Principles of Corporate Finance
M M M
by Richard A. Breadley, Stewart C. Myers, Franklin Allen, Alex Edmans
M M M M M M M M M M
14th Edition
M
SOLUTION MANUAL!!! M
, CHAPTERM1
IntroductionMtoMCorporateMFinance
TheMvaluesMshownMinMtheMsolutionsMmayMbeMroundedMforMdisplayMpurposes.MHowever,MtheManswersMwere
MderivedMusingMaMspreadsheetMwithoutManyMintermediateMrounding.
AnswersMtoMProblemMSets
1. a. real
b. executiveMairplanes
c. brandMnames
d. financial
e. bonds
*f. investmentMorMcapitalMexpenditure
*g. capitalMbudgetingMorMinvestment
h. financing
*NoteMthatMfMandMgMareMinterchangeableMinMtheMquestion.
EstMtime:M01-05
2. AMtrademark,MaMfactory,MundevelopedMland,MandMyourMworkMforceM(c,Md,Me,MandMg)MareMallMrealMa
ssets.MRealMassetsMareMidentifiableMasMitemsMwithMintrinsicMvalue.MTheMothersMinMtheMlistMareMfina
ncialMassets,MthatMis,MtheseMassetsMderiveMvalueMbecauseMofMaMcontractualMclaim.
EstMtime:M01-05
3. a.
FinancialMassets,MsuchMasMstocksMorMbankMloans,MareMclaimsMheldMbyMinvestors.M
CorporationsMsellMfinancialMassetsMtoMraiseMtheMcashMtoMinvestMinMrealMassetsMsuchMasM
plantMandMequipment.MSomeMrealMassetsMareMintangible.
b. CapitalMexpenditureMmeansMinvestmentMinMrealMassets.MFinancingMmeansMraisingMtheMc
ashMforMthisMinvestment.
c. TheMsharesMofMpublicMcorporationsMareMtradedMonMstockMexchangesMandMcanMbeMpurch
asedMbyMaMwideMrangeMofMinvestors.MTheMsharesMofMcloselyMheldMcorporationsMareMnotM
publiclyMtradedMandMareMheldMbyMaMsmallMgroupMofMprivateMinvestors.
d. UnlimitedMliability:MInvestorsMareMresponsibleMforMallMtheMfirm‘sMdebts.MAMsoleMproprietor
MhasMunlimitedMliability.MInvestorsMinMcorporationsMhaveMlimitedMliability.M TheyMcanMlos
eMtheirMinvestment,MbutMnoMmore.
EstMtime:M01-05
,4. ItemsMcMandMdMapplyMtoMcorporations.M BecauseMcorporationsMhaveMperpetualMlife,MownershipMca
nMbeMtransferredMwithoutMaffectingMoperations,MandMmanagersMcanMbeMfiredMwithMnoMeffectMonMo
wnership.MOtherMformsMofMbusinessMmayMhaveMunlimitedMliabilityMandMlimitedMlife.
EstMtime:M01-05
5. SeparationMofMownershipMfacilitatesMtheMkeyMattributesMofMaMcorporation,MincludingMlimitedMliabilit
yMforMinvestors,MtransferabilityMofMownership,MaMseparateMlegalMpersonalityMofMtheMcorporation,Ma
ndMdelegatedMcentralizedMmanagement.M TheseMfourMattributesMprovideMsubstantialMbenefitMforMi
nvestors,MincludingMtheMabilityMtoMdiversifyMtheirMinvestmentMamongMmanyMuncorrelatedMreturns
—
aMveryMvaluableMtoolMexploredMinMlaterMchapters.M Also,MtheseMattributesMallowMinvestorsMtoMquick
lyMexit,Menter,MorMshortMsellManMinvestment,MtherebyMgeneratingManMactiveMliquidMmarketMforMcorp
orations.
However,MtheseMpositiveMaspectsMalsoMintroduceMsubstantialMnegativeMexternalitiesMasMwell.M Th
eMseparationMofMownershipMfromMmanagementMtypicallyMleadsMtoMagencyMproblems,MwhereMman
agersMpreferMtoMconsumeMprivateMperksMorMmakeMotherMdecisionsMforMtheirMprivateMbenefit—
ratherMthanMmaximizeMshareholderMwealth.M ShareholdersMtendMtoMexerciseMlessMoversightMofMea
chMindividualMinvestmentMasMtheirMdiversificationMincreases.M Finally,MtheMcorporation‘sMseparateMl
egalMpersonalityMmakesMitMdifficultMtoMenforceMaccountabilityMifMtheyMexternalizeMcostsMontoMsoci
ety.
EstMtime:M01-05
6. ShareholdersMwillMonlyMvoteMtoMmaximizeMshareholderMwealth.M ShareholdersMcanMmodifyMth
eirMpatternMofMconsumptionMthroughMborrowingMandMlending,MmatchMriskMpreferences,MandMh
opefullyMbalanceMtheirMownMcheckbooksM(orMhireMaMqualifiedMprofessionalMtoMhelpMthemMwithM
theseMtasks).
EstMtime:M01-05
7. IfMtheMinvestmentMincreasesMtheMfirm‘sMwealth,MitMincreasesMtheMfirm‘sMshareMvalue.M Ms.MEspi
nozaMcouldMthenMsellMsomeMorMallMtheseMmoreMvaluableMsharesMtoMprovideMforMherMretirement
Mincome.
EstMtime:M01-05
8. a.
AssumingMthatMtheMencabulatorMmarketMisMrisky,ManM8%MexpectedMr
eturnMonMtheMF&HMencabulatorMinvestmentsMmayMbeMinferiorMtoMaM4%Mr
eturnMonMU.S.
governmentMsecurities,MdependingMonMtheMrelativeMriskMbetweenMtheMtwoMassets.
b. UnlessMtheMfinancialMassetsMareMasMsafeMasMU.S.MgovernmentMsecurities,MtheirMcostMofMc
apitalMwouldMbeMhigher.MTheMCFOMcouldMconsiderMexpectedMreturnsMonMassetsMwithMsim
ilarMrisk.
EstMtime:M06-10
9. ManagersMwouldMactMinMshareholders‘MinterestsMbecauseMtheyMhaveMaMlegalMdutyMtoMactMinMtheirM
interests.M ManagersMmayMalsoMreceiveMcompensation—
Mbonuses,Mstock,MandMoptionMpayoutsMwithMvalueMtiedM(roughly)MtoMfirmMperformance.M Managers
MmayMfearMpersonal Mreputational MdamageMfromMnotMactingMinMshareholders‘Minterests.MAndMmana
gersMcanMbeMfiredMbyMtheMboardMofMdirectorsM(electedMbyMshareholders).M IfMmanagersMstillMfailMto
MactMinMshareholders‘Minterests,MshareholdersMmayMsellMtheirMshares,MloweringMtheMstockMpriceMa
, ndMpotentiallyMcreatingMtheMpossibilityMofMaMtakeover,MwhichMcanMagainMleadMtoMchangesMinMtheM
boardMofMdirectorsMandMseniorMmanagement.
EstMtime:M01-05