A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Author(s): Gary S. Becker
Source: Journal of Political Economy , Jul. - Aug., 1973, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug.,
1973), pp. 813-846
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831130
REFERENCES
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https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831130?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
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The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Journal of Political Economy
This content downloaded from
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,Journal of Political Economy
Volume 81 Number 4 July/August 1973
Articles
813 A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Gary S. Becker
847 Stabilization Policy and Lags
Stanley Fischer and J. Phillip Cooper
878 The Specification of Technology with Several Kinds of Output
Robert E. Hall
893 Currency Depreciation, Hoarding, and Relative Prices
Rudiger Dornbusch
916 Policy Choices in an Open Economy: Some Dynamic
Considerations
Seven W. Arndt
936 The Expansion of Firms
Paul H. Rubin
950 Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species
Colin W. Clark
Communications
962 A Model of Imported Inflation
Yoichi Shinkai
972 The Effect of Nonneutral Taxation on the Use of Capital by Sector
David J. and Attiat F. Ott
982 Investment and Corporate Taxation
M. T. Sumner
994 The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values
Comment by Henry O. Pollakowski
Reply by Wallace E. Oates
1009 A CPI-Futures Market
Michael C. Lovell and Robert C. Vogel
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
,1013 Denison and the Contribution of Education to National Income
Growth: A Comment
P. R. G. Layard
Miscellany
1017 What Economists Think of Their Journals
Robert G. Hawkins, Lawrence S. Ritter, and Ingo Walter
1033 A Milton Friedman-Sir Dennis Robertson Correspondence
1040 Book Reviews
Jagdish Bhagwati et al., eds., Trade, Balance of Payments and
Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P.
Kindelberger
Anne 0. Krueger
William Breit and Roger L. Ransom, The Academic Scribblers:
American Economists in Collision
Kenneth E. Boulding
Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States
Joe D. Reid, Jr.
Norman Jacobs, Modernization without Development: Thailand as
an Asian Case Study
T. H. Silcock
Gustav Ranis, ed., Government and Economic Development
S. G. Triantis
Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital
Ray Richardson
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
, A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Gary S. Becker
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
I present in this paper the skeleton of a theory of marriage. The two basic
assumptions are that each person tries to do as well as possible and that
the "marriage market" is in equilibrium. With the aid of several
additional simplifying assumptions, I derive a number of significant
implications about behavior in this market. For example, the gain to a
man and woman from marrying compared to remaining single is shown
to depend positively on their incomes, human capital, and relative
difference in wage rates. The theory also implies that men differing in
physical capital, education or intelligence (aside from their effects on
wage rates), height, race, or many other traits will tend to marry women
with like values of these traits, whereas the correlation between mates for
wage rates or for traits of men and women that are close substitutes in
household production will tend to be negative. The theory does not take
the division of output between mates as given, but rather derives it from
the nature of the marriage market equilibrium. The division is deter-
mined here, as in other markets, by marginal productivities, and these
are affected by the human and physical capital of different persons, sex
ratios (that is, the relative numbers of men and women), and some other
variables.
1. Introduction
In recent years, economists have used economic theory more boldly to
explain behavior outside the monetary market sector, and increasing
numbers of noneconomists have been following their examples. As a
result, racial discrimination, fertility, politics, crime, education, statistical
Submitted for publication October 1, 1972. Final version received December 21, 1972.
I have benefited from the discussion of several earlier drafts at the Workshop in
Applications in Economics of the University of Chicago and in seminars at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Northwestern University, and the Population Council.
Very helpful comments were received from H. Gregg Lewis, George J. Stigler, T. W.
Schultz, William Brock, Marc Nerlove, Alan Frieden, and two referees. Michael Keeley
provided valuable research assistance. My research has been supported by the National
Bureau of Economic Research but this paper is not an official NBER publication since
it has not been reviewed by the NBER board of directors.
8I3
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Author(s): Gary S. Becker
Source: Journal of Political Economy , Jul. - Aug., 1973, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug.,
1973), pp. 813-846
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831130
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831130?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact .
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Journal of Political Economy
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
,Journal of Political Economy
Volume 81 Number 4 July/August 1973
Articles
813 A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Gary S. Becker
847 Stabilization Policy and Lags
Stanley Fischer and J. Phillip Cooper
878 The Specification of Technology with Several Kinds of Output
Robert E. Hall
893 Currency Depreciation, Hoarding, and Relative Prices
Rudiger Dornbusch
916 Policy Choices in an Open Economy: Some Dynamic
Considerations
Seven W. Arndt
936 The Expansion of Firms
Paul H. Rubin
950 Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species
Colin W. Clark
Communications
962 A Model of Imported Inflation
Yoichi Shinkai
972 The Effect of Nonneutral Taxation on the Use of Capital by Sector
David J. and Attiat F. Ott
982 Investment and Corporate Taxation
M. T. Sumner
994 The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values
Comment by Henry O. Pollakowski
Reply by Wallace E. Oates
1009 A CPI-Futures Market
Michael C. Lovell and Robert C. Vogel
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
,1013 Denison and the Contribution of Education to National Income
Growth: A Comment
P. R. G. Layard
Miscellany
1017 What Economists Think of Their Journals
Robert G. Hawkins, Lawrence S. Ritter, and Ingo Walter
1033 A Milton Friedman-Sir Dennis Robertson Correspondence
1040 Book Reviews
Jagdish Bhagwati et al., eds., Trade, Balance of Payments and
Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P.
Kindelberger
Anne 0. Krueger
William Breit and Roger L. Ransom, The Academic Scribblers:
American Economists in Collision
Kenneth E. Boulding
Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States
Joe D. Reid, Jr.
Norman Jacobs, Modernization without Development: Thailand as
an Asian Case Study
T. H. Silcock
Gustav Ranis, ed., Government and Economic Development
S. G. Triantis
Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital
Ray Richardson
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
, A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Gary S. Becker
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
I present in this paper the skeleton of a theory of marriage. The two basic
assumptions are that each person tries to do as well as possible and that
the "marriage market" is in equilibrium. With the aid of several
additional simplifying assumptions, I derive a number of significant
implications about behavior in this market. For example, the gain to a
man and woman from marrying compared to remaining single is shown
to depend positively on their incomes, human capital, and relative
difference in wage rates. The theory also implies that men differing in
physical capital, education or intelligence (aside from their effects on
wage rates), height, race, or many other traits will tend to marry women
with like values of these traits, whereas the correlation between mates for
wage rates or for traits of men and women that are close substitutes in
household production will tend to be negative. The theory does not take
the division of output between mates as given, but rather derives it from
the nature of the marriage market equilibrium. The division is deter-
mined here, as in other markets, by marginal productivities, and these
are affected by the human and physical capital of different persons, sex
ratios (that is, the relative numbers of men and women), and some other
variables.
1. Introduction
In recent years, economists have used economic theory more boldly to
explain behavior outside the monetary market sector, and increasing
numbers of noneconomists have been following their examples. As a
result, racial discrimination, fertility, politics, crime, education, statistical
Submitted for publication October 1, 1972. Final version received December 21, 1972.
I have benefited from the discussion of several earlier drafts at the Workshop in
Applications in Economics of the University of Chicago and in seminars at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Northwestern University, and the Population Council.
Very helpful comments were received from H. Gregg Lewis, George J. Stigler, T. W.
Schultz, William Brock, Marc Nerlove, Alan Frieden, and two referees. Michael Keeley
provided valuable research assistance. My research has been supported by the National
Bureau of Economic Research but this paper is not an official NBER publication since
it has not been reviewed by the NBER board of directors.
8I3
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:27:17 UTC
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