Congress – essay plans
To what extent does Congress remain a powerful body?
Foreign policy – within this, talk about imperial/imperilled presidency
• Congressional powers/checks on president
o Power to declare war (Article 1 Section 8)
o Power of the purse
o Power to reject appointments
o Vagueness of constitution
o Congressional resolutions:
§ Cooper-Church Agreement (1971) – prohibited the use of appropriated funds to
finance any military intervention without Congressional approval (was successful and
utilised the power of the purse to great avail, as it ended participation in Cambodia
and Laos, and refused Ford’s appeal for financial aid for Vietnam in 1975)
§ The Case Act (1972) – the president must inform Congress of any executive
agreements he makes with foreign leaders
§ War Powers Act (1973) – if the president is intent on committing troops for more
than 90 days, he must inform Congress within 48h
§ These Congressional resolution signified a “new mood of congressional
assertiveness in foreign policy” (Mervin, 1993) and cause President Ford to complain
that the president is “imperilled”, and thus Congress remains powerful
• President has power over foreign policy
o Constitutional powers:
§ Commander in Chief (Article 2 Section 2)
§ Executive agreements and negotiate treaties
§ Can bypass the War Powers Act
• The loopholes in War Powers Act and its definition of military combatants has
allowed various presidents to bypass it – e.g. Obama with Libya and JFK
with the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam
o Congress has deferred powers
§ Curtiss-Wright decision (1936) – declared that the constitution implicitly grants the
president broad foreign policy making powers
§ Gulf of Tonkin Resolution – effectively gave Johnson a blank cheque
o Dual Presidency theory
§ President has greater freedom from public and Congress during crises
§ Aaron Wildavsky’s theory holds when analysing foreign policy
§ Not only can the president set the tone for foreign policy through State of the
Union addresses (e.g. Bush in 2002 declaring war on the Axis of Evil and terrorism),
but he is also given greater freedom by the public and Congress
• Most evident during the Cold War, where the permanent state of crisis
caused everyone to “rally around the flag” (Rosati, 2003) leading to “high
congressional compliance and presidential supremacy in foreign policy”
(Carter, 1986) – during this crises, people rally around the president for
decisive action and the public perception of an “omnipotent president”
(Rosati, 2003) during a crisis often leads to increased presidential power
• Thus Congress must oblige “and has little choice but to go along, as it is
dishonourable to deprive men risking their lives of financial support” (Mervin,
1993)
• Conclusion
o Congress – despite having some constitutional powers – has deferred true authority
over to the president in dealings with foreign policy – “It was as much a matter of
congressional abdication as of presidential usurpation” (Schlesinger, 1973)
o It “has the scope to make difficulties at the margin and cause delays” (Mervin, 1993), but
cannot enforce its will upon the president, and the Congressional resolutions were
insignificant in the long-term due to their vague wording
To what extent does Congress remain a powerful body?
Foreign policy – within this, talk about imperial/imperilled presidency
• Congressional powers/checks on president
o Power to declare war (Article 1 Section 8)
o Power of the purse
o Power to reject appointments
o Vagueness of constitution
o Congressional resolutions:
§ Cooper-Church Agreement (1971) – prohibited the use of appropriated funds to
finance any military intervention without Congressional approval (was successful and
utilised the power of the purse to great avail, as it ended participation in Cambodia
and Laos, and refused Ford’s appeal for financial aid for Vietnam in 1975)
§ The Case Act (1972) – the president must inform Congress of any executive
agreements he makes with foreign leaders
§ War Powers Act (1973) – if the president is intent on committing troops for more
than 90 days, he must inform Congress within 48h
§ These Congressional resolution signified a “new mood of congressional
assertiveness in foreign policy” (Mervin, 1993) and cause President Ford to complain
that the president is “imperilled”, and thus Congress remains powerful
• President has power over foreign policy
o Constitutional powers:
§ Commander in Chief (Article 2 Section 2)
§ Executive agreements and negotiate treaties
§ Can bypass the War Powers Act
• The loopholes in War Powers Act and its definition of military combatants has
allowed various presidents to bypass it – e.g. Obama with Libya and JFK
with the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam
o Congress has deferred powers
§ Curtiss-Wright decision (1936) – declared that the constitution implicitly grants the
president broad foreign policy making powers
§ Gulf of Tonkin Resolution – effectively gave Johnson a blank cheque
o Dual Presidency theory
§ President has greater freedom from public and Congress during crises
§ Aaron Wildavsky’s theory holds when analysing foreign policy
§ Not only can the president set the tone for foreign policy through State of the
Union addresses (e.g. Bush in 2002 declaring war on the Axis of Evil and terrorism),
but he is also given greater freedom by the public and Congress
• Most evident during the Cold War, where the permanent state of crisis
caused everyone to “rally around the flag” (Rosati, 2003) leading to “high
congressional compliance and presidential supremacy in foreign policy”
(Carter, 1986) – during this crises, people rally around the president for
decisive action and the public perception of an “omnipotent president”
(Rosati, 2003) during a crisis often leads to increased presidential power
• Thus Congress must oblige “and has little choice but to go along, as it is
dishonourable to deprive men risking their lives of financial support” (Mervin,
1993)
• Conclusion
o Congress – despite having some constitutional powers – has deferred true authority
over to the president in dealings with foreign policy – “It was as much a matter of
congressional abdication as of presidential usurpation” (Schlesinger, 1973)
o It “has the scope to make difficulties at the margin and cause delays” (Mervin, 1993), but
cannot enforce its will upon the president, and the Congressional resolutions were
insignificant in the long-term due to their vague wording
