How successful was Elizabeth’s foreign policy in the years 1568-1589?
Elizabeth I was a shrewd and astute leader whose foreign policy, considered against her
subliminal political aim of defensive action, was partially successful; her pursuit abroad
proved a delicate act of balance between aggression and negotiation. Whilst successful in
containing hostilities for over two decades, by the end of her reign this approach was no
longer viable.
Elizabeth I’s foreign policy decisions in 1568, particularly through her support of Hawkins
and suppression of Alva, could frame her diplomatic strategy as a failure. As a key figure in
the early English slave trade, Hawkins’ third expedition to the Spanish colonies in 1568
deeply antagonized Philip II: a state backed venture in which Elizabeth herself had invested.
Forced to take shelter in the port of San Juan de Ulua, Hawkins was caught and attacked by
the Spanish fleet who declared him a pirate. Simultaneously in England, the seizing of the
gold on the Duke of Alva’s fleet, intended as payments for the Spanish troops in the
Netherlands, provoked retaliation in the form of Elizabeth and Alva arresting Spanish and
English merchants respectively. Phillip II’s deep anger, by his perception of blatant English,
resulted in the inhibition of trade for the next 5 years. Although this period temporarily
heightened tensions with Spain, it arguably did not push England into an inevitable war;
Elizabeth continued to pursue more measured channels whilst avoiding direct
confrontation. Her subsequent policy of naval harassment conducted through the likes of
Drake, although further antagonised Spain, reflected a delicate compromise to balance her
more cautious approach and preference for Spanish control of the Netherlands, with the
mounting pressure from her Privy Council to take more offensive action. Although her
support of John Hawkins’ pursuits undoubtedly marked a diplomatic setback, it did not
characterise an irreversible failure of her foreign diplomacy. Despite the escalation of
hostilities, the events of 1568 did not constitute a period of no return.
Following this period of hostility, the subsequent improvement of Anglo-Spanish relations
arguably epitomises a success in Elizabeth I’s foreign policy pursuit. Following Alva’s
departure from the Netherlands in 1573, the seemingly ever imminent threat from Spain
was thus lessened; English security had consequently improved, providing Elizabeth with
more stable foundations for diplomatic concessions. As a result, the Convention of Nymegen
resulted in Elizabeth’s withdrawal of support for raids on Spanish shipping in the Indies that
had been enacted in 1568. The following year, under the Treaty of Bristol, trade resumed
once again between England and Spain, English Protestants in the Netherlands were
permitted to practise their religion, and English harbours were now closed to Dutch rebels.
1574 constituted a period of diplomacy fostered directly by Elizabeth’s willingness to
protect the security of England through coaction with Philip II, despite the previous period
of hostility. This culture of cooperation carried into the following years, aided by Philip’s
fortuitous bankruptcy that made the prospects of direct confrontation slim; understanding
the diplomatic implications, Elizabeth refused sovereignty of the Netherlands following the
‘Sack of Antwerp’. Ultimately, this period of reconciliation underscores a success in
Elizabeth’s foreign policy pursuit, navigating a shift from hostility to negotiation in the
interests of English national security. In these years her measured governance is epitomised,
successfully safeguarding the stability of her country.
Elizabeth I was a shrewd and astute leader whose foreign policy, considered against her
subliminal political aim of defensive action, was partially successful; her pursuit abroad
proved a delicate act of balance between aggression and negotiation. Whilst successful in
containing hostilities for over two decades, by the end of her reign this approach was no
longer viable.
Elizabeth I’s foreign policy decisions in 1568, particularly through her support of Hawkins
and suppression of Alva, could frame her diplomatic strategy as a failure. As a key figure in
the early English slave trade, Hawkins’ third expedition to the Spanish colonies in 1568
deeply antagonized Philip II: a state backed venture in which Elizabeth herself had invested.
Forced to take shelter in the port of San Juan de Ulua, Hawkins was caught and attacked by
the Spanish fleet who declared him a pirate. Simultaneously in England, the seizing of the
gold on the Duke of Alva’s fleet, intended as payments for the Spanish troops in the
Netherlands, provoked retaliation in the form of Elizabeth and Alva arresting Spanish and
English merchants respectively. Phillip II’s deep anger, by his perception of blatant English,
resulted in the inhibition of trade for the next 5 years. Although this period temporarily
heightened tensions with Spain, it arguably did not push England into an inevitable war;
Elizabeth continued to pursue more measured channels whilst avoiding direct
confrontation. Her subsequent policy of naval harassment conducted through the likes of
Drake, although further antagonised Spain, reflected a delicate compromise to balance her
more cautious approach and preference for Spanish control of the Netherlands, with the
mounting pressure from her Privy Council to take more offensive action. Although her
support of John Hawkins’ pursuits undoubtedly marked a diplomatic setback, it did not
characterise an irreversible failure of her foreign diplomacy. Despite the escalation of
hostilities, the events of 1568 did not constitute a period of no return.
Following this period of hostility, the subsequent improvement of Anglo-Spanish relations
arguably epitomises a success in Elizabeth I’s foreign policy pursuit. Following Alva’s
departure from the Netherlands in 1573, the seemingly ever imminent threat from Spain
was thus lessened; English security had consequently improved, providing Elizabeth with
more stable foundations for diplomatic concessions. As a result, the Convention of Nymegen
resulted in Elizabeth’s withdrawal of support for raids on Spanish shipping in the Indies that
had been enacted in 1568. The following year, under the Treaty of Bristol, trade resumed
once again between England and Spain, English Protestants in the Netherlands were
permitted to practise their religion, and English harbours were now closed to Dutch rebels.
1574 constituted a period of diplomacy fostered directly by Elizabeth’s willingness to
protect the security of England through coaction with Philip II, despite the previous period
of hostility. This culture of cooperation carried into the following years, aided by Philip’s
fortuitous bankruptcy that made the prospects of direct confrontation slim; understanding
the diplomatic implications, Elizabeth refused sovereignty of the Netherlands following the
‘Sack of Antwerp’. Ultimately, this period of reconciliation underscores a success in
Elizabeth’s foreign policy pursuit, navigating a shift from hostility to negotiation in the
interests of English national security. In these years her measured governance is epitomised,
successfully safeguarding the stability of her country.
