Barnes & Bloor - Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge
● Most critics of relativism subscribe to rationalism
● Relativism:
○ recognizes varying beliefs on a certain topic
○ is convinced that the incidences of belief are dependent on the
circumstances of the user
○ has an equivalence postulate; what is equivalent between beliefs
■ B&B claim it is that ‘all beliefs are on a par with one
another with respect to the causes of their credibility’
● we must search for specific, local causes
of credibility
● Relativism advocates monism - the identity of ostensibly separate things
○ rationalism advocates dualism, by insisting that some beliefs are
rational/true whilst others are irrational/false
■ Relativism maintains meaningful use of the words true
and false as the idiom through which preferences over beliefs within a culture are
expressed
● however, relativists also maintain that
none of these preferences can be expressed in absolute or context-
independent terms - such a claim would be nonsense
● Debate on alleged difference between credibility and validity, conclusion: there is none in
the practice of this matter
● Often rationalists will draw on beliefs that are ‘directly and immediately apprehended by
experience’
○ these can be sustained and attract credibility in virtue of their
correspondence with reality, something common to all cultures
■ BUT often these beliefs are facts we hold in common
with animals - they are the realm of the biologist, not the sociologist
■ also, these beliefs are only a fraction of our systems of
belief - they shed no light on institutionalized patterns of knowledge
● the issue at stake here is individual
knowledge, not social knowledge
■ these beliefs can increasingly be explained by causal
theories of the brain, which places them in opposition to most rationalist theories
of knowledge, which rest on non-causal reasoning
○ we cannot treat reality as a useful common factor because it is possible to
draw so many different conclusions from the same reality
■ e.g. scientific interpretation
● Hollis and Lukes claim that ‘all cultures share a common core of true beliefs and
rationally-justified patterns of inference’
○ this is made up of statements which rational men ‘cannot fail to believe
in simple perceptual situations’ and rules of logic
○ this implies a universal, context independent criteria of truth and
rationality
■ there must be some common core to act as a ‘rational
bridgehead’ or else translation between languages would be impossible - we
● Most critics of relativism subscribe to rationalism
● Relativism:
○ recognizes varying beliefs on a certain topic
○ is convinced that the incidences of belief are dependent on the
circumstances of the user
○ has an equivalence postulate; what is equivalent between beliefs
■ B&B claim it is that ‘all beliefs are on a par with one
another with respect to the causes of their credibility’
● we must search for specific, local causes
of credibility
● Relativism advocates monism - the identity of ostensibly separate things
○ rationalism advocates dualism, by insisting that some beliefs are
rational/true whilst others are irrational/false
■ Relativism maintains meaningful use of the words true
and false as the idiom through which preferences over beliefs within a culture are
expressed
● however, relativists also maintain that
none of these preferences can be expressed in absolute or context-
independent terms - such a claim would be nonsense
● Debate on alleged difference between credibility and validity, conclusion: there is none in
the practice of this matter
● Often rationalists will draw on beliefs that are ‘directly and immediately apprehended by
experience’
○ these can be sustained and attract credibility in virtue of their
correspondence with reality, something common to all cultures
■ BUT often these beliefs are facts we hold in common
with animals - they are the realm of the biologist, not the sociologist
■ also, these beliefs are only a fraction of our systems of
belief - they shed no light on institutionalized patterns of knowledge
● the issue at stake here is individual
knowledge, not social knowledge
■ these beliefs can increasingly be explained by causal
theories of the brain, which places them in opposition to most rationalist theories
of knowledge, which rest on non-causal reasoning
○ we cannot treat reality as a useful common factor because it is possible to
draw so many different conclusions from the same reality
■ e.g. scientific interpretation
● Hollis and Lukes claim that ‘all cultures share a common core of true beliefs and
rationally-justified patterns of inference’
○ this is made up of statements which rational men ‘cannot fail to believe
in simple perceptual situations’ and rules of logic
○ this implies a universal, context independent criteria of truth and
rationality
■ there must be some common core to act as a ‘rational
bridgehead’ or else translation between languages would be impossible - we
