mackie's objection to Plantinga's free will argument, and Plantinga's
response (6)
- omnipotence means God can do anything that is logically possible
- there are possible worlds (non-contradictory scenarios) in which free agents
do only good things
- hence God could bring about such worlds
,Plantinga's response
- this depends on the agents ability to do things freely
- the propositions "it is possible that free agents do only good things in W"
and "it is possible that God makes free agents do only good things" are
contradictory
outline the Snyder-Hawthorne objection to Plantinga's free will argument (6)
- transworld sanctity: the property of always doing what is right in every
world in which the carrier of the property exists
- it does not seem possible that everyone can have TWD and TWS at the
same time
- it is possible that X does not exist in every world and hence is not sanctified
in every possible world
- instantiated essences = set of properties that OBTAINS in every possible
world whether or not they are instantiated
- hence it is possible that in every world, if E is instantiatiated E would go
wrong / right wrt A
- hence TWD and TWS are contradictory but "equally possible"
What is Plantinga's response to Snyder-Hawthorne (2)
- need to appeal to first person, is TWD or TWS more believable
- TWD is more consistent with what we KNOW
what is Plantinga's view on the resurrection? (2)
, - every possible world containing incarnation and atonement must
necessarily contain a lot of evil
- a possible world in which people DO only good things is a possible world in
which people COULD do only good things if the world was actualized
outline the quantitative free will defense (3)
1. it is consistent with God's goodness to create a world with as much good
as the actual world
2. it is possible that a world with that amount of good couldn't be had
without this amount of evil given TWD
3. It is consistent with God's goodness (attributes) to create a world with this
amount of evil
outline the Hume-Kraal objection to Plantinga (4)
- it is not clear that this proportion of good / evil (let alone ANY proportion) is
consistent with God's attributes (would God create the world at all)
- the world may contain overwhelming evil compared to good (the Amount of
Goodness assumption aims to show that good > evil)
1. we don't know the proportion of good vs evil
2. we don't know how much evil comes at the price of this amount of good
What is Plantinga's response to the Hume-Kraal objection (4)
- appeal to the possibility of the Christian story
- the amount of goodness in the act of the resurrection overcomes the
amount of evil
