By Nayim Mohammed
‘Nixon’s policies towards Vietnam in the years 1969 to 1973 were confused
and ineffective’. Assess the validity of this view.
After becoming President in 1969, Nixon’s policies towards Vietnam were based on two principles; 1)
the policy of Vietnamization as an alternative policy to Johnson’s military containment. 2) In the run
up to his elections, he promised to secure ‘peace with honour’, meaning to secure a respectable
settlement for the United States and put an end to the war. Although there are the counter
arguments that Vietnam was an ‘unwinnable war’ for the US, and importance had turned to the
‘Great Game’, the two policies that Nixon set out with in 1969 both catastrophically failed, and for
this reason, describing his policies as ‘confused and ineffective’, would be valid.
Nixon’s policy of ‘Vietnamization’, can be described as the opposite of Johnson’s ‘Americanization’.
Instead of military escalation and adding more American troops to the war, Nixon sought to remove
American troops and strengthen the ARVN. Although the policies seem clear-cut rather than
confusing, they would be complicated by the escalation of intense bombing in North Vietnam
(Operation Line-backer I and II), covert bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia (Operation
Menu 1969-1973) and a large-scale ARVN operation in Laos (Operation Lam Son Feb-March 1971).
As a result, the policy of Vietnamization became disorderly and the costs of the policy reflected
negatively on both Nixon and the US. The conflict had caused 38,000 US deaths by 1969, and by
1973, a further 20,500 US lives, along with 107,000 ARVN soldiers. In addition to this, there were 2
million further fatalities across Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, the withdrawal of US
troops meant the ARVN became weak, spineless and ineffective on their own, against a growing
intensity and strength of the NVA and Vietcong.
In 1968, Nixon stated to political assistant “I’m not going to end up like LBJ, holed up in the White
House… I’m going to stop that war.” Before becoming President, Nixon pledged to the American
population that he would secure ‘peace with honour’. Although clear in nature, this would become
massively confusing as the years progressed, ironically as a result of his desire to not be the first US
president to lose a war, much like Johnson. In October 1972, Kissinger stated that “peace is at hand”,
and this would be followed by Nixon’s landslide victory in the November 1972 elections. However, a
month later, Nixon ordered the heaviest bombing campaign of the Vietnam War, bombing Hanoi,
Haiphong and other northern cities. Consequently, Nixon’s approval ratings fell 32% and faced
international condemnation, highlighting the confused nature of Nixon’s aim, which had before
seemed so clear-cut. It was not just American attitudes towards the Vietnam War, but the failures of
the war redefined global outlook on the reputation of the United States as a ‘world policeman’.
Thus, it can be argued that Vietnamization, although it helped Nixon win the election, only
prolonged the war by four years, at an immense cost of lives and flouting of the Constitution – with
the bombing of Cambodia and Laos – straining of the federal budget causing double-digit inflation,
created more divisions and resentment towards the war effort, and the war was ultimately lost, with
the South Vietnamese regime overthrown by the NVA in 1975.
However, the proposition can be countered as the arguments do not just weigh completely against
Nixon. It is important to note that his policies did create a lot of hope amongst Americans during
1968-69, so they were not completely ineffective. He recognised that the war was a ‘television war’,
and winning domestic support from Americans at home was important. The withdrawal of American
troops was significant in reducing the growing opposition to the Vietnam War, and was a crucial
factor in allowing Nixon to win the 1972 elections by a resounding margin (61% of the votes).
Furthermore, there is the argument that Kissinger and Nixon’s priorities had changed towards the
‘Great Game’, with a much greater focus on the ‘bigger picture’ of defeating communists, by
‘Nixon’s policies towards Vietnam in the years 1969 to 1973 were confused
and ineffective’. Assess the validity of this view.
After becoming President in 1969, Nixon’s policies towards Vietnam were based on two principles; 1)
the policy of Vietnamization as an alternative policy to Johnson’s military containment. 2) In the run
up to his elections, he promised to secure ‘peace with honour’, meaning to secure a respectable
settlement for the United States and put an end to the war. Although there are the counter
arguments that Vietnam was an ‘unwinnable war’ for the US, and importance had turned to the
‘Great Game’, the two policies that Nixon set out with in 1969 both catastrophically failed, and for
this reason, describing his policies as ‘confused and ineffective’, would be valid.
Nixon’s policy of ‘Vietnamization’, can be described as the opposite of Johnson’s ‘Americanization’.
Instead of military escalation and adding more American troops to the war, Nixon sought to remove
American troops and strengthen the ARVN. Although the policies seem clear-cut rather than
confusing, they would be complicated by the escalation of intense bombing in North Vietnam
(Operation Line-backer I and II), covert bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia (Operation
Menu 1969-1973) and a large-scale ARVN operation in Laos (Operation Lam Son Feb-March 1971).
As a result, the policy of Vietnamization became disorderly and the costs of the policy reflected
negatively on both Nixon and the US. The conflict had caused 38,000 US deaths by 1969, and by
1973, a further 20,500 US lives, along with 107,000 ARVN soldiers. In addition to this, there were 2
million further fatalities across Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, the withdrawal of US
troops meant the ARVN became weak, spineless and ineffective on their own, against a growing
intensity and strength of the NVA and Vietcong.
In 1968, Nixon stated to political assistant “I’m not going to end up like LBJ, holed up in the White
House… I’m going to stop that war.” Before becoming President, Nixon pledged to the American
population that he would secure ‘peace with honour’. Although clear in nature, this would become
massively confusing as the years progressed, ironically as a result of his desire to not be the first US
president to lose a war, much like Johnson. In October 1972, Kissinger stated that “peace is at hand”,
and this would be followed by Nixon’s landslide victory in the November 1972 elections. However, a
month later, Nixon ordered the heaviest bombing campaign of the Vietnam War, bombing Hanoi,
Haiphong and other northern cities. Consequently, Nixon’s approval ratings fell 32% and faced
international condemnation, highlighting the confused nature of Nixon’s aim, which had before
seemed so clear-cut. It was not just American attitudes towards the Vietnam War, but the failures of
the war redefined global outlook on the reputation of the United States as a ‘world policeman’.
Thus, it can be argued that Vietnamization, although it helped Nixon win the election, only
prolonged the war by four years, at an immense cost of lives and flouting of the Constitution – with
the bombing of Cambodia and Laos – straining of the federal budget causing double-digit inflation,
created more divisions and resentment towards the war effort, and the war was ultimately lost, with
the South Vietnamese regime overthrown by the NVA in 1975.
However, the proposition can be countered as the arguments do not just weigh completely against
Nixon. It is important to note that his policies did create a lot of hope amongst Americans during
1968-69, so they were not completely ineffective. He recognised that the war was a ‘television war’,
and winning domestic support from Americans at home was important. The withdrawal of American
troops was significant in reducing the growing opposition to the Vietnam War, and was a crucial
factor in allowing Nixon to win the 1972 elections by a resounding margin (61% of the votes).
Furthermore, there is the argument that Kissinger and Nixon’s priorities had changed towards the
‘Great Game’, with a much greater focus on the ‘bigger picture’ of defeating communists, by
