How successful were economic policies in promoting economic development in the USSR in the
years 1917-41?
Prior to the Bolsheviks taking power in 1917, the Russian economy was largely agrarian with little to
no industrialisation. However, by 1941, the USSR was an industrial superpower and competed with
the likes of the United States and Great Britain, for industrial superiority. Despite this, economic
policies were largely unsuccessful in promoting economic development in the years 1917-41. This is
because, in this context ‘successful economic development’ refers to the economy improving so that
living conditions become better and production increases. These are the two main indicators in
measuring economic development. As a result, Collectivisation is the most significant economic
policy in revealing the lack of economic development as it resulted in mass famine across the
country with upwards of 12 million deaths and agricultural production decreased. Other economic
policies that are significant in revealing the paucity of success that economic policies had on
promoting economic death are the NEP, the Five-Year Plans, and War Communism. They are less
significant however, because the NEP and the Five-Year plans did have some economic success and
increased industrial production in certain sectors, and War Communism was more of a necessary
measure in order to survive the civil war rather than a policy to promote economic development.
The most significant economic policy which shows the lack of success that economic policies had on
promoting economic development is Collectivisation. In the process of Collectivisation small farms
were merged into large farms of between 20 and 150 families and ownership of the farms was taken
over by the state. Stalin’s aimed to transform traditional agriculture in the Soviet Union and to
reduce the economic power of the kulaks, who were the prosperous peasants, under the policy of
Collectivisation. In essence, it was a way for Stalin to further expand his control over the country.
However, this policy was very unsuccessful in transforming agricultural output and instead,
worsened conditions for the peasantry. The measures were very unpopular as it meant that the
promise of ‘peace, bread and land’ was broken- the peasants had all their land stripped away from
them. Therefore, in opposition to the policy, many peasants responded by destroying their crops,
animals, and machinery. This led Stalin to initiate the Dekulakisation programme, which in theory
was meant to mean taking farms and equipment from the richest peasants but actually it meant
mass deportations and killings of peasants who resisted government policies. Around 1.5 million
peasants were sent to labour camps in the dekulakisation campaign. The kulaks who were deported
or killed were usually the most experienced and successful farmers, thus contributing to falling
production- the farms simply no longer had enough people to maintain them. For example, grain
production decreased from 73.3 tons in 1928 to 68.4 tons in 1933 and grain harvests were regularly
much smaller than they had been in the best years of NEP, due to the fact that collective farms were
less productive than private farms. On average the private kulak farms produced 410 kilos of grain
per hectare while collective farms only produced about 320 kilos per hectare. This shortage of grain,
as well as shortages in other major crops and food (26 million cattle, 11 million pigs, 60 million sheep
and goats killed) led to mass famine, causing many people to start resorting towards cannibalism.
One of the worst famines was in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933, when Stalin punished the region
for its intense resistance to collectivisation by seizing its grain and it resulted in 5 million deaths. In
total, 12 million were killed due to collectivisation. This is why this is the most significant economic
policy in revealing the dearth of success that economic policies had on promoting economic
development, as under this policy living conditions were extremely worsened and agricultural
production was slashed, which therefore means this policy meets all the criteria for what
substantiates a lack of economic development. The policy shifted the Soviet Union’s backwards in
years 1917-41?
Prior to the Bolsheviks taking power in 1917, the Russian economy was largely agrarian with little to
no industrialisation. However, by 1941, the USSR was an industrial superpower and competed with
the likes of the United States and Great Britain, for industrial superiority. Despite this, economic
policies were largely unsuccessful in promoting economic development in the years 1917-41. This is
because, in this context ‘successful economic development’ refers to the economy improving so that
living conditions become better and production increases. These are the two main indicators in
measuring economic development. As a result, Collectivisation is the most significant economic
policy in revealing the lack of economic development as it resulted in mass famine across the
country with upwards of 12 million deaths and agricultural production decreased. Other economic
policies that are significant in revealing the paucity of success that economic policies had on
promoting economic death are the NEP, the Five-Year Plans, and War Communism. They are less
significant however, because the NEP and the Five-Year plans did have some economic success and
increased industrial production in certain sectors, and War Communism was more of a necessary
measure in order to survive the civil war rather than a policy to promote economic development.
The most significant economic policy which shows the lack of success that economic policies had on
promoting economic development is Collectivisation. In the process of Collectivisation small farms
were merged into large farms of between 20 and 150 families and ownership of the farms was taken
over by the state. Stalin’s aimed to transform traditional agriculture in the Soviet Union and to
reduce the economic power of the kulaks, who were the prosperous peasants, under the policy of
Collectivisation. In essence, it was a way for Stalin to further expand his control over the country.
However, this policy was very unsuccessful in transforming agricultural output and instead,
worsened conditions for the peasantry. The measures were very unpopular as it meant that the
promise of ‘peace, bread and land’ was broken- the peasants had all their land stripped away from
them. Therefore, in opposition to the policy, many peasants responded by destroying their crops,
animals, and machinery. This led Stalin to initiate the Dekulakisation programme, which in theory
was meant to mean taking farms and equipment from the richest peasants but actually it meant
mass deportations and killings of peasants who resisted government policies. Around 1.5 million
peasants were sent to labour camps in the dekulakisation campaign. The kulaks who were deported
or killed were usually the most experienced and successful farmers, thus contributing to falling
production- the farms simply no longer had enough people to maintain them. For example, grain
production decreased from 73.3 tons in 1928 to 68.4 tons in 1933 and grain harvests were regularly
much smaller than they had been in the best years of NEP, due to the fact that collective farms were
less productive than private farms. On average the private kulak farms produced 410 kilos of grain
per hectare while collective farms only produced about 320 kilos per hectare. This shortage of grain,
as well as shortages in other major crops and food (26 million cattle, 11 million pigs, 60 million sheep
and goats killed) led to mass famine, causing many people to start resorting towards cannibalism.
One of the worst famines was in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933, when Stalin punished the region
for its intense resistance to collectivisation by seizing its grain and it resulted in 5 million deaths. In
total, 12 million were killed due to collectivisation. This is why this is the most significant economic
policy in revealing the dearth of success that economic policies had on promoting economic
development, as under this policy living conditions were extremely worsened and agricultural
production was slashed, which therefore means this policy meets all the criteria for what
substantiates a lack of economic development. The policy shifted the Soviet Union’s backwards in
