Causation
Causation is the ‘causal relationship between conduct and consequence’.
There are two concepts of factual causation and legal causation.
The factual causation should always be applied first when considering
causation. It is the idea that BUT FOR the defendant’s conduct the
consequence would not have occurred. In the case of R V White the defendant
attempted to kill his mother, however, she died of an unrelated heart attack.
So BUT FOR the defendant’s conduct, the victim would have died anyway. In R
V Pagett, the defendant used his pregnant gf as a human shield. The victim was
shot and died. So BUT FOR the defendant using the victim as a shield, the
victim would not have died.
Once the factual causation has been satisfied the legal causation is applied:
The de minimis rule: this is where the defendant is guilty if his conduct is more
than a minimal cause of the consequence. In R V Kinsey, the defendant was
convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. There was a presumption in
this case that there was something more than a slight/ trifling link.
The ‘thin skull rule’: this is where the defendant has to take the victim as he
finds him. In the case of R V Blaue the defendant was help responsible for
murder, even though he was not aware of her beliefs which meant she refused
the treatment. Due to the defendant’s conduct being more than the minimal
cause of the victim’s death, he was guilty.
Novus Actus Interveniens: this is where for the defendant to be guilty; there
must be a direct link from his conduct to the consequence in question. The
chain of causation may be broken by: an act of a third party. In the case of R V
Cheshire, the victim died due to an operation blocking his breathing. The
intervening act was sufficiently independent that it broke the chain of
causation. The chain of causation may also be broken by the victim’s own act.
The general rule is that if the defendant causes the victim to react in a
foreseeable way then any injury is considered to be caused by the defendant.
In the case of Roberts, the defendant was held liable as the victim’s action of
jumping out a car to escape sexual advances was foreseeable.
, COINCIDENCE/CONTEMPORANEITY RULE
Under the contemporaneity rule, the actus reus [AR] and mens rea [MR] of a
crime must happen in the same place, time and person. There are exceptions
to this rule.
Under the continuing act doctrine, the AR of a crime may consist of an ongoing
course of conduct, such that if the defendant [D] only forms MR at one point
during that continuing act, then the AR and MR still come together. In Fagan v
Met. Police D parked on V’s foot without realising. When D realised, he refused
to move his car. The court held that although D didn’t have MR at the
inception of the AR (parking on V’s foot) he formed it during the continuing AR,
so was guilty of assault.
Similarly, in Thabo-Meli the D’s argued that MR and AR for murder did not
coincide because the D’s had MR when they attacked V but not when they
committed the AR of murder by throwing him off a cliff, causing him to die of
exposure. The court held that these formed one continuing act, not two
separate ones, such that MR and AR coincided.
In Church, D knocked V unconscious in a fight. Thinking he had killed her, he
threw V into a river. The cause of death was drowning. The court held that the
fight and the drowning were one continuing act, so that the MR and AR for
manslaughter came together.
In Gallagher v MPC, D became voluntarily intoxicated so that he could go
through with murdering his wife. D argued that he was so intoxicated that he
did not have MR when committing the AR. The court held that D formed MR
when he planned to kill his wife such that his intoxication did not prevent AR
and MR from coming together.
Causation is the ‘causal relationship between conduct and consequence’.
There are two concepts of factual causation and legal causation.
The factual causation should always be applied first when considering
causation. It is the idea that BUT FOR the defendant’s conduct the
consequence would not have occurred. In the case of R V White the defendant
attempted to kill his mother, however, she died of an unrelated heart attack.
So BUT FOR the defendant’s conduct, the victim would have died anyway. In R
V Pagett, the defendant used his pregnant gf as a human shield. The victim was
shot and died. So BUT FOR the defendant using the victim as a shield, the
victim would not have died.
Once the factual causation has been satisfied the legal causation is applied:
The de minimis rule: this is where the defendant is guilty if his conduct is more
than a minimal cause of the consequence. In R V Kinsey, the defendant was
convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. There was a presumption in
this case that there was something more than a slight/ trifling link.
The ‘thin skull rule’: this is where the defendant has to take the victim as he
finds him. In the case of R V Blaue the defendant was help responsible for
murder, even though he was not aware of her beliefs which meant she refused
the treatment. Due to the defendant’s conduct being more than the minimal
cause of the victim’s death, he was guilty.
Novus Actus Interveniens: this is where for the defendant to be guilty; there
must be a direct link from his conduct to the consequence in question. The
chain of causation may be broken by: an act of a third party. In the case of R V
Cheshire, the victim died due to an operation blocking his breathing. The
intervening act was sufficiently independent that it broke the chain of
causation. The chain of causation may also be broken by the victim’s own act.
The general rule is that if the defendant causes the victim to react in a
foreseeable way then any injury is considered to be caused by the defendant.
In the case of Roberts, the defendant was held liable as the victim’s action of
jumping out a car to escape sexual advances was foreseeable.
, COINCIDENCE/CONTEMPORANEITY RULE
Under the contemporaneity rule, the actus reus [AR] and mens rea [MR] of a
crime must happen in the same place, time and person. There are exceptions
to this rule.
Under the continuing act doctrine, the AR of a crime may consist of an ongoing
course of conduct, such that if the defendant [D] only forms MR at one point
during that continuing act, then the AR and MR still come together. In Fagan v
Met. Police D parked on V’s foot without realising. When D realised, he refused
to move his car. The court held that although D didn’t have MR at the
inception of the AR (parking on V’s foot) he formed it during the continuing AR,
so was guilty of assault.
Similarly, in Thabo-Meli the D’s argued that MR and AR for murder did not
coincide because the D’s had MR when they attacked V but not when they
committed the AR of murder by throwing him off a cliff, causing him to die of
exposure. The court held that these formed one continuing act, not two
separate ones, such that MR and AR coincided.
In Church, D knocked V unconscious in a fight. Thinking he had killed her, he
threw V into a river. The cause of death was drowning. The court held that the
fight and the drowning were one continuing act, so that the MR and AR for
manslaughter came together.
In Gallagher v MPC, D became voluntarily intoxicated so that he could go
through with murdering his wife. D argued that he was so intoxicated that he
did not have MR when committing the AR. The court held that D formed MR
when he planned to kill his wife such that his intoxication did not prevent AR
and MR from coming together.
