Issue Problems with calculation
Integration The plausibility of a quantitative approach to measuring
pleasure and pain
Weighting This issue does not attack the more fundamental assumptions
or claims of utilitarianism (e.g., teleology, hedonism). Thus,
utilitarianism can survive this attack by moving to an ulterior
means of measuring pleasure and pain (e.g a qualitative
approach) while preserving the essence of utilitarianism.
Moreover, this issue is not fatal as it does not explicitly attack
all branches of utilitarianism. While it does very explicitly
challenge Bentham’s quantitative approach (the Hedonic
Calculus), it is less effective in undermining qualitative accounts
such as Mill’s, qualitative rule utilitarianism or Hare’s
preference utilitarianism, as these do not directly rely upon
calculation
Finally, it cannot be fatal, as it does not directly disprove
utilitarianism but merely highlights an unappealing tenet; this
does not ipso facto render the theory false
This would be pro tanto a significant but not a fatal
criticism, if successful
Counter 1 There are some methods in psychometrics that attempt to
quantify pleasure and pain. Thus, by deploying these
techniques, it is at least possible that we could try to work out
the particular consequences of any given action
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve
utilitarianism’s appeal by rejecting the core assumption made
by the objection that we cannot quantify pleasure and pain
Success While this may be possible, this response still ignores the major
push of the objection - that calculation isn’t feasible. Would we
have to walk around with microchips in our brains? Would
, we all need to be experts in psychometrics to make this
possible?
While this counter-argument has illustrated the possibility of a
purely quantitative act utilitarianism, more is required to
preserve the feasibility of such an approach.
Counter 2 Both Bentham and Mill accepted that it is impossible to
calculate which action aligns with the principle of utility
perfectly. That’s why Bentham defines the principle of utility
not in terms of particular consequences but in terms of the
“tendency” of an action to produce consequences. Accordingly,
individuals can best follow the principle of utility by following
“rules of thumb” (Bentham) or “secondary principles” (Mill)
fashioned by the state and wider culture, which tend to
maximise happiness and minimise pain.
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve
utilitarianism’s appeal by shifting the burden of calculation
away from individuals and onto culture and the state
Success? Mill and Bentham do improve the appeal of utilitarianism by
shifting the burden of calculation away from individuals.
However, is it plausible that they still haven’t eliminated
calculation? How does society produce these secondary
principles?
However, in response, Mill argues, unless we assume “universal
idiocy,” human beings have, through experience, already
developed shared beliefs about which kinds of actions promote
happiness, and these inherited beliefs form the basis of
common moral rules. Moreover, just as sailors rely on
pre-calculated navigational tools rather than recomputing
astronomy at sea, individuals rely on these established moral
rules in everyday life, using them as practical guides without
needing to calculate consequences from scratch in each case.
But do we still need to do a calculation to test if these
inherited moral norms are just?
, Issue Fairness and individual rights/liberty
Integration This challenges the appeal of a purely teleological account by
drawing attention to its problematic implications for freedom
and individual rights.
Weighting This objection attacks one of the most fundamental claims
made by utilitarianism - teleology. Thus, it attacks the essence
of the theory and, therefore, if successful, would be very
significant.
However, it is perhaps not fatal as it does not ipso facto render
teleology false. Instead, it highlights that it is merely
unappealing. This ensures that utilitarianism can conceptually
survive this objection. Albeit, it survives at the cost of being
misaligned with and perhaps even incompatible with the values
of our society.
It does attack all branches of utilitarianism, as utilitarianism is,
by definition, teleological. However, prima facie, it does not
significantly undermine rule utilitarianism as it is somewhat
deontological in its application
This would be pro tanto a very significant but not a fatal
criticism, if successful
Counter 1 Bentham may rebut by arguing that this objection attacks a
strawman of his theory. While utilitarianism may prima facie
justify harming people, he argues we must consider what
would happen if such behaviour were generally accepted. If
injustice were permitted against one person, the same
reasoning could be extended to others, and so on, making it
impossible to limit such harm to only rare cases. Such a world
would not actually maximise pleasure and minimise pain. Thus,
fairness and freedom are priorities of utilitarian governance -
not because of their intrinsic worth - but because of their
instrumental worth in maximising pleasure and minimising
Integration The plausibility of a quantitative approach to measuring
pleasure and pain
Weighting This issue does not attack the more fundamental assumptions
or claims of utilitarianism (e.g., teleology, hedonism). Thus,
utilitarianism can survive this attack by moving to an ulterior
means of measuring pleasure and pain (e.g a qualitative
approach) while preserving the essence of utilitarianism.
Moreover, this issue is not fatal as it does not explicitly attack
all branches of utilitarianism. While it does very explicitly
challenge Bentham’s quantitative approach (the Hedonic
Calculus), it is less effective in undermining qualitative accounts
such as Mill’s, qualitative rule utilitarianism or Hare’s
preference utilitarianism, as these do not directly rely upon
calculation
Finally, it cannot be fatal, as it does not directly disprove
utilitarianism but merely highlights an unappealing tenet; this
does not ipso facto render the theory false
This would be pro tanto a significant but not a fatal
criticism, if successful
Counter 1 There are some methods in psychometrics that attempt to
quantify pleasure and pain. Thus, by deploying these
techniques, it is at least possible that we could try to work out
the particular consequences of any given action
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve
utilitarianism’s appeal by rejecting the core assumption made
by the objection that we cannot quantify pleasure and pain
Success While this may be possible, this response still ignores the major
push of the objection - that calculation isn’t feasible. Would we
have to walk around with microchips in our brains? Would
, we all need to be experts in psychometrics to make this
possible?
While this counter-argument has illustrated the possibility of a
purely quantitative act utilitarianism, more is required to
preserve the feasibility of such an approach.
Counter 2 Both Bentham and Mill accepted that it is impossible to
calculate which action aligns with the principle of utility
perfectly. That’s why Bentham defines the principle of utility
not in terms of particular consequences but in terms of the
“tendency” of an action to produce consequences. Accordingly,
individuals can best follow the principle of utility by following
“rules of thumb” (Bentham) or “secondary principles” (Mill)
fashioned by the state and wider culture, which tend to
maximise happiness and minimise pain.
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve
utilitarianism’s appeal by shifting the burden of calculation
away from individuals and onto culture and the state
Success? Mill and Bentham do improve the appeal of utilitarianism by
shifting the burden of calculation away from individuals.
However, is it plausible that they still haven’t eliminated
calculation? How does society produce these secondary
principles?
However, in response, Mill argues, unless we assume “universal
idiocy,” human beings have, through experience, already
developed shared beliefs about which kinds of actions promote
happiness, and these inherited beliefs form the basis of
common moral rules. Moreover, just as sailors rely on
pre-calculated navigational tools rather than recomputing
astronomy at sea, individuals rely on these established moral
rules in everyday life, using them as practical guides without
needing to calculate consequences from scratch in each case.
But do we still need to do a calculation to test if these
inherited moral norms are just?
, Issue Fairness and individual rights/liberty
Integration This challenges the appeal of a purely teleological account by
drawing attention to its problematic implications for freedom
and individual rights.
Weighting This objection attacks one of the most fundamental claims
made by utilitarianism - teleology. Thus, it attacks the essence
of the theory and, therefore, if successful, would be very
significant.
However, it is perhaps not fatal as it does not ipso facto render
teleology false. Instead, it highlights that it is merely
unappealing. This ensures that utilitarianism can conceptually
survive this objection. Albeit, it survives at the cost of being
misaligned with and perhaps even incompatible with the values
of our society.
It does attack all branches of utilitarianism, as utilitarianism is,
by definition, teleological. However, prima facie, it does not
significantly undermine rule utilitarianism as it is somewhat
deontological in its application
This would be pro tanto a very significant but not a fatal
criticism, if successful
Counter 1 Bentham may rebut by arguing that this objection attacks a
strawman of his theory. While utilitarianism may prima facie
justify harming people, he argues we must consider what
would happen if such behaviour were generally accepted. If
injustice were permitted against one person, the same
reasoning could be extended to others, and so on, making it
impossible to limit such harm to only rare cases. Such a world
would not actually maximise pleasure and minimise pain. Thus,
fairness and freedom are priorities of utilitarian governance -
not because of their intrinsic worth - but because of their
instrumental worth in maximising pleasure and minimising
