Philosophy of Mind, Brain and Behavior
Key concepts and the most important information.
Philosophy and psychology
The philosophical toolbox:
- To determine the certainty of claims
- Assessing strengths of arguments
- Analyzing concepts, definitions and explananda
- Interpreting scientific results and conclusions
- Scientific integrity (responsibility, publication, pressure, bias)
- Ethical reflection
Using the scientific toolbox may result in a lot of (theoretical uncertainty) and more questions, rather
than answers.
Mind-body problem
The mind body problem refers to the relation between the mind and the body and what exactly this
relation is and how it exists, if it exists at all.
The mind is a label for mental states; perception, sensation, emotion, belief, desire etc. Mental states
have certain properties:
- They are caused by the world (e.g. pain)
- They cause actions
- They cause other mental states
- They are conscious and have a particular quality (‘what it is like’)
- They have intentionality (they are about something, e.g. a belief)
- They are correlated with certain brain states
Substance dualism
Descartes proposed the theory of substance dualism, which said that human beings consist of two
substances: mental and physical.
A substance in this sentence meant, fundamental building block of reality. Therefore, a physical
substance was the size, shape, location in space and the mental substance was thinking, anything
marked by consciousness.
Descartes’ substance dualism theory relied on two arguments:
- Cogito ergo sum, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Descartes argues that something physical is not
conscious and therefore in cannot reason or use language. He said that we can doubt
everything, except the fact that we are doubting in that moment.
A problem with this argument was that Descartes said that physical objects do not rationality,
language and consciousness, but these days we can doubt this as we think about robots and
computers.
- Leibniz’s principle of indiscernible: x=y, but only when x and y share all properties. This
was proof for mind-body dualism because”
o I can doubt that I have a body
o I cannot doubt that I exist
o Thus, I am not identical with my body
However, this theory didn’t work in psychology, because what people think about something,
is not a property of that thing. The problem here was, that there was a leap from epistemology
(the theory of knowledge, how we know things) to ontology (the study of what exists).
Another problem with Descartes’ substance dualism what the problem of mental causation. How is
causal interaction between mental and physical substances possible? There is a causal closure of the
physical domain, meaning that we can give a full explanation of the physical, without referring to the
mental.
,Furthermore, there were some methodological problems with this theory, namely that Descartes said
that we know our own mind my means of introspection. We are directly aware of our own mental
states, but we need to infer mental states of others on the basis of their behavior. There might be some
asymmetries between the knowledge about ourselves and the knowledge of others, so that raises the
questions of how reliable the introspection method is.
Behaviorism
Psychological behaviorism is a methodological thesis about how psychology should proceed. Its
central focus: explaining behavior in terms of stimulus-response reactions, such as classical- and
operant conditioning. Psychological behaviorism is against postulation non-observable states and the
use of introspection.
There are some problems with psychological behaviorism:
- What is wrong with postulating non-observable entities?
- The stimulus-response paradigm doesn’t work for complex interactions
- The ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument by Chomsky: sometimes people are now exposed to a
rich enough environment in order for the to ‘learn’ how to properly behave in certain
situations.
Philosophical behaviorism is a thesis about the meaning of mental states. It states that mental states
are behavioral dispositions. A disposition is a tendency to display certain behavior in certain
circumstances, but a disposition is not the cause of a behavior and does not guarantee that the
expected behavior does occur. According to philosophical behaviorist, observable behavior
operationalizes the meaning of mental states. Te mind is nothing more than the way our behavior is
organized, it is manifesting in he intelligent actions of people in a certain context. The mind is not a
ghost in the machine and the body is not a machine. There is no asymmetry between how we know
ourselves and how we know others. Interpretation is solely based on observing behavior.
Mental holism is a problem for philosophical behaviorism. It states that there is no one-to-one
relation between behavior and mental states, rather that one mental state can lead to different
behaviors in different circumstances.
- Super stoic: mental states without the corresponding behavioral expression
- Perfect pretender: behavioral expression without the corresponding mental states
Identity theory
Identity theory states that mental states are identical to brain states. Neuroscientists suggest a very
intimate relationship between mental states and brain states, so why not identity? Identity is different
from interaction, association, realization, correlation or causation, it is ‘a brute fact of nature’, one =
the other. There are two versions within identity theory:
- Type identity theory: ‘type’ means a category, for example the word dog. Type identity
theory is the strongest version of identity theory. It suggests that every mental state of a
specific type is identical with a brain state of a specific type. Multiple realizability theory:
mental states can be realized by different brain states, which can be proven with neural-
plasticity. This is an argument against type identity theory.
- Token identity theory: ‘token’ refers to an individual object in a category, for example that
husky. Token identity theory claims that all mental states are brain states but doesn’t specify
which mental states are which brain states. This makes token identity theory compatible with
multiple realizability.
There is another problem for identity theory, it lacks explanatory power. Simply stating that mental
states are identical with brain states doesn’t explain anything.
, Functionalism
Functionalism says that mental states are defined as functions, or causal roles. The focus is not so
much on what mental states are, but more on what they do. Mental states as functions, can be
characterized in terms of:
- Input (what causes them)
- Output (what they cause)
- Their relation to other mental states
Functionalism combines insight from both behaviorism (mental states exist, and they play a causal
role, which is connected to behavior) and identity theory (mental states can be brain processes, but
there is no type-identity because of multiple realizability).
Functionalism’s role in psychology focusses on ‘cognitive models: internal states and how they are
interrelated. There are three mechanisms:
- The cognitive triad: automatic and reinforcing negative thoughts about the self, world and
future
- Negative self-schemas: beliefs about the self that are essentially negative and pessimistic
- Errors in logic: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, magnification and minimization
etc.
Computationalism
Computationalism has a central role for symbols. It’s about the human capacity to think about objects
and events that are not in the immediate environment. A symbol is a stand-in for something else, such
as traffic signs, letters and words. Symbols are composed of syntax and semantics:
- Syntax: the physical properties of a word
- Semantics: the meaning, reference or truth value of the symbols
Machines and computers can manipulate symbols, based on syntactic properties and a set of
instruction the computers have been given. Computers can be programmed to respect semantics as
well, but do they then really understand what it means?
Computers can ‘think’. Thinking can be both causal and rational. Look at the following example:
The computer knows: all metals expand when heated, iron is a metal. Then, the computer can
think that thus iron will expand when heated.
Perhaps, this is how we work as well, perhaps the mind a symbol-processing computer, and that is
what computationalism is all about. Computationalism thinks of our brain as a biological computer.
It performs computations based on the syntactic properties of a symbolic language.
There are two thought experiments that are related to computationalism: The Chinese Room
experiment and the Turing Test (if a human asks questions to another human and a computer, and he
or she cannot tell the difference between answers, the computer can think).
Connectionism
Connectionism focusses on bottom-up processing rather than top-down processing, which is the case
in computationalism. Connectionism rejects the requirements of a symbolic language; the starting
point is a simple computational unit (node or neuron). The focus is on artificial neural networks:
complex behaviors require many interconnected nodes. Neurons compute a simple transfer function,
which determines the neuron’s output given the input. The weight of the connection determines the
effect of the output of a previous neuron on the receiving neuron. The combination of connections,
weights and transfer functions determines the behavior of the network. Output is determined by the
activity of many neurons, there are no explicit rules. Networks can learn:
- Supervised learning: when an input is presented, the network produces some output, which
is then compared to the right answer. The errors are ‘backwards propagated’ (basing the
current networks on the error rate of the last networks) through the network, updating the
weights to minimize errors.
- Unsupervised learning: relies on statistics of the input to organize the output space into
categories. The network learns to pick out the ‘most salient’ patterns in the input.
Key concepts and the most important information.
Philosophy and psychology
The philosophical toolbox:
- To determine the certainty of claims
- Assessing strengths of arguments
- Analyzing concepts, definitions and explananda
- Interpreting scientific results and conclusions
- Scientific integrity (responsibility, publication, pressure, bias)
- Ethical reflection
Using the scientific toolbox may result in a lot of (theoretical uncertainty) and more questions, rather
than answers.
Mind-body problem
The mind body problem refers to the relation between the mind and the body and what exactly this
relation is and how it exists, if it exists at all.
The mind is a label for mental states; perception, sensation, emotion, belief, desire etc. Mental states
have certain properties:
- They are caused by the world (e.g. pain)
- They cause actions
- They cause other mental states
- They are conscious and have a particular quality (‘what it is like’)
- They have intentionality (they are about something, e.g. a belief)
- They are correlated with certain brain states
Substance dualism
Descartes proposed the theory of substance dualism, which said that human beings consist of two
substances: mental and physical.
A substance in this sentence meant, fundamental building block of reality. Therefore, a physical
substance was the size, shape, location in space and the mental substance was thinking, anything
marked by consciousness.
Descartes’ substance dualism theory relied on two arguments:
- Cogito ergo sum, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Descartes argues that something physical is not
conscious and therefore in cannot reason or use language. He said that we can doubt
everything, except the fact that we are doubting in that moment.
A problem with this argument was that Descartes said that physical objects do not rationality,
language and consciousness, but these days we can doubt this as we think about robots and
computers.
- Leibniz’s principle of indiscernible: x=y, but only when x and y share all properties. This
was proof for mind-body dualism because”
o I can doubt that I have a body
o I cannot doubt that I exist
o Thus, I am not identical with my body
However, this theory didn’t work in psychology, because what people think about something,
is not a property of that thing. The problem here was, that there was a leap from epistemology
(the theory of knowledge, how we know things) to ontology (the study of what exists).
Another problem with Descartes’ substance dualism what the problem of mental causation. How is
causal interaction between mental and physical substances possible? There is a causal closure of the
physical domain, meaning that we can give a full explanation of the physical, without referring to the
mental.
,Furthermore, there were some methodological problems with this theory, namely that Descartes said
that we know our own mind my means of introspection. We are directly aware of our own mental
states, but we need to infer mental states of others on the basis of their behavior. There might be some
asymmetries between the knowledge about ourselves and the knowledge of others, so that raises the
questions of how reliable the introspection method is.
Behaviorism
Psychological behaviorism is a methodological thesis about how psychology should proceed. Its
central focus: explaining behavior in terms of stimulus-response reactions, such as classical- and
operant conditioning. Psychological behaviorism is against postulation non-observable states and the
use of introspection.
There are some problems with psychological behaviorism:
- What is wrong with postulating non-observable entities?
- The stimulus-response paradigm doesn’t work for complex interactions
- The ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument by Chomsky: sometimes people are now exposed to a
rich enough environment in order for the to ‘learn’ how to properly behave in certain
situations.
Philosophical behaviorism is a thesis about the meaning of mental states. It states that mental states
are behavioral dispositions. A disposition is a tendency to display certain behavior in certain
circumstances, but a disposition is not the cause of a behavior and does not guarantee that the
expected behavior does occur. According to philosophical behaviorist, observable behavior
operationalizes the meaning of mental states. Te mind is nothing more than the way our behavior is
organized, it is manifesting in he intelligent actions of people in a certain context. The mind is not a
ghost in the machine and the body is not a machine. There is no asymmetry between how we know
ourselves and how we know others. Interpretation is solely based on observing behavior.
Mental holism is a problem for philosophical behaviorism. It states that there is no one-to-one
relation between behavior and mental states, rather that one mental state can lead to different
behaviors in different circumstances.
- Super stoic: mental states without the corresponding behavioral expression
- Perfect pretender: behavioral expression without the corresponding mental states
Identity theory
Identity theory states that mental states are identical to brain states. Neuroscientists suggest a very
intimate relationship between mental states and brain states, so why not identity? Identity is different
from interaction, association, realization, correlation or causation, it is ‘a brute fact of nature’, one =
the other. There are two versions within identity theory:
- Type identity theory: ‘type’ means a category, for example the word dog. Type identity
theory is the strongest version of identity theory. It suggests that every mental state of a
specific type is identical with a brain state of a specific type. Multiple realizability theory:
mental states can be realized by different brain states, which can be proven with neural-
plasticity. This is an argument against type identity theory.
- Token identity theory: ‘token’ refers to an individual object in a category, for example that
husky. Token identity theory claims that all mental states are brain states but doesn’t specify
which mental states are which brain states. This makes token identity theory compatible with
multiple realizability.
There is another problem for identity theory, it lacks explanatory power. Simply stating that mental
states are identical with brain states doesn’t explain anything.
, Functionalism
Functionalism says that mental states are defined as functions, or causal roles. The focus is not so
much on what mental states are, but more on what they do. Mental states as functions, can be
characterized in terms of:
- Input (what causes them)
- Output (what they cause)
- Their relation to other mental states
Functionalism combines insight from both behaviorism (mental states exist, and they play a causal
role, which is connected to behavior) and identity theory (mental states can be brain processes, but
there is no type-identity because of multiple realizability).
Functionalism’s role in psychology focusses on ‘cognitive models: internal states and how they are
interrelated. There are three mechanisms:
- The cognitive triad: automatic and reinforcing negative thoughts about the self, world and
future
- Negative self-schemas: beliefs about the self that are essentially negative and pessimistic
- Errors in logic: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, magnification and minimization
etc.
Computationalism
Computationalism has a central role for symbols. It’s about the human capacity to think about objects
and events that are not in the immediate environment. A symbol is a stand-in for something else, such
as traffic signs, letters and words. Symbols are composed of syntax and semantics:
- Syntax: the physical properties of a word
- Semantics: the meaning, reference or truth value of the symbols
Machines and computers can manipulate symbols, based on syntactic properties and a set of
instruction the computers have been given. Computers can be programmed to respect semantics as
well, but do they then really understand what it means?
Computers can ‘think’. Thinking can be both causal and rational. Look at the following example:
The computer knows: all metals expand when heated, iron is a metal. Then, the computer can
think that thus iron will expand when heated.
Perhaps, this is how we work as well, perhaps the mind a symbol-processing computer, and that is
what computationalism is all about. Computationalism thinks of our brain as a biological computer.
It performs computations based on the syntactic properties of a symbolic language.
There are two thought experiments that are related to computationalism: The Chinese Room
experiment and the Turing Test (if a human asks questions to another human and a computer, and he
or she cannot tell the difference between answers, the computer can think).
Connectionism
Connectionism focusses on bottom-up processing rather than top-down processing, which is the case
in computationalism. Connectionism rejects the requirements of a symbolic language; the starting
point is a simple computational unit (node or neuron). The focus is on artificial neural networks:
complex behaviors require many interconnected nodes. Neurons compute a simple transfer function,
which determines the neuron’s output given the input. The weight of the connection determines the
effect of the output of a previous neuron on the receiving neuron. The combination of connections,
weights and transfer functions determines the behavior of the network. Output is determined by the
activity of many neurons, there are no explicit rules. Networks can learn:
- Supervised learning: when an input is presented, the network produces some output, which
is then compared to the right answer. The errors are ‘backwards propagated’ (basing the
current networks on the error rate of the last networks) through the network, updating the
weights to minimize errors.
- Unsupervised learning: relies on statistics of the input to organize the output space into
categories. The network learns to pick out the ‘most salient’ patterns in the input.
