A/A* Essay Plans- The Second Boer War 1899-1902
Second Boer War
To what extent was the British Army prepared for war in 1899?
Prepared to a very small extent
Criteria: ‘prepared’= going into the war aware of the strengths of your opposition, equipped
with sufficient resources.
Point 1: Government not ready to spend money on the army or the war effort
Underestimated Boer strength
At first the Treasury estimated the cost of the war at £10 million, but the colonial
expedition turned into a war on a European scale, the final charge to the British
Exchequer was £217 million.
The rigidity of the annual peace time budget obstructed before the war the taking of
any serious military precautions, left no reserve fund for war contingencies, and
made any long-term strategic planning almost impossible. Rather than run the risk of
asking money from Parliament for reinforcements to South Africa, which would be
unpopular, as it might require increased taxation, and which might prove
unnecessary, the Cabinet waited till the need to spend taxpayers' money had been
demonstrated, although it could result in initial setbacks and in a longer and more
expensive campaign.
Duke of Cambridge, defender of traditional practices, replaced by Lord Wolsely in
1895 as commander in chief who was more willing to reform, however he was
deprived of the money by Salisbury’s government.
Most significant because lack of funding means lack of funding into maps and
strength of the army
Point 2: Lack of local knowledge, maps inaccurate and poor intelligence
In spite of the fact that the British had been involved in southern Africa for the best
part of the century, there was a shortage of maps available of the two Boer republics
(Orange free state and Transvaal) and even of their own British colonies (Natal and
Cape Colony).
In Britain, this map shortage was regarded as one of the biggest military scandals of
the war. The risk of war had been apparent for months and yet the outbreak of war in
October 1899 found the British woefully unprepared in the field of intelligence.
Two officers were responsible for the entire Colonial Empire. In comparison, the
Transvaal Republic was at this time spending £90 000 per annum on intelligence.
The British High Command had yet to learn the value of reconnaissance and efficient
scouting.
At the battle of Stormberg (10 December 1899), the map of the ground was reported
to be utterly misleading and worse than useless. Not only was the contouring so
incorrect that it gave a totally false impression of the configuration of the hills, but
distances and roads were also inaccurately represented.
At the battle of the Modder River, the British entered the action with little knowledge
of the exact location of the Boer forces. Furthermore Lord Methuen's maps and
intelligence indicated that the Modder and Riet rivers could be forded at any point.
The intelligence on British maps was entirely at fault. The rivers were not fordable
and the course of the Riet River had been improperly drawn; in fact, just about every
Second Boer War
To what extent was the British Army prepared for war in 1899?
Prepared to a very small extent
Criteria: ‘prepared’= going into the war aware of the strengths of your opposition, equipped
with sufficient resources.
Point 1: Government not ready to spend money on the army or the war effort
Underestimated Boer strength
At first the Treasury estimated the cost of the war at £10 million, but the colonial
expedition turned into a war on a European scale, the final charge to the British
Exchequer was £217 million.
The rigidity of the annual peace time budget obstructed before the war the taking of
any serious military precautions, left no reserve fund for war contingencies, and
made any long-term strategic planning almost impossible. Rather than run the risk of
asking money from Parliament for reinforcements to South Africa, which would be
unpopular, as it might require increased taxation, and which might prove
unnecessary, the Cabinet waited till the need to spend taxpayers' money had been
demonstrated, although it could result in initial setbacks and in a longer and more
expensive campaign.
Duke of Cambridge, defender of traditional practices, replaced by Lord Wolsely in
1895 as commander in chief who was more willing to reform, however he was
deprived of the money by Salisbury’s government.
Most significant because lack of funding means lack of funding into maps and
strength of the army
Point 2: Lack of local knowledge, maps inaccurate and poor intelligence
In spite of the fact that the British had been involved in southern Africa for the best
part of the century, there was a shortage of maps available of the two Boer republics
(Orange free state and Transvaal) and even of their own British colonies (Natal and
Cape Colony).
In Britain, this map shortage was regarded as one of the biggest military scandals of
the war. The risk of war had been apparent for months and yet the outbreak of war in
October 1899 found the British woefully unprepared in the field of intelligence.
Two officers were responsible for the entire Colonial Empire. In comparison, the
Transvaal Republic was at this time spending £90 000 per annum on intelligence.
The British High Command had yet to learn the value of reconnaissance and efficient
scouting.
At the battle of Stormberg (10 December 1899), the map of the ground was reported
to be utterly misleading and worse than useless. Not only was the contouring so
incorrect that it gave a totally false impression of the configuration of the hills, but
distances and roads were also inaccurately represented.
At the battle of the Modder River, the British entered the action with little knowledge
of the exact location of the Boer forces. Furthermore Lord Methuen's maps and
intelligence indicated that the Modder and Riet rivers could be forded at any point.
The intelligence on British maps was entirely at fault. The rivers were not fordable
and the course of the Riet River had been improperly drawn; in fact, just about every
