In 1991, the USSR was economically and politically fragile, with many conflicting problems facing
Gorbachev it was seemingly inevitable that the collapse was on the horizon. With the introduction of
Glasnost, Gorbachev allowed open criticism and opposition to the point of even allowing multi
candidate elections, amending Article 6 and allowing other political parties to form. This was
catastrophic for the Communist Party who had held onto power by force for over 70 years after
seizing control in 1917. However, now that other parties could stand, the blaringly obvious
illegitimacy of the communist was obvious for all to see. Gorbachev had left a vacuum of power,
destroying the old system but failing to replace it with any policies to protect the Government,
perhaps because he was naïve to the threats or simply too optimistic. Additionally, the introduction
of Perestroika was a definite catalyst in the collapse of the USSR, introducing joint ventures, co-
operatives and a generally more capitalist market. However, this left state shops in ruin as goods
were funneled into the more expensive foreign enterprises and co-ops. Shortages were increasing as
was inflation. Whilst removing the planned economy was a potentially viable option to reduce the
impact of the failing economy, it was ideologically impossible. But was the political reform of
Glasnost a more influential player than Perestroika, which aimed to reform the economy? Both
played a clear part, causing destruction to the regime in both areas and forcing Gorbachev into an
unstable position, but was the increasing opposition and public unrest caused by political freedom
more impactful than the failing economy and increased discontent with the market?
Extract 1 primarily focuses on the impact of Glasnost and the amendment of Article 6. The writer
explores the idea that because Gorbachev ‘amended Article 6’ and ‘loosened the electoral structure
one stage further’ the Communist Party’s power was waning and becoming almost fatally weak. For
the first time, a Communist government had ended the one-party-state and reduced some of its
central control. This can be evidenced by the introducing of multi candidate elections, which allowed
Yeltsin to run for Chairman of Congress, backed by the public, and push for an increase in
Nationalism in Russia. In the past, any kind of opposition was crushed by the secret police but in line
with Glasnost Gorbachev failed to stop the increase of Yeltsin’s power, potentially the most
influential factor in the collapse as after Yeltsin became the President of Russia demonstrating his
large amounts of influence and popularity. However, it must be acknowledged that the extract
perhaps exaggerates the argument that political reforms were the sole factor, only adding ‘economic
crisis and inter-ethnic conflict engulfed his reform regime’. Perhaps these factors, combined with the
increase in social awareness and unrest also were incredibly influential factors the extract fails to
explore and evaluate. The extract also explores the idea that Gorbachev’s lack of legitimacy was an
important factor in the collapse of the USSR. Having explored the impacts of the amendment of
Article 6, the extract links Gorbachev’s lack of legitimacy to Yeltsin’s increased power as a public
backed politician. The writer declares ‘the lack of either symbolic or actual authority undermined
him fatally’. Gorbachev failed to win public favour after promising reform and freedoms but failing to
deliver. Unlike previous leaders he failed to make use of a cult of personality or propaganda to
maintain support, instead hoping his mediocre and continuously failing reforms would keep the
public happy. Yeltsin’s increase in popularity exposed the Communist Party’s illegitimacy and left
them in a fragile position. Whilst the source fails to mention Gorbachev’s better qualities such as
refusing to use violence and terror, it was hard to celebrate him doing the bare minimum to try and
upkeep the public’s basic human rights. Overall, the extract is entirely in favour of the opinion that
the failing political reforms and the allowing of political openness in the form of multi-party
candidates, were the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR. Whilst Gorbachev perhaps did
genuinely want to create more freedom and opportunities, he failed to replace the old system with
anything secure, instead leaving a vacuum of political structure that Yeltsin was happy to fill.
Gorbachev it was seemingly inevitable that the collapse was on the horizon. With the introduction of
Glasnost, Gorbachev allowed open criticism and opposition to the point of even allowing multi
candidate elections, amending Article 6 and allowing other political parties to form. This was
catastrophic for the Communist Party who had held onto power by force for over 70 years after
seizing control in 1917. However, now that other parties could stand, the blaringly obvious
illegitimacy of the communist was obvious for all to see. Gorbachev had left a vacuum of power,
destroying the old system but failing to replace it with any policies to protect the Government,
perhaps because he was naïve to the threats or simply too optimistic. Additionally, the introduction
of Perestroika was a definite catalyst in the collapse of the USSR, introducing joint ventures, co-
operatives and a generally more capitalist market. However, this left state shops in ruin as goods
were funneled into the more expensive foreign enterprises and co-ops. Shortages were increasing as
was inflation. Whilst removing the planned economy was a potentially viable option to reduce the
impact of the failing economy, it was ideologically impossible. But was the political reform of
Glasnost a more influential player than Perestroika, which aimed to reform the economy? Both
played a clear part, causing destruction to the regime in both areas and forcing Gorbachev into an
unstable position, but was the increasing opposition and public unrest caused by political freedom
more impactful than the failing economy and increased discontent with the market?
Extract 1 primarily focuses on the impact of Glasnost and the amendment of Article 6. The writer
explores the idea that because Gorbachev ‘amended Article 6’ and ‘loosened the electoral structure
one stage further’ the Communist Party’s power was waning and becoming almost fatally weak. For
the first time, a Communist government had ended the one-party-state and reduced some of its
central control. This can be evidenced by the introducing of multi candidate elections, which allowed
Yeltsin to run for Chairman of Congress, backed by the public, and push for an increase in
Nationalism in Russia. In the past, any kind of opposition was crushed by the secret police but in line
with Glasnost Gorbachev failed to stop the increase of Yeltsin’s power, potentially the most
influential factor in the collapse as after Yeltsin became the President of Russia demonstrating his
large amounts of influence and popularity. However, it must be acknowledged that the extract
perhaps exaggerates the argument that political reforms were the sole factor, only adding ‘economic
crisis and inter-ethnic conflict engulfed his reform regime’. Perhaps these factors, combined with the
increase in social awareness and unrest also were incredibly influential factors the extract fails to
explore and evaluate. The extract also explores the idea that Gorbachev’s lack of legitimacy was an
important factor in the collapse of the USSR. Having explored the impacts of the amendment of
Article 6, the extract links Gorbachev’s lack of legitimacy to Yeltsin’s increased power as a public
backed politician. The writer declares ‘the lack of either symbolic or actual authority undermined
him fatally’. Gorbachev failed to win public favour after promising reform and freedoms but failing to
deliver. Unlike previous leaders he failed to make use of a cult of personality or propaganda to
maintain support, instead hoping his mediocre and continuously failing reforms would keep the
public happy. Yeltsin’s increase in popularity exposed the Communist Party’s illegitimacy and left
them in a fragile position. Whilst the source fails to mention Gorbachev’s better qualities such as
refusing to use violence and terror, it was hard to celebrate him doing the bare minimum to try and
upkeep the public’s basic human rights. Overall, the extract is entirely in favour of the opinion that
the failing political reforms and the allowing of political openness in the form of multi-party
candidates, were the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR. Whilst Gorbachev perhaps did
genuinely want to create more freedom and opportunities, he failed to replace the old system with
anything secure, instead leaving a vacuum of political structure that Yeltsin was happy to fill.
