Metaphysics of mind revision notes
The essence of the mind
Consciousness is described by Nagel as the state of experiencing “something that it is like”, the idea of
perceiving the first-person subjective point of view in relativity – my other experiences interact with
my current perceptions (note that this is not what Nagel says himself but how I interpret what he is
saying). For example, when I walk through a garden, I experience the smell of roses and it seems to
me that these roses smell like ‘sweetness’, that is because I’ve previously had the experience of
something sweet. According to Chalmers when he talks about consciousness he is “talking about the
subjective quality of experience: what it is like to be a cognitive agent.” The AQA specification outlines
mental states as having both phenomenal and intentional properties.
Phenomenal vs intentional
The difference between phenomenal and intentional properties is that phenomenal properties are
intrinsic whilst intentional properties are relational. Introspectively refers to our ability to examine
the contents of your own conscious experience.
Phenomenal properties Intentional properties
• Phenomenal qualities are qualia, these are • Intentional properties refer to aboutness, they are
‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal directed at or are about something and they are
properties that are introspectively accessible’ non-phenomenal.
• The type of consciousness involved in perception, • The quality of certain mental states which directs
sensation and emotion. them beyond themselves and to things in the world.
• Qualia are not about anything, they just are! Like • Intentionality is a necessary and sufficient condition
experiencing the colour red. for mentality.
• Ineffable – indescribable
The mind body problem: Substance Dualism
Descartes’ meditations II and VI, meditation VI focuses on the distinction between substances and properties. A
substance is the most basic unit of existence, a foundational, fundamental entity; whilst, a property is, an attribute
or a characteristic. All substances have properties, but a substance is not just a collection of properties, it is the
thing that posses’ properties, the stuff that binds properties together. In other words, properties cannot exist
without substances, rather than properties joining together to form a substance. For Descartes there are two kinds
of substances, two kinds of essential things in existence:
• Material substances such as the body
• Mental or Immaterial substances such as the mind
Descartes uses two kinds of laws to substantiate his argument for substance dualism, Hume’s law and Leibniz’s Law.
Hume’s law argues that if something is conceivable it is logically possible (there are no logical contradictions).
Something can be conceivable in three ways: logical possibility (all the ways the world might have been, consistent
with the laws of thought), metaphysical possibility (all the ways the world could have been, consistent with the
laws of physics) and actual possibility (the way the world happens to be now).
Leibniz’s law argues if two things have distinct properties, they cannot be the same thing.
Descartes’ argument for Dualism (The conceivability argument)
• P1) I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body existing (and the whole physical
world).
• P2) Anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive of is metaphysically possible (God can make it so)
• C1) Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is metaphysically possible.
, • P3) If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.
• C2) Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the
physical world).
Problems with the conceivability argument
1. Premise one, the mind existing independently of the body is in fact not conceivable - according to behaviourists
it is not conceivable that the mind exists without the body. Ryle (key behaviourist thinker) argues that Descartes
makes a mistake when categorising the mind in its logical category; Descartes defines a physical object as something
that is extended, divisible and non-thinking, therefore drawing the conclusion that since the mind has none of these
attributes it must hence be a non-physical things.
Ryle says that this is wrong and that the mind isn’t a “thing” at all, instead the mind refers to a set of behavioural
dispositions. Ryle uses the example of ‘how does the colour blue taste?”, this question falsely assumes that is blue
under the category of things that have taste. A disposition is a tendency for a thing to behave in a certain way under
certain conditions, he uses the example of the brittleness of glass. Glass in brittle upon impact, this brittleness
cannot be examined in a physical way, we cannot divide it or extend it; yet we wouldn’t consider the brittleness
some immaterial substance separate from the glass like we do the mind from the body. Ultimately, Ryle is arguing
that we should not be tempted by Descartes’ argument to classify the mind as immaterial.
Response: Descartes would argue that the two distinct properties in which the mind and body possess (non-
extended and extended) is enough reason to be able to conceive of the mind and body as distinct.
2. What is logically conceivable may not be metaphysically possible – Whilst it is possible to imagine myself
existing as a mind distinct with my body, is that actually how the world works. Take the example of water, I can
imagine water existing as something other than H20; however, it is metaphysically impossible for water to be
anything other than H20 because this composition of elements causes water to exist.
The issue here is that Descartes is committing the masked man fallacy, take the example of superman. Cindy
believes that superman cannot be Clark Kent because Kent wears glasses whereas superman does not; superman
and Kent posses two different attributes and therefore cannot be the same. However, we can tell that Cindy has
wrongly jumped to this conclusion because superman is Clark Kent! In the same sense Descartes wrongly applies
Leibniz’s law, just because in his mind he can conceive of the mind and the body being two distinct substances this
does not mean it is metaphysically possible that these two things possess the properties which Descartes has
attributed to them (physical and immaterial).
Leibniz's law works as an a priori rule but you cannot apply it a posteriori. Descartes misapplies Leibniz's law. The
fact that mind and body have distinct properties doesn’t necessarily entail they are distinct substances. They could
equally be properties of the same thing. It is perfectly conceivable for one substance to have distinct properties
(e.g. H20 is substance that has distinct properties in different conditions i.e. ice, steam and water): the physical
substance body could have physical properties and mental properties. Therefore, three is rendered false, ultimately
trivialising Descartes conclusion that the mind is inf act separate from the body.
Response: However, Descartes could easily argue that there is no reason to believe that it is not a metaphysical
possibility for the mind to exist separately from the body. If we have the clear and distinct idea of a material and
immaterial substance, then it could very well be a metaphysical truth.
3. What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about actual possibility – Descartes may be able to convince
us that it is logically and metaphysically possible for our mind to exits and separate substance to the body, however,
Descartes cannot prove that this is the actual nature of the mind in the reality we exist in. If we use the example of
H20 again, we can argue that it is logically and metaphysically possible for water to exist as a different substance
than H20, before we discovered the molecular structure of water, water was not H20. However, as we know water
only exists as H20 in this reality, as thus any hypotheticals about its possible nature are rendered irrelevant. The
same can be said for the mind.
The essence of the mind
Consciousness is described by Nagel as the state of experiencing “something that it is like”, the idea of
perceiving the first-person subjective point of view in relativity – my other experiences interact with
my current perceptions (note that this is not what Nagel says himself but how I interpret what he is
saying). For example, when I walk through a garden, I experience the smell of roses and it seems to
me that these roses smell like ‘sweetness’, that is because I’ve previously had the experience of
something sweet. According to Chalmers when he talks about consciousness he is “talking about the
subjective quality of experience: what it is like to be a cognitive agent.” The AQA specification outlines
mental states as having both phenomenal and intentional properties.
Phenomenal vs intentional
The difference between phenomenal and intentional properties is that phenomenal properties are
intrinsic whilst intentional properties are relational. Introspectively refers to our ability to examine
the contents of your own conscious experience.
Phenomenal properties Intentional properties
• Phenomenal qualities are qualia, these are • Intentional properties refer to aboutness, they are
‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal directed at or are about something and they are
properties that are introspectively accessible’ non-phenomenal.
• The type of consciousness involved in perception, • The quality of certain mental states which directs
sensation and emotion. them beyond themselves and to things in the world.
• Qualia are not about anything, they just are! Like • Intentionality is a necessary and sufficient condition
experiencing the colour red. for mentality.
• Ineffable – indescribable
The mind body problem: Substance Dualism
Descartes’ meditations II and VI, meditation VI focuses on the distinction between substances and properties. A
substance is the most basic unit of existence, a foundational, fundamental entity; whilst, a property is, an attribute
or a characteristic. All substances have properties, but a substance is not just a collection of properties, it is the
thing that posses’ properties, the stuff that binds properties together. In other words, properties cannot exist
without substances, rather than properties joining together to form a substance. For Descartes there are two kinds
of substances, two kinds of essential things in existence:
• Material substances such as the body
• Mental or Immaterial substances such as the mind
Descartes uses two kinds of laws to substantiate his argument for substance dualism, Hume’s law and Leibniz’s Law.
Hume’s law argues that if something is conceivable it is logically possible (there are no logical contradictions).
Something can be conceivable in three ways: logical possibility (all the ways the world might have been, consistent
with the laws of thought), metaphysical possibility (all the ways the world could have been, consistent with the
laws of physics) and actual possibility (the way the world happens to be now).
Leibniz’s law argues if two things have distinct properties, they cannot be the same thing.
Descartes’ argument for Dualism (The conceivability argument)
• P1) I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body existing (and the whole physical
world).
• P2) Anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive of is metaphysically possible (God can make it so)
• C1) Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is metaphysically possible.
, • P3) If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.
• C2) Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the
physical world).
Problems with the conceivability argument
1. Premise one, the mind existing independently of the body is in fact not conceivable - according to behaviourists
it is not conceivable that the mind exists without the body. Ryle (key behaviourist thinker) argues that Descartes
makes a mistake when categorising the mind in its logical category; Descartes defines a physical object as something
that is extended, divisible and non-thinking, therefore drawing the conclusion that since the mind has none of these
attributes it must hence be a non-physical things.
Ryle says that this is wrong and that the mind isn’t a “thing” at all, instead the mind refers to a set of behavioural
dispositions. Ryle uses the example of ‘how does the colour blue taste?”, this question falsely assumes that is blue
under the category of things that have taste. A disposition is a tendency for a thing to behave in a certain way under
certain conditions, he uses the example of the brittleness of glass. Glass in brittle upon impact, this brittleness
cannot be examined in a physical way, we cannot divide it or extend it; yet we wouldn’t consider the brittleness
some immaterial substance separate from the glass like we do the mind from the body. Ultimately, Ryle is arguing
that we should not be tempted by Descartes’ argument to classify the mind as immaterial.
Response: Descartes would argue that the two distinct properties in which the mind and body possess (non-
extended and extended) is enough reason to be able to conceive of the mind and body as distinct.
2. What is logically conceivable may not be metaphysically possible – Whilst it is possible to imagine myself
existing as a mind distinct with my body, is that actually how the world works. Take the example of water, I can
imagine water existing as something other than H20; however, it is metaphysically impossible for water to be
anything other than H20 because this composition of elements causes water to exist.
The issue here is that Descartes is committing the masked man fallacy, take the example of superman. Cindy
believes that superman cannot be Clark Kent because Kent wears glasses whereas superman does not; superman
and Kent posses two different attributes and therefore cannot be the same. However, we can tell that Cindy has
wrongly jumped to this conclusion because superman is Clark Kent! In the same sense Descartes wrongly applies
Leibniz’s law, just because in his mind he can conceive of the mind and the body being two distinct substances this
does not mean it is metaphysically possible that these two things possess the properties which Descartes has
attributed to them (physical and immaterial).
Leibniz's law works as an a priori rule but you cannot apply it a posteriori. Descartes misapplies Leibniz's law. The
fact that mind and body have distinct properties doesn’t necessarily entail they are distinct substances. They could
equally be properties of the same thing. It is perfectly conceivable for one substance to have distinct properties
(e.g. H20 is substance that has distinct properties in different conditions i.e. ice, steam and water): the physical
substance body could have physical properties and mental properties. Therefore, three is rendered false, ultimately
trivialising Descartes conclusion that the mind is inf act separate from the body.
Response: However, Descartes could easily argue that there is no reason to believe that it is not a metaphysical
possibility for the mind to exist separately from the body. If we have the clear and distinct idea of a material and
immaterial substance, then it could very well be a metaphysical truth.
3. What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about actual possibility – Descartes may be able to convince
us that it is logically and metaphysically possible for our mind to exits and separate substance to the body, however,
Descartes cannot prove that this is the actual nature of the mind in the reality we exist in. If we use the example of
H20 again, we can argue that it is logically and metaphysically possible for water to exist as a different substance
than H20, before we discovered the molecular structure of water, water was not H20. However, as we know water
only exists as H20 in this reality, as thus any hypotheticals about its possible nature are rendered irrelevant. The
same can be said for the mind.
