OCR A Level History A Y315/01 The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945
Combined Question Paper and Mark Scheme
Oxford Cambridge and RSA
A Level History A
Y315/01 The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945
Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes
*1409263165*
You must have:
• the OCR 12–page Answer Booklet
INSTRUCTIONS
• Use black ink.
• Write your answer to each question in the Answer Booklet. The question numbers must
be clearly shown.
• Fill in the boxes on the front of the Answer Booklet.
• Answer the question in Section A and any two questions in Section B.
INFORMATION
• The total mark for this paper is 80.
• The marks for each question are shown in brackets [ ].
• Quality of extended response will be assessed in questions marked with an asterisk (*).
• This document has 4 pages.
ADVICE
• Read each question carefully before you start your answer.
, 2
Section A
Read the two passages and answer Question 1.
1 Evaluate the interpretations in both of the two passages.
Explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of the effectiveness of generalship
on the Western Front. [30]
Passage A
© Neil Stewart, The Changing Nature of Warfare 1700-1945, p90-1, Hodder & Stoughton, 2001. From first line "The blanket condemnation of the British Generals denies the fact that the British army under the guidance of its commanders made tremendous improvements," to last line "their readiness to take
Passage B
Probably the greatest charge levelled against the leaders is a failure to learn. Similar tactics failed for
similar reasons with similarly tragic consequences for over three years. Although some changes were
made, essentially the terrible British attacks in 1917 were not much different from earlier unsuccessful
attacks in 1916 and 1915. Similarly, the French attacks in 1917 were not much different from the
attacks in 1915 and 1916. Only the Germans in their attacks of March 1918 showed any significant
large-scale adaptation of these tactics, but the policy of 1916 of ‘bleeding the French white’ by
deliberately attacking their strongpoint was the crassest strategy of attrition of the war. In any case,
this attack was not properly followed up. Generals so slowly fathomed the crucial difficulty of trench
warfare, and they failed to understand that with more and more artillery, the more the surface of the
ground would be damaged and from a normal battlefield it would become a crater area. By the time
this ground had been repaired and roads built to get men and supplies to the front, the enemy would
have re-entrenched, so another attack would be needed. Given the very large number of casualties
on the Western Front and the harrowing personal accounts of hardship and loss, it is difficult to reject
these criticisms.
N. Fellows and M. Wells, The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945, published in 2016.
© OCR 2025 Y315/01 Jun25
Combined Question Paper and Mark Scheme
Oxford Cambridge and RSA
A Level History A
Y315/01 The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945
Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes
*1409263165*
You must have:
• the OCR 12–page Answer Booklet
INSTRUCTIONS
• Use black ink.
• Write your answer to each question in the Answer Booklet. The question numbers must
be clearly shown.
• Fill in the boxes on the front of the Answer Booklet.
• Answer the question in Section A and any two questions in Section B.
INFORMATION
• The total mark for this paper is 80.
• The marks for each question are shown in brackets [ ].
• Quality of extended response will be assessed in questions marked with an asterisk (*).
• This document has 4 pages.
ADVICE
• Read each question carefully before you start your answer.
, 2
Section A
Read the two passages and answer Question 1.
1 Evaluate the interpretations in both of the two passages.
Explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of the effectiveness of generalship
on the Western Front. [30]
Passage A
© Neil Stewart, The Changing Nature of Warfare 1700-1945, p90-1, Hodder & Stoughton, 2001. From first line "The blanket condemnation of the British Generals denies the fact that the British army under the guidance of its commanders made tremendous improvements," to last line "their readiness to take
Passage B
Probably the greatest charge levelled against the leaders is a failure to learn. Similar tactics failed for
similar reasons with similarly tragic consequences for over three years. Although some changes were
made, essentially the terrible British attacks in 1917 were not much different from earlier unsuccessful
attacks in 1916 and 1915. Similarly, the French attacks in 1917 were not much different from the
attacks in 1915 and 1916. Only the Germans in their attacks of March 1918 showed any significant
large-scale adaptation of these tactics, but the policy of 1916 of ‘bleeding the French white’ by
deliberately attacking their strongpoint was the crassest strategy of attrition of the war. In any case,
this attack was not properly followed up. Generals so slowly fathomed the crucial difficulty of trench
warfare, and they failed to understand that with more and more artillery, the more the surface of the
ground would be damaged and from a normal battlefield it would become a crater area. By the time
this ground had been repaired and roads built to get men and supplies to the front, the enemy would
have re-entrenched, so another attack would be needed. Given the very large number of casualties
on the Western Front and the harrowing personal accounts of hardship and loss, it is difficult to reject
these criticisms.
N. Fellows and M. Wells, The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945, published in 2016.
© OCR 2025 Y315/01 Jun25
