COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
THE MIND – CHAPTER 12: BODIES, THE WORLD & DYNAMIC SYSTEMS (THAGARD)
3 challenges – body, world, dynamic systems – accuse CRUM of
Focusing too much on mental representation
Neglecting the fact that thought is not a solitary, disembodied occurrence, but
occurs in individuals who interact with a physical world
BODIES IN THE WORLD
Body & world challenge – thinking is not just in the head
CRUM seems to restrict thinking to computational processing occurring in the
mind
EMBODIMENT & DIRECT PERCEPTION
How do people interact with the world?
Info needs to be conveyed from the world to the mind through senses
CRUM Inferential view of perception
Treats perception as involving the inferential construction of representations
that capture features of the world
Inferential view – rejected learn about the world more directly, our perceptual
apparatus so attuned to world that info is directly conveys to brain without requiring
computations on representations
Physical sensory apparatus – one of the contributors to our ability to interact with
the world
Body-based relations in language – up & down, left & right, in & out
Many key aspects of human thinking depend on body we have & how it is attuned
to world
Basic concepts we use to categorise world derived from way our sensory systems
detect the overall part-whole structure of the world
Support: conceptual representations are grounded in specific sensory modalities
Example: representation of car not abstract, verbal symbol BUT involves neurons in
brain’s visual areas that capture & re-enact sensory experiences of cars
BEING-IN-THE-WORLD (HEIDEGGER)
How do people hammer in a nail?
CRUM Representational view
Start to consider what kinds of representation we have of a hammer & nail
Hammering takes place bc we are able to do computational operations on
, these representations that somehow get translated into physical action of
hammering the nail
Representational view – rejected we function in the world simply bc we are a part of it
“being-in-the-world” – conveys that people can perform tasks just by virtue of their
physical skills, without any kinds of representation
AI trying to formalise & represent knowledge = hopeless our intelligence is
non-representational
Antirepresentational view of cognition
Found favour in some AI researchers
“embedded computing” (Smith) – avoids representational load by emphasising
interaction with world rather than internal processing
ROBOTICS (BROOKS)
Embodiment – major theme in research in robotics
Brooks – builds simple machines that have capacity to learn about their environments
Insect-like robots – multiple processors that enable them to learn to walk by
interacting with the environment WITHOUT representation techniques used in
CRUM
Designed to be able to recognise & respond to faces BUT contain no rules /
concepts for reasoning about people
SITUATED ACTION (SUCHMAN & LAVE)
Cognitive psychologists – examined human thinking on artificial tasks
Problem solving in realistic context not so heavily dependent on mental
representations BUT depends on direct interaction with world & other people
People are thinking through interaction with the world
CRUM incapable of appreciating the subtle, contextual ways in which people deal with
the world
INTENTIONALITY (SEARLE)
Relation between mind & world – crucial objection to CRUM
Mental states – intended to represent the world, they possess intentionality (they are
about sth)
Computer could never have intentionality
Computer manipulates symbols lacking in understanding
Symbols that people operate with (e.g., letters/words) have semantic meanings
have intentionality
Representations in computers are independent of the world lack intentionality
Symbols they use have no meaning for them
THE MIND – CHAPTER 12: BODIES, THE WORLD & DYNAMIC SYSTEMS (THAGARD)
3 challenges – body, world, dynamic systems – accuse CRUM of
Focusing too much on mental representation
Neglecting the fact that thought is not a solitary, disembodied occurrence, but
occurs in individuals who interact with a physical world
BODIES IN THE WORLD
Body & world challenge – thinking is not just in the head
CRUM seems to restrict thinking to computational processing occurring in the
mind
EMBODIMENT & DIRECT PERCEPTION
How do people interact with the world?
Info needs to be conveyed from the world to the mind through senses
CRUM Inferential view of perception
Treats perception as involving the inferential construction of representations
that capture features of the world
Inferential view – rejected learn about the world more directly, our perceptual
apparatus so attuned to world that info is directly conveys to brain without requiring
computations on representations
Physical sensory apparatus – one of the contributors to our ability to interact with
the world
Body-based relations in language – up & down, left & right, in & out
Many key aspects of human thinking depend on body we have & how it is attuned
to world
Basic concepts we use to categorise world derived from way our sensory systems
detect the overall part-whole structure of the world
Support: conceptual representations are grounded in specific sensory modalities
Example: representation of car not abstract, verbal symbol BUT involves neurons in
brain’s visual areas that capture & re-enact sensory experiences of cars
BEING-IN-THE-WORLD (HEIDEGGER)
How do people hammer in a nail?
CRUM Representational view
Start to consider what kinds of representation we have of a hammer & nail
Hammering takes place bc we are able to do computational operations on
, these representations that somehow get translated into physical action of
hammering the nail
Representational view – rejected we function in the world simply bc we are a part of it
“being-in-the-world” – conveys that people can perform tasks just by virtue of their
physical skills, without any kinds of representation
AI trying to formalise & represent knowledge = hopeless our intelligence is
non-representational
Antirepresentational view of cognition
Found favour in some AI researchers
“embedded computing” (Smith) – avoids representational load by emphasising
interaction with world rather than internal processing
ROBOTICS (BROOKS)
Embodiment – major theme in research in robotics
Brooks – builds simple machines that have capacity to learn about their environments
Insect-like robots – multiple processors that enable them to learn to walk by
interacting with the environment WITHOUT representation techniques used in
CRUM
Designed to be able to recognise & respond to faces BUT contain no rules /
concepts for reasoning about people
SITUATED ACTION (SUCHMAN & LAVE)
Cognitive psychologists – examined human thinking on artificial tasks
Problem solving in realistic context not so heavily dependent on mental
representations BUT depends on direct interaction with world & other people
People are thinking through interaction with the world
CRUM incapable of appreciating the subtle, contextual ways in which people deal with
the world
INTENTIONALITY (SEARLE)
Relation between mind & world – crucial objection to CRUM
Mental states – intended to represent the world, they possess intentionality (they are
about sth)
Computer could never have intentionality
Computer manipulates symbols lacking in understanding
Symbols that people operate with (e.g., letters/words) have semantic meanings
have intentionality
Representations in computers are independent of the world lack intentionality
Symbols they use have no meaning for them
