SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Juan Antonio Pérez (2004)
Summary:
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATION
In 1898, Durkheim, after visiting Wundt's laboratory, proposed differentiating between individual and collective representations in
order to distinguish psychology from sociology. Collective representations reflect the social thinking shared by different individuals.
However, Durkheim did not explore how the diversity of social relations generates diverse forms of social thought, which led to
the notion of representation receiving less attention in sociology. Moscovici, following Wundt, but with criticisms similar to those
of G. H. Mead, preferred the term "social representation."
Moscovici's theory of social representations addresses the social origin of knowledge, both lay and scientific, based on four
premises: 1) knowledge is based on symbolic thought, 2) the genesis of knowledge arises from communication made possible by
symbolic thought, 3) the elaboration of concepts is social, and 4) these concepts symbolize social relations. Although Moscovici
does not use the term "collective representation," he takes up two of Durkheim's key ideas: the origin and functioning of symbolic
thought in collective representations and cognitive organization based on social organization.
SYMBOLIC THINKING AND COMMUNICATION
The nature of social thought is communication by symbols. Unlike machines, which can transmit information directly, we rely on
an inferential process of interpretation. Our individual mental functioning is also based on the use of symbols, so social and mental
thinking share the same foundation: communication.
Communication is essentially symbolic thinking, which consists of representing one thing by another and extracting information
through interpretation. For example, when we make a sign to remember something, we use a symbolic and interpretive process.
Although this idea may seem self-evident, it is not the dominant approach. It is often thought that everything happens inside the
mind (psychologism) or communication is reduced to encoding and decoding information (cybernetics) or information processing
(cognitivism), without considering the mediating concepts.
Culture manifests itself in signifiers such as churches, buildings, festivals, books, language, and ceremonies. The mental
development of the individual consists in handling these signifiers, inferring meanings and using them to communicate. Language
is a system of signs, but not the only one.
An example of a non-linguistic sign is Martín Puye, a Guinean Bubi leader who became a symbol of political resistance. Symbols
have a social nature, as their meanings must be shared for communication.
In addition, symbols are historical in nature, as their formation and understanding depend on interrelation with other symbols
over time. Thus, the human mind, operating by symbols, is social and historical, since these symbols are crystallizations of
reciprocal actions between individuals.
THE SOCIAL NATURE OF CONCEPTS
In the theory of social representations, there is a second fundamental idea that Durkheim mentioned, but did not fully develop:
the idea of concepts. A concept is something common to the parts and a coordination of parts in a whole, being impersonal and
representing what is common in a collective of individuals. This social nature of concepts implies that higher units can be formed
with meanings of their own and irreducible to each of the individual parts.
Social grouping is essential for the formation of concepts and symbols. The social grouping not only determines the interpretation,
but also has a meaning of its own. Thus, symbolic thought makes social life possible and necessary, as Levi-Strauss pointed out.
The specific social relations in which symbols are created are intrinsic to the resulting social concepts.
For example, the concept of a square is not found in the lines that form it, but in the specific relationship between them. Similarly,
social concepts such as family, church, or nation symbolize systems of social relations that organize those concepts.
Durkheim suggested that concepts and classifications respond to the same operation: to represent something common to several
parts. The formation of a group is synonymous with representing the individual by means of a sign that groups him with others,
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, classifying him and differentiating him from other classes. The choice of a criterion of grouping or classification is rooted in tradition
and pre-existing collective conceptions.
Objective knowledge, like science, is also based on symbols and social relations. Although an individual may create something new,
he or she does so by combining symbols previously created by others. Scientific creativity is influenced by social differentiation and
social relationships.
Even mathematical thinking, apparently autonomous, is linked to social relations. A homogeneous social system can lead to more
mystical mental operations, while a differentiated social system favors formal logic. Thus, scientific thought continues to have a
social origin, based on more abstract and symmetrical social relations.
For example, the modern definition of the meter, based on the distance light travels in a vacuum in a fraction of a second, is the
result of a long social and scientific history that reflects the need for precision and the evolution of social functions. This metric
system symbolizes not only exactness, but also modernity and equality, reflecting a system of social relations.
In short, the theory of social representations holds that concepts and symbolic thought are inherently social and historical, arising
from interactions and relationships between individuals within a specific cultural and social context.
A model of the structuring of representation. It is rare for a concept or representation to evoke a single meaning, object, or behavior.
A social concept is not an isolated unit of meaning that is exchanged for another isolated unit. Instead, it unfolds a network of
signifying relations maintained by the units of information that articulate it, known as the field of representation.
The Aix-en-Provence school of social representations has developed one of the most comprehensive models for analysing the
structure of these concepts. They propose that representations are organized around a central core, which is the most consensual,
and a set of peripheral elements.
For example, when asking about the social representation of work, many associations emerge, but some generate consensus and
form the central nucleus, such as the perception of a salary in exchange for work. Another example is the representation of the
ideal group of friends, where two elements stand out: equality and convergence of opinions. However, it was shown that equality
is central while convergence of opinions is peripheral.
The central core gives meaning to the whole representation, has a generative and organizational function, and determines the
nature of the links between the elements of the representation. It is influenced by historical, sociological and political conditions,
and constitutes the collective memory of the group. Although the central core gives stability and homogeneity to representation,
it also allows for some flexibility in the peripheral social practices derived from it.
In some cases, a representation may have several central cores, forming a paradigm. For example, in a study of social
representations of "eating," four central nuclei were identified: wanting to eat, the act of eating, what is eaten, and the
circumstance in which one eats. These nuclei form a basic paradigm that can be found in various studies and surveys.
Concisely, social concepts and their representations are complex and structured around central nuclei and peripheral elements,
reflecting the network of significant relations that constitute them.
The peripheral elements in social representations guarantee the functioning of the representation by adapting and deciphering
situations. Although they are different from the central core, they are no less important. Its flexibility allows for the integration of
variations and personal experiences, facilitating modulations of representation.
The peripheral system absorbs information and events that may question the central core, acting as jurisprudence in the face of
the central core law. This allows for individualized social representations around a common central system, combining stability and
change. Social representations are stable and consensual in the central core, but they change in social practices and present
individual differences. A representation does not change until the central core is questioned and loses consensus, although this
hypothesis has not been experimentally tested.
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Made by MatyBuda
Juan Antonio Pérez (2004)
Summary:
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATION
In 1898, Durkheim, after visiting Wundt's laboratory, proposed differentiating between individual and collective representations in
order to distinguish psychology from sociology. Collective representations reflect the social thinking shared by different individuals.
However, Durkheim did not explore how the diversity of social relations generates diverse forms of social thought, which led to
the notion of representation receiving less attention in sociology. Moscovici, following Wundt, but with criticisms similar to those
of G. H. Mead, preferred the term "social representation."
Moscovici's theory of social representations addresses the social origin of knowledge, both lay and scientific, based on four
premises: 1) knowledge is based on symbolic thought, 2) the genesis of knowledge arises from communication made possible by
symbolic thought, 3) the elaboration of concepts is social, and 4) these concepts symbolize social relations. Although Moscovici
does not use the term "collective representation," he takes up two of Durkheim's key ideas: the origin and functioning of symbolic
thought in collective representations and cognitive organization based on social organization.
SYMBOLIC THINKING AND COMMUNICATION
The nature of social thought is communication by symbols. Unlike machines, which can transmit information directly, we rely on
an inferential process of interpretation. Our individual mental functioning is also based on the use of symbols, so social and mental
thinking share the same foundation: communication.
Communication is essentially symbolic thinking, which consists of representing one thing by another and extracting information
through interpretation. For example, when we make a sign to remember something, we use a symbolic and interpretive process.
Although this idea may seem self-evident, it is not the dominant approach. It is often thought that everything happens inside the
mind (psychologism) or communication is reduced to encoding and decoding information (cybernetics) or information processing
(cognitivism), without considering the mediating concepts.
Culture manifests itself in signifiers such as churches, buildings, festivals, books, language, and ceremonies. The mental
development of the individual consists in handling these signifiers, inferring meanings and using them to communicate. Language
is a system of signs, but not the only one.
An example of a non-linguistic sign is Martín Puye, a Guinean Bubi leader who became a symbol of political resistance. Symbols
have a social nature, as their meanings must be shared for communication.
In addition, symbols are historical in nature, as their formation and understanding depend on interrelation with other symbols
over time. Thus, the human mind, operating by symbols, is social and historical, since these symbols are crystallizations of
reciprocal actions between individuals.
THE SOCIAL NATURE OF CONCEPTS
In the theory of social representations, there is a second fundamental idea that Durkheim mentioned, but did not fully develop:
the idea of concepts. A concept is something common to the parts and a coordination of parts in a whole, being impersonal and
representing what is common in a collective of individuals. This social nature of concepts implies that higher units can be formed
with meanings of their own and irreducible to each of the individual parts.
Social grouping is essential for the formation of concepts and symbols. The social grouping not only determines the interpretation,
but also has a meaning of its own. Thus, symbolic thought makes social life possible and necessary, as Levi-Strauss pointed out.
The specific social relations in which symbols are created are intrinsic to the resulting social concepts.
For example, the concept of a square is not found in the lines that form it, but in the specific relationship between them. Similarly,
social concepts such as family, church, or nation symbolize systems of social relations that organize those concepts.
Durkheim suggested that concepts and classifications respond to the same operation: to represent something common to several
parts. The formation of a group is synonymous with representing the individual by means of a sign that groups him with others,
1
Made by MatyBuda
, classifying him and differentiating him from other classes. The choice of a criterion of grouping or classification is rooted in tradition
and pre-existing collective conceptions.
Objective knowledge, like science, is also based on symbols and social relations. Although an individual may create something new,
he or she does so by combining symbols previously created by others. Scientific creativity is influenced by social differentiation and
social relationships.
Even mathematical thinking, apparently autonomous, is linked to social relations. A homogeneous social system can lead to more
mystical mental operations, while a differentiated social system favors formal logic. Thus, scientific thought continues to have a
social origin, based on more abstract and symmetrical social relations.
For example, the modern definition of the meter, based on the distance light travels in a vacuum in a fraction of a second, is the
result of a long social and scientific history that reflects the need for precision and the evolution of social functions. This metric
system symbolizes not only exactness, but also modernity and equality, reflecting a system of social relations.
In short, the theory of social representations holds that concepts and symbolic thought are inherently social and historical, arising
from interactions and relationships between individuals within a specific cultural and social context.
A model of the structuring of representation. It is rare for a concept or representation to evoke a single meaning, object, or behavior.
A social concept is not an isolated unit of meaning that is exchanged for another isolated unit. Instead, it unfolds a network of
signifying relations maintained by the units of information that articulate it, known as the field of representation.
The Aix-en-Provence school of social representations has developed one of the most comprehensive models for analysing the
structure of these concepts. They propose that representations are organized around a central core, which is the most consensual,
and a set of peripheral elements.
For example, when asking about the social representation of work, many associations emerge, but some generate consensus and
form the central nucleus, such as the perception of a salary in exchange for work. Another example is the representation of the
ideal group of friends, where two elements stand out: equality and convergence of opinions. However, it was shown that equality
is central while convergence of opinions is peripheral.
The central core gives meaning to the whole representation, has a generative and organizational function, and determines the
nature of the links between the elements of the representation. It is influenced by historical, sociological and political conditions,
and constitutes the collective memory of the group. Although the central core gives stability and homogeneity to representation,
it also allows for some flexibility in the peripheral social practices derived from it.
In some cases, a representation may have several central cores, forming a paradigm. For example, in a study of social
representations of "eating," four central nuclei were identified: wanting to eat, the act of eating, what is eaten, and the
circumstance in which one eats. These nuclei form a basic paradigm that can be found in various studies and surveys.
Concisely, social concepts and their representations are complex and structured around central nuclei and peripheral elements,
reflecting the network of significant relations that constitute them.
The peripheral elements in social representations guarantee the functioning of the representation by adapting and deciphering
situations. Although they are different from the central core, they are no less important. Its flexibility allows for the integration of
variations and personal experiences, facilitating modulations of representation.
The peripheral system absorbs information and events that may question the central core, acting as jurisprudence in the face of
the central core law. This allows for individualized social representations around a common central system, combining stability and
change. Social representations are stable and consensual in the central core, but they change in social practices and present
individual differences. A representation does not change until the central core is questioned and loses consensus, although this
hypothesis has not been experimentally tested.
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Made by MatyBuda
