J. Child Psychol. Psychiat. Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 699–702, 2001
Cambridge University Press. Printed in Great Britain
Book Reviews
Handbook of Child Psychology. Fifth Edition. Vol. One : contemporary developmental psychology would under-
Theoretical Models of Human Development. Editor in Chief : standably lead to a sense of paralysis in all but the best-funded,
W. Damon ; Volume Editor : R. M. Lerner. John Wiley & interdisciplinary-team-based academics.
Sons, Chichester, U.K., 1998. pp. 1274. £125±00 (pb) for all Although the chapters on systems approaches pose important
four volumes. and timely challenges to the theoretical myopia that has become
widespread in a discipline that is so often phenomenon-led (e.g.,
A key theme that recurs throughout much of this impressive much of the research on false belief understanding), my guess is
volume is that developmental psychology should embrace a that over the next decade or so the most striking progress will be
developmental systems approach. But there is much more than made in more modest and tractable efforts at integration. For
this, and vastly more than I could hope to convey in a brief example, the recent work of Zhe and Siegler (2000) comes to
review. In all senses, this is a very substantial book. It comprises mind. Zhe and Siegler note that even in closely related areas of
19 heavyweight chapters in a formidable 1274 pages. The research, such as the study of cognitive development in toddlers
contributors (e.g. Bronfenbrenner, Cairns, Fischer, Gardner, and older children, there exist differences in the sorts of
Goodnow, Gottlieb, Keil, Lerner, Overton, Shweder, Spelke, questions asked, methods and measures used, and the level of
Thelen, Wapner), all leaders in their fields, have written for their detail at which children’s knowledge is described. Their work
academic peers—by which I mean that the chapters are densely attempts to bridge the gap between our understanding of
and technically written. The range of theoretical approaches toddlers’ and older children’s thinking. Thus, notwithstanding
represented is considerable : neo-Piagetian, neo-Vygotskian, the force of the arguments of developmental systems theorists,
cognitive science, cultural psychology, ecological perspectives, in my view enterprises of the sort pursued by Zhe and Siegler
life-span approaches, behaviour genetics, action theories, and nonetheless represent significant progress and are likely to be
systems (and dynamic systems) approaches. particularly fruitful over the next decade. Expanding the frame
Despite diversity in the theories that feature, approximately and integrating different levels of analysis, then, is likely to
half of the chapters argue for some form of developmental happen rather gradually and we shouldn’t be embarrassed
systems approach. The systems approach is not so much a by the pace of change (particularly given the diversity and
unified theory as a general framework that seeks the synthesis of incommensurability of much of the theoretical terminology
multiple levels of analysis, from the biological to the cultural within the different subdomains of contemporary develop-
and historical. To quote from Lerner, systems approaches : mental psychology).
The book offers many other challenges to the discipline. For
stress that the bases for change, and for both plasticity and
example, Brandsta$ dter notes that although we have for many
constraints in development, lie in the relations that exist
decades recognised that the child is actively involved in the
among the multiple levels of organization that comprise
process of development, development has not been conceived as
the substance of human life … These levels range from the
in any sense the outcome of agents’ intentional processes. For
inner biological through the individual}psychological and
Brandsta$ dter, human ontogeny is conceptualised, at least to
the proximal social relational (e.g. involving dyads, peer
some degree, as a reflexive process in which individuals self-
groups, and nuclear families), to the sociocultural level
consciously direct their own development. This chapter, like
(including key macro institutions …) and the natural and
many in this volume, suggests innovative programmes of new
designed physical ecologies of human development.
research based on ‘‘ action theory ’’.
… These tiers are structurally and functionally integrated.
Several contributors (e.g. Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter ;
Such a developmental systems perspective promotes a
Overton ; Valsiner) tackle the issue of what is meant by
relational unit of analysis … . Variables associated with
development—not a practice, curiously, to which develop-
any level of organization exist (are structured) in relation
mentalists are much inclined. Elder addresses the challenge of
to variables from other levels … (p. 7)
how to conceptualise development post-childhood. Valsiner, in
From this perspective, what is wrong with developmental a particularly good chapter, begins by discussing the three
psychology’s myriad short-range, uni-level theories is that, at major conceptualisations of development that have dominated
best, ‘‘ they focus essentially on what are main effects embedded the discipline : development as differentiation (e.g. Werner), as
in higher-order interactions ’’ (p. 7). Indeed, based on this line of equilibration (e.g. Piaget) and as the outcome of teaching}
reasoning, Lerner rejects a broad swathe of contemporary learning processes (e.g. Vygotsky). Valsiner argues that none of
theories as ‘‘ non-veridical ’’. It is hard to argue with Lerner : at these positions represent profound improvements on their
some level nearly all developmentalists would accept the need to ancient predecessors. Amongst other trenchant claims, he
acknowledge the ‘‘ bigger picture ’’. However, there are in- asserts that this lack of theoretical progress is due to the
evitable obstacles in the pursuit of what might ultimately be adoption of developmental psychology by general experimental
identified as a sort of scientific Holy Grail. For example, one psychology (a ‘‘ metatheoretically distant ’’ foster parent). This
cannot know, a priori, the range of factors that might be adoption, he argues, has resulted in attempts at objectivity
implicated in any aspect of human development (not so long founded upon the measurement ideals of physics. Influence
ago, after all, we didn’t know of the existence of DNA), thus one from a different science, for example chemistry, ‘‘ might have
can never really know how far one has got a ‘‘ veridical ’’ grip on provided these models with a more persistent intellectual
the ‘‘ higher order interactions ’’. At a more mundane level it focus … and thereby furthered their elaboration. Thus, the
also concerns me that the requirements of adequate science set focus on structure and its conditional transformation would be
out by fundamentalist advocates of the systems approach pose far better aligned with the conceptual sphere of chemistry than
simply overwhelming goals for practising scientists. That is, with the physics of psychology’s construction ’’ (p. 219). Such
literatures within the subfields of developmental psychology critiques underline the need for developmental psychology
have become so vast that staying up-to-date in one’s own area explicitly to address the concept of development.
of specialism can be extremely difficult ; to attempt to embrace An issue that emerges in many chapters is that of individual
the prodigious range of material represented throughout variability in human development. For the most part, develop-
699
Cambridge University Press. Printed in Great Britain
Book Reviews
Handbook of Child Psychology. Fifth Edition. Vol. One : contemporary developmental psychology would under-
Theoretical Models of Human Development. Editor in Chief : standably lead to a sense of paralysis in all but the best-funded,
W. Damon ; Volume Editor : R. M. Lerner. John Wiley & interdisciplinary-team-based academics.
Sons, Chichester, U.K., 1998. pp. 1274. £125±00 (pb) for all Although the chapters on systems approaches pose important
four volumes. and timely challenges to the theoretical myopia that has become
widespread in a discipline that is so often phenomenon-led (e.g.,
A key theme that recurs throughout much of this impressive much of the research on false belief understanding), my guess is
volume is that developmental psychology should embrace a that over the next decade or so the most striking progress will be
developmental systems approach. But there is much more than made in more modest and tractable efforts at integration. For
this, and vastly more than I could hope to convey in a brief example, the recent work of Zhe and Siegler (2000) comes to
review. In all senses, this is a very substantial book. It comprises mind. Zhe and Siegler note that even in closely related areas of
19 heavyweight chapters in a formidable 1274 pages. The research, such as the study of cognitive development in toddlers
contributors (e.g. Bronfenbrenner, Cairns, Fischer, Gardner, and older children, there exist differences in the sorts of
Goodnow, Gottlieb, Keil, Lerner, Overton, Shweder, Spelke, questions asked, methods and measures used, and the level of
Thelen, Wapner), all leaders in their fields, have written for their detail at which children’s knowledge is described. Their work
academic peers—by which I mean that the chapters are densely attempts to bridge the gap between our understanding of
and technically written. The range of theoretical approaches toddlers’ and older children’s thinking. Thus, notwithstanding
represented is considerable : neo-Piagetian, neo-Vygotskian, the force of the arguments of developmental systems theorists,
cognitive science, cultural psychology, ecological perspectives, in my view enterprises of the sort pursued by Zhe and Siegler
life-span approaches, behaviour genetics, action theories, and nonetheless represent significant progress and are likely to be
systems (and dynamic systems) approaches. particularly fruitful over the next decade. Expanding the frame
Despite diversity in the theories that feature, approximately and integrating different levels of analysis, then, is likely to
half of the chapters argue for some form of developmental happen rather gradually and we shouldn’t be embarrassed
systems approach. The systems approach is not so much a by the pace of change (particularly given the diversity and
unified theory as a general framework that seeks the synthesis of incommensurability of much of the theoretical terminology
multiple levels of analysis, from the biological to the cultural within the different subdomains of contemporary develop-
and historical. To quote from Lerner, systems approaches : mental psychology).
The book offers many other challenges to the discipline. For
stress that the bases for change, and for both plasticity and
example, Brandsta$ dter notes that although we have for many
constraints in development, lie in the relations that exist
decades recognised that the child is actively involved in the
among the multiple levels of organization that comprise
process of development, development has not been conceived as
the substance of human life … These levels range from the
in any sense the outcome of agents’ intentional processes. For
inner biological through the individual}psychological and
Brandsta$ dter, human ontogeny is conceptualised, at least to
the proximal social relational (e.g. involving dyads, peer
some degree, as a reflexive process in which individuals self-
groups, and nuclear families), to the sociocultural level
consciously direct their own development. This chapter, like
(including key macro institutions …) and the natural and
many in this volume, suggests innovative programmes of new
designed physical ecologies of human development.
research based on ‘‘ action theory ’’.
… These tiers are structurally and functionally integrated.
Several contributors (e.g. Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter ;
Such a developmental systems perspective promotes a
Overton ; Valsiner) tackle the issue of what is meant by
relational unit of analysis … . Variables associated with
development—not a practice, curiously, to which develop-
any level of organization exist (are structured) in relation
mentalists are much inclined. Elder addresses the challenge of
to variables from other levels … (p. 7)
how to conceptualise development post-childhood. Valsiner, in
From this perspective, what is wrong with developmental a particularly good chapter, begins by discussing the three
psychology’s myriad short-range, uni-level theories is that, at major conceptualisations of development that have dominated
best, ‘‘ they focus essentially on what are main effects embedded the discipline : development as differentiation (e.g. Werner), as
in higher-order interactions ’’ (p. 7). Indeed, based on this line of equilibration (e.g. Piaget) and as the outcome of teaching}
reasoning, Lerner rejects a broad swathe of contemporary learning processes (e.g. Vygotsky). Valsiner argues that none of
theories as ‘‘ non-veridical ’’. It is hard to argue with Lerner : at these positions represent profound improvements on their
some level nearly all developmentalists would accept the need to ancient predecessors. Amongst other trenchant claims, he
acknowledge the ‘‘ bigger picture ’’. However, there are in- asserts that this lack of theoretical progress is due to the
evitable obstacles in the pursuit of what might ultimately be adoption of developmental psychology by general experimental
identified as a sort of scientific Holy Grail. For example, one psychology (a ‘‘ metatheoretically distant ’’ foster parent). This
cannot know, a priori, the range of factors that might be adoption, he argues, has resulted in attempts at objectivity
implicated in any aspect of human development (not so long founded upon the measurement ideals of physics. Influence
ago, after all, we didn’t know of the existence of DNA), thus one from a different science, for example chemistry, ‘‘ might have
can never really know how far one has got a ‘‘ veridical ’’ grip on provided these models with a more persistent intellectual
the ‘‘ higher order interactions ’’. At a more mundane level it focus … and thereby furthered their elaboration. Thus, the
also concerns me that the requirements of adequate science set focus on structure and its conditional transformation would be
out by fundamentalist advocates of the systems approach pose far better aligned with the conceptual sphere of chemistry than
simply overwhelming goals for practising scientists. That is, with the physics of psychology’s construction ’’ (p. 219). Such
literatures within the subfields of developmental psychology critiques underline the need for developmental psychology
have become so vast that staying up-to-date in one’s own area explicitly to address the concept of development.
of specialism can be extremely difficult ; to attempt to embrace An issue that emerges in many chapters is that of individual
the prodigious range of material represented throughout variability in human development. For the most part, develop-
699
