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Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory
Third Edition
Instructor’s Manual
Joel Watson with Jesse Bull
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Part I
General Materials
This part contains some notes on outlining and preparing a game theory course for
those adopting Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Sample Syllabi
Most of the book can be covered in a semester-length (13-15 week) course. Here
is a sample thirteen-week course outline:
Weeks Topics Chapters
A. Representing Games
1 Introduction, extensive form, strategies, 1–3
and normal form
1–2 Beliefs and mixed strategies 4–5
B. Analysis of Static Settings
2–3 Best response, rationalizability, applications 6–8
3–4 Equilibrium, applications 9–10
5 Other equilibrium topics 11–12
5 Contract, law, and enforcement 13
C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings
6 Extensive form, backward induction, 14–15
and subgame perfection
7 Examples and applications 16–17
8 Bargaining 18–19
9 Negotiation equilibrium and problems of 20–21
contracting and investment
10 Repeated games, applications 22–23
D. Information
11 Random events and incomplete information 24
11 Risk and contracting 25
12 Bayesian equilibrium, applications 26–27
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13 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and applications 28–29
In a ten-week (quarter system) course, most, but not all, of the book can be covered. For
this length of course, you can easily leave out (or simply not cover in class) some of the
chapters. For example, any of the chapters devoted to applications (Chapters 8, 10, 16,
21, 23, 25, 27, and 29) can be covered selectively or skipped without disrupting the
flow of ideas and concepts. Chapters 12 and 17 contain ma- terial that may be regarded as
more esoteric than essential; one can easily have the students learn the material in these
chapters on their own. Instructors who prefer not to cover contract can skip Chapters
13, 20, 21, and 25.
Below is a sample ten-week course outline that is formed by trimming some of the
applications from the thirteen-week outline. This is the outline that I use for my
quarter-length game theory course. I usually cover only one application from each of
Chapters 8, 10, 16, 23, 27, and 29. I avoid some end-of-chapter advanced topics, such
as the infinite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining game, I skip Chapter 25, and,
depending on the pace of the course, I selectively cover Chapters 18, 20, 27, 28, and 29.
Weeks Topics Chapters
A. Representing Games
1 Introduction, extensive form, strategies, 1-3
and normal form
1-2 Beliefs and mixed strategies 4-5
B. Analysis of Static Settings
2-3 Best response, rationalizability, applications 6-8
3-4 Equilibrium, applications 9-10
5 Other equilibrium topics 11-12
5 Contract, law, and enforcement 13
C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings
6 Backward induction, subgame perfection, 14-17
and an application
7 Bargaining 18-19
7-8 Negotiation equilibrium and problems of 20-21
contracting and investment
8-9 Repeated games, applications 22-23
D. Information
9 Random events and incomplete information 24
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10 Bayesian equilibrium, application 26-27
10 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and an application 28-29
Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory
Third Edition
Instructor’s Manual
Joel Watson with Jesse Bull
,AllTestsBank
Part I
General Materials
This part contains some notes on outlining and preparing a game theory course for
those adopting Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Sample Syllabi
Most of the book can be covered in a semester-length (13-15 week) course. Here
is a sample thirteen-week course outline:
Weeks Topics Chapters
A. Representing Games
1 Introduction, extensive form, strategies, 1–3
and normal form
1–2 Beliefs and mixed strategies 4–5
B. Analysis of Static Settings
2–3 Best response, rationalizability, applications 6–8
3–4 Equilibrium, applications 9–10
5 Other equilibrium topics 11–12
5 Contract, law, and enforcement 13
C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings
6 Extensive form, backward induction, 14–15
and subgame perfection
7 Examples and applications 16–17
8 Bargaining 18–19
9 Negotiation equilibrium and problems of 20–21
contracting and investment
10 Repeated games, applications 22–23
D. Information
11 Random events and incomplete information 24
11 Risk and contracting 25
12 Bayesian equilibrium, applications 26–27
,AllTestsBank
13 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and applications 28–29
In a ten-week (quarter system) course, most, but not all, of the book can be covered. For
this length of course, you can easily leave out (or simply not cover in class) some of the
chapters. For example, any of the chapters devoted to applications (Chapters 8, 10, 16,
21, 23, 25, 27, and 29) can be covered selectively or skipped without disrupting the
flow of ideas and concepts. Chapters 12 and 17 contain ma- terial that may be regarded as
more esoteric than essential; one can easily have the students learn the material in these
chapters on their own. Instructors who prefer not to cover contract can skip Chapters
13, 20, 21, and 25.
Below is a sample ten-week course outline that is formed by trimming some of the
applications from the thirteen-week outline. This is the outline that I use for my
quarter-length game theory course. I usually cover only one application from each of
Chapters 8, 10, 16, 23, 27, and 29. I avoid some end-of-chapter advanced topics, such
as the infinite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining game, I skip Chapter 25, and,
depending on the pace of the course, I selectively cover Chapters 18, 20, 27, 28, and 29.
Weeks Topics Chapters
A. Representing Games
1 Introduction, extensive form, strategies, 1-3
and normal form
1-2 Beliefs and mixed strategies 4-5
B. Analysis of Static Settings
2-3 Best response, rationalizability, applications 6-8
3-4 Equilibrium, applications 9-10
5 Other equilibrium topics 11-12
5 Contract, law, and enforcement 13
C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings
6 Backward induction, subgame perfection, 14-17
and an application
7 Bargaining 18-19
7-8 Negotiation equilibrium and problems of 20-21
contracting and investment
8-9 Repeated games, applications 22-23
D. Information
9 Random events and incomplete information 24
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10 Bayesian equilibrium, application 26-27
10 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and an application 28-29
