Modern Philosophy
Paulsen
Paulsen advocated for better education for everyone, making him somewhat of an
opposite of Marx. He argued especially for humanistic education, with his first reason
being that we should know/understand our place in the world, as humans. This is because
we have a history, contrary to animals, and Paulsen thinks working is only a means to an
end: we should not only be concerned with our own survival, but get meaning out of it. Also,
humanities have the same capacity to shape you as a human being (teach discipline,
concentration, methodical working, giving proofs, etc). It also teaches that not everything is
universally applicable, which means broadening our perspectives. His third argument is that
understanding humanities takes one to experience it first, contrary to science, of which the
benefits come “prepackaged” (everyone benefited from the invention of plastic, while a piece
of art is only beneficial to people who take the time to understand it). He also pleaded for a
kind of cosmopolitanism: Everyone should be representative for humanity by being
able to understand their views.
His book ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ provided insight into the interconnected nature of the
sciences.
Introduction to Philosophy
Philosophy distinguishes itself from other sciences in having either different subject-matter or
a different manner in which it handles that. The latter view dominated the first half of the 20th
century: Reality could be treated in a philosophical or scientific way (speculative VS
empirical). Here, science had the function of acquiring knowledge of the facts, while
philosophy tried to set forth on the essence and connections of things. This view
disappeared because philosophy doesn’t seem to have a great way to gain a priori
knowledge.
The switch to the view that philosophy differs in subject matter made people look for what
philosophy actually focuses on, but those are all open to serious objections since many
definitions are names of sub-fields in philosophy (theory of knowledge is dealt with by
epistemology, goods and values are dealt with by ethics, etc). Philosophy also can’t be the
‘science of principles’ since that doesn’t show borders of where philosophy ends and
sciences begin, and if philosophy were to handle whatever science can’t research, how
would it do that while using the same methods other sciences use?
Paulsen thinks philosophy is distinguished neither by a special method nor subject matter
and proposes that it be ‘the sum-total of all scientific knowledge’. He thinks that all
sciences give philosophy the knowledge to eventually solve nature’s greatest riddles. He
thinks this is the only appropriate definition from a historical point of view, since tradition has
established it to be that, in such a way that it would otherwise conflict with history and the
common usage of language. From ancient Greece to the 19th century, philosophy has dealt
with all domains, which made it so philosophers were in a position where they could combine
things from all fields, instead of only knowing everything about a single thing, and
represented how all sciences are somewhat interconnected.
,Paulsen wants to go back to this kind of polymathy, but an objection to this is that such a
task would require a philosopher to possess a collectively absurd amount of knowledge.
Paulsen counters this by noting that other sciences also have a goal to collect all knowledge,
but haven’t gotten there yet (historians don’t possess all knowledge, but are still historians).
‘This could make a philosopher a man who strives after a uniform and universal knowledge
of things’.
, Brentano
Scientific status of philosophy
People tried to make philosophy more mathematical: studying mathematical models to study
the underlying qualities of nature. Later, this attempt turned to investigating the mind by
investigating the brain instead of investigating the mind from itself: no more top-down,
normative thinking. This caused many physicists to become psychologists, which
philosophers didn’t like. They wrote a petition which caused psychology to split off from
philosophy.
Psychology started observing brains as organic machines: ‘thoughts stand in the same
relation to the brain as urine to the kidneys’ shows how thoughts are merely a byproduct of
brain activity. Consciousness was seen as a biological process. Psychologists started
looking at strange patterns (‘bumps in your head describe your properties’).
Mechanization of consciousness: Modern technology also simplified mental processes like
calculating, with the invention of calculators. People even tried to explain mental processes
with machines.
Brentano on psychology:
Is the mind outside the natural order or a physical object? And is there a third option
between speculation and scientific reductionism? Brentano thinks the answer to the latter is
‘yes’. He thought philosophy is a science just like the other sciences, and thus must have a
method that is identical to the method of other sciences. Only in that way it can connect to
other sciences. Brentano pleads for “humbly cultivating fellow scientific ground step by step”
instead of constructing large speculative systems.
Intentionality: All mental acts are directed at something or have a context. They are directed
at psychic (seeing a color, hearing sound, feeling warmth) and physical phenomena (color,
sound, warmth), using internal (infallible, cuz we might be wrong about what corresponds to
our perceptions, but the fact that we have them is enough to prove it) or external perception.
Brentano thinks the facts of the physiologist and the psychologist are closest together,
despite their differences: physical states are also elicited by mental states, not only by
physical ones, and vice versa. Brentano thinks we can give both approaches the same
starting point by starting with sensation, proceeding inward or outward based on induction,
trying to find regularities, facts, etc.
There are three classes of mental acts: presentations, judgements and emotions, which are
the foundations for presentations (aesthetics), logic and ethics respectively. These would be
the foundations of philosophical disciplines. These acts would either be presentations or
contain presentations, since there can not be presentations without something presented.
Perception would be a type of judgement where we perceive the existence of an object
without reflection. This can be split in wahrnehmung: taking as true and ‘falschnehmung’:
wrongly taking something as true. This makes internal perception ‘wahrnehmung and
external perception falschnehmung, since the first is sure to be true and the second isn’t.
Paulsen
Paulsen advocated for better education for everyone, making him somewhat of an
opposite of Marx. He argued especially for humanistic education, with his first reason
being that we should know/understand our place in the world, as humans. This is because
we have a history, contrary to animals, and Paulsen thinks working is only a means to an
end: we should not only be concerned with our own survival, but get meaning out of it. Also,
humanities have the same capacity to shape you as a human being (teach discipline,
concentration, methodical working, giving proofs, etc). It also teaches that not everything is
universally applicable, which means broadening our perspectives. His third argument is that
understanding humanities takes one to experience it first, contrary to science, of which the
benefits come “prepackaged” (everyone benefited from the invention of plastic, while a piece
of art is only beneficial to people who take the time to understand it). He also pleaded for a
kind of cosmopolitanism: Everyone should be representative for humanity by being
able to understand their views.
His book ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ provided insight into the interconnected nature of the
sciences.
Introduction to Philosophy
Philosophy distinguishes itself from other sciences in having either different subject-matter or
a different manner in which it handles that. The latter view dominated the first half of the 20th
century: Reality could be treated in a philosophical or scientific way (speculative VS
empirical). Here, science had the function of acquiring knowledge of the facts, while
philosophy tried to set forth on the essence and connections of things. This view
disappeared because philosophy doesn’t seem to have a great way to gain a priori
knowledge.
The switch to the view that philosophy differs in subject matter made people look for what
philosophy actually focuses on, but those are all open to serious objections since many
definitions are names of sub-fields in philosophy (theory of knowledge is dealt with by
epistemology, goods and values are dealt with by ethics, etc). Philosophy also can’t be the
‘science of principles’ since that doesn’t show borders of where philosophy ends and
sciences begin, and if philosophy were to handle whatever science can’t research, how
would it do that while using the same methods other sciences use?
Paulsen thinks philosophy is distinguished neither by a special method nor subject matter
and proposes that it be ‘the sum-total of all scientific knowledge’. He thinks that all
sciences give philosophy the knowledge to eventually solve nature’s greatest riddles. He
thinks this is the only appropriate definition from a historical point of view, since tradition has
established it to be that, in such a way that it would otherwise conflict with history and the
common usage of language. From ancient Greece to the 19th century, philosophy has dealt
with all domains, which made it so philosophers were in a position where they could combine
things from all fields, instead of only knowing everything about a single thing, and
represented how all sciences are somewhat interconnected.
,Paulsen wants to go back to this kind of polymathy, but an objection to this is that such a
task would require a philosopher to possess a collectively absurd amount of knowledge.
Paulsen counters this by noting that other sciences also have a goal to collect all knowledge,
but haven’t gotten there yet (historians don’t possess all knowledge, but are still historians).
‘This could make a philosopher a man who strives after a uniform and universal knowledge
of things’.
, Brentano
Scientific status of philosophy
People tried to make philosophy more mathematical: studying mathematical models to study
the underlying qualities of nature. Later, this attempt turned to investigating the mind by
investigating the brain instead of investigating the mind from itself: no more top-down,
normative thinking. This caused many physicists to become psychologists, which
philosophers didn’t like. They wrote a petition which caused psychology to split off from
philosophy.
Psychology started observing brains as organic machines: ‘thoughts stand in the same
relation to the brain as urine to the kidneys’ shows how thoughts are merely a byproduct of
brain activity. Consciousness was seen as a biological process. Psychologists started
looking at strange patterns (‘bumps in your head describe your properties’).
Mechanization of consciousness: Modern technology also simplified mental processes like
calculating, with the invention of calculators. People even tried to explain mental processes
with machines.
Brentano on psychology:
Is the mind outside the natural order or a physical object? And is there a third option
between speculation and scientific reductionism? Brentano thinks the answer to the latter is
‘yes’. He thought philosophy is a science just like the other sciences, and thus must have a
method that is identical to the method of other sciences. Only in that way it can connect to
other sciences. Brentano pleads for “humbly cultivating fellow scientific ground step by step”
instead of constructing large speculative systems.
Intentionality: All mental acts are directed at something or have a context. They are directed
at psychic (seeing a color, hearing sound, feeling warmth) and physical phenomena (color,
sound, warmth), using internal (infallible, cuz we might be wrong about what corresponds to
our perceptions, but the fact that we have them is enough to prove it) or external perception.
Brentano thinks the facts of the physiologist and the psychologist are closest together,
despite their differences: physical states are also elicited by mental states, not only by
physical ones, and vice versa. Brentano thinks we can give both approaches the same
starting point by starting with sensation, proceeding inward or outward based on induction,
trying to find regularities, facts, etc.
There are three classes of mental acts: presentations, judgements and emotions, which are
the foundations for presentations (aesthetics), logic and ethics respectively. These would be
the foundations of philosophical disciplines. These acts would either be presentations or
contain presentations, since there can not be presentations without something presented.
Perception would be a type of judgement where we perceive the existence of an object
without reflection. This can be split in wahrnehmung: taking as true and ‘falschnehmung’:
wrongly taking something as true. This makes internal perception ‘wahrnehmung and
external perception falschnehmung, since the first is sure to be true and the second isn’t.
