68 PART 3 « KNOWLEDGE
Knowing vs. Thinking 69
care
and predict
Sbout ability
o . Eachach ofof the
these things isis desi
desirable within
ithi a domaini of what we
b v at domain. A Caring j#poses th ese demands on this morning as he was leaving home. Jill's door, however, must be locked for
us, which means we impgeeThese demand
s o;n)wél?e?}:y caring. Some of these the sentence about her to be true: you can’t ordinarily say, Jill knows that her
owledge might be something else. door is Jocked, but her door isn’t locked’ Knowledge links a subject to a truth.
: can know only facts, or true
This feature of ‘knowing that’is called factivitywe
propositions. ‘To know that’ is not the only factive construction: others include
“to realize that) ‘to see that),‘to remember that)‘to prove that You can realize that
your lottery ticket has won only if it really has won. One of the special features of
“know’ is that it is the most general such verb, standing for the deeper state that
B Zagzebski, in what two way§ d 0es caring
ot ing impose remembering, realizing, and the rest all have in common. Seeing that the barn
i a demand for
is on fire or proving that there is no greatest prime number are just two of the
community of epistemic trust”? many ways of achieving knowledge.
at lesson does Zagzebgkt draw from the legend of Cassandra? Of course, it's possible to seem to know something that later turns out to be
4. If some of your beliefs turned out to be false, would you care, false—but as soon as we recognize the falsity, we have to retract the claim that it
and, if so, why?
was ever known. (‘We thought he knew that, but it turned out he was wrong and
didn’t know?) To complicate matters, it can be hard to tell whether someone knows
something or just seems to know it. This doesn't erase the distinction between
knowing and seeming to know. In a market flooded with imitations it can be hard
Knowing vs. Thinking to tell a real diamond from a fake, but the practical difficulty of identifying the
genuine article shouldn’t make us think there is no difference out there: real dia-
?\q monds have a special essence—a special structure of carbon atoms—not shared
by lookalikes.
JENNIFER NAGEL
The dedicated link to truth is part of the essence of knowledge. We speak of
‘knowing’ falsehoods when we are speaking in a non-literal way (just as we can use
iow df’js lfnowi.ng Fhat something is the case differ from merely
thinking it so? a2 word like ‘delicious’ sarcastically, describing things that taste awful). Emphasis—
in italics or pitch—is one sign of non-literal use.‘That cabbage soup smells deli-
" :S:c; Uifl?;:nce kl: that you can think that a falseho
od is true but not kno“.l
h
cious, right?"‘I knew 1 had been picked for the team. But it turned out I wasn’t’ This
e. Thus, knowledge is linked to truth. 3 The matter isis disdi
-
nifer Nagel, Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Toronto, cussed by en use of ‘knows’ has been called the ‘projected’ use: the speaker is projecting herself
into a past frame of mind, recalling a moment when it seemed to her that she knew.
The emphasis is a clue that the speaker is distancing herself from that frame of
i
... [H]ow is ‘know’ different from the contrastin b ‘think’? mind; she didn't literally or really know (as our emphatic speaker didn't really like
provides some clues, Consider the following two s enees
entences: | Ty vsage the soup). The literal use of ‘know’ can’t mix with falsehood in this way.
ml knows thfxt her door is locked. Bycontrast, belief can easily link a subject to a false proposition: it's perfectly
think’
Bill thinks that his door is locked, acceptableto say, ‘Bill thinks that his door is locked, but it isr't’ The verb
Tis non-factive. {Other non-factive verbs include ‘hope} ‘suspect, ‘doubt, and ‘say’—
one ‘f"letimrrlxlediately register a difference between
Jill and Bill—but what is it? you can certainly say that your door is Jocked when it isn't.) Opinions being non-
ot actor
the domy
that comes
comes to¢ mind d has to do \with the i truth
ruth of of the embedded claim , factive does not mean that opinion is always wrong: when Bill just thinks that his
he g i just thinks that his door is locked, 5 perha; s thi is i
- door is locked, he could be right. Perhaps Bill's somewhat unreliable roommate
cause Bill's door is not really locked. Maybe he didn't
turn 51& ke;; farl:xics):)geh Bob occasionally forgets to lock the door. If Bill isn't entirely sure that his door is
it is
locked, then he could think that it is locked, and be right, but fail to know that
locked. Confiden ce
matters to knowledge.
From Jennifer Nagel, Knowledge: A Very Short Introdu Knowledge has still further requirements, beyond truth and confidence.
Press, 2014). Reprinted by permission of the publisher. ction (Oxord: Oxlord University Someone who is very confident but for the wrong reasons would also fail to have
knowledge. A father whose daughter is charged with a crime might feel utterly
Knowing vs. Thinking 69
care
and predict
Sbout ability
o . Eachach ofof the
these things isis desi
desirable within
ithi a domaini of what we
b v at domain. A Caring j#poses th ese demands on this morning as he was leaving home. Jill's door, however, must be locked for
us, which means we impgeeThese demand
s o;n)wél?e?}:y caring. Some of these the sentence about her to be true: you can’t ordinarily say, Jill knows that her
owledge might be something else. door is Jocked, but her door isn’t locked’ Knowledge links a subject to a truth.
: can know only facts, or true
This feature of ‘knowing that’is called factivitywe
propositions. ‘To know that’ is not the only factive construction: others include
“to realize that) ‘to see that),‘to remember that)‘to prove that You can realize that
your lottery ticket has won only if it really has won. One of the special features of
“know’ is that it is the most general such verb, standing for the deeper state that
B Zagzebski, in what two way§ d 0es caring
ot ing impose remembering, realizing, and the rest all have in common. Seeing that the barn
i a demand for
is on fire or proving that there is no greatest prime number are just two of the
community of epistemic trust”? many ways of achieving knowledge.
at lesson does Zagzebgkt draw from the legend of Cassandra? Of course, it's possible to seem to know something that later turns out to be
4. If some of your beliefs turned out to be false, would you care, false—but as soon as we recognize the falsity, we have to retract the claim that it
and, if so, why?
was ever known. (‘We thought he knew that, but it turned out he was wrong and
didn’t know?) To complicate matters, it can be hard to tell whether someone knows
something or just seems to know it. This doesn't erase the distinction between
knowing and seeming to know. In a market flooded with imitations it can be hard
Knowing vs. Thinking to tell a real diamond from a fake, but the practical difficulty of identifying the
genuine article shouldn’t make us think there is no difference out there: real dia-
?\q monds have a special essence—a special structure of carbon atoms—not shared
by lookalikes.
JENNIFER NAGEL
The dedicated link to truth is part of the essence of knowledge. We speak of
‘knowing’ falsehoods when we are speaking in a non-literal way (just as we can use
iow df’js lfnowi.ng Fhat something is the case differ from merely
thinking it so? a2 word like ‘delicious’ sarcastically, describing things that taste awful). Emphasis—
in italics or pitch—is one sign of non-literal use.‘That cabbage soup smells deli-
" :S:c; Uifl?;:nce kl: that you can think that a falseho
od is true but not kno“.l
h
cious, right?"‘I knew 1 had been picked for the team. But it turned out I wasn’t’ This
e. Thus, knowledge is linked to truth. 3 The matter isis disdi
-
nifer Nagel, Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Toronto, cussed by en use of ‘knows’ has been called the ‘projected’ use: the speaker is projecting herself
into a past frame of mind, recalling a moment when it seemed to her that she knew.
The emphasis is a clue that the speaker is distancing herself from that frame of
i
... [H]ow is ‘know’ different from the contrastin b ‘think’? mind; she didn't literally or really know (as our emphatic speaker didn't really like
provides some clues, Consider the following two s enees
entences: | Ty vsage the soup). The literal use of ‘know’ can’t mix with falsehood in this way.
ml knows thfxt her door is locked. Bycontrast, belief can easily link a subject to a false proposition: it's perfectly
think’
Bill thinks that his door is locked, acceptableto say, ‘Bill thinks that his door is locked, but it isr't’ The verb
Tis non-factive. {Other non-factive verbs include ‘hope} ‘suspect, ‘doubt, and ‘say’—
one ‘f"letimrrlxlediately register a difference between
Jill and Bill—but what is it? you can certainly say that your door is Jocked when it isn't.) Opinions being non-
ot actor
the domy
that comes
comes to¢ mind d has to do \with the i truth
ruth of of the embedded claim , factive does not mean that opinion is always wrong: when Bill just thinks that his
he g i just thinks that his door is locked, 5 perha; s thi is i
- door is locked, he could be right. Perhaps Bill's somewhat unreliable roommate
cause Bill's door is not really locked. Maybe he didn't
turn 51& ke;; farl:xics):)geh Bob occasionally forgets to lock the door. If Bill isn't entirely sure that his door is
it is
locked, then he could think that it is locked, and be right, but fail to know that
locked. Confiden ce
matters to knowledge.
From Jennifer Nagel, Knowledge: A Very Short Introdu Knowledge has still further requirements, beyond truth and confidence.
Press, 2014). Reprinted by permission of the publisher. ction (Oxord: Oxlord University Someone who is very confident but for the wrong reasons would also fail to have
knowledge. A father whose daughter is charged with a crime might feel utterly
