Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 1: Criminal Law: Purposes, Scope, and Sources
Solution and Answer Guide
GARDNER & ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 14E, 2026, 9780357935507;
CHAPTER 1: CRIMINAL LAW: PURPOSES, SCOPE, AND SOURCES
CASE ANALYSIS AND WRITING EXERCISES
1. Virginia has a statute aimed at persons addicted to alcohol. Under the statute, persons who have been
classified as “habitual drunkards” in a civil interdiction proceeding can be prohibited from obtaining,
buying, or using alcohol. Once designated a “habitual drunkard,” a person can be charged with a criminal
violation for possessing or using alcohol. The crime carries a jail sentence of up to one year. A homeless
alcoholic is charged with violation of the statute by possessing alcohol. Can Virginia pass such a law under
its police power? If so, is the statute susceptible to any constitutional claims? What claims, and how should
they be resolved? See Manning v. Caldwell for City of Roanoke, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). Note the
posture of the case and how it ended up being heard by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
Solution:
Criminal laws are an essential part of the criminal justice system, ideally protecting the safety of the
community while preserving the constitutional rights provided to citizens. The inherent power of every
state and local government (as provided in the Tenth Amendment) to enact laws is known as its police
power; that power is limited by the principle of legality and the provisions of the United States
Constitution.
While a state may regulate the use of alcohol, it cannot create a law that punishes a status, such as alcohol
addiction.
Virginia, under its police power, can make the argument that they are prohibiting behavior (purchasing,
obtaining, or using alcohol) rather than criminalizing the addiction itself. A criminal law that punishes
alcoholism, with no act requirement, constitutes a status crime. The Supreme Court has held that a state law
that criminalizes a status inflicts “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Under this reasoning, an individual can be punished for an
act (drinking and driving, public drunkenness, etc.) but not for an addiction (alcoholism).
Virginia’s statute was subject to constitutional claims in Manning v. Caldwell for the City of Roanoke. In
this case the defendant made the argument that the statute prohibited the behaviors of those “who have
shown themselves to be a habitual drunkard” without ever defining how that status was to be assigned. In
the Manning case, the Court reversed and remanded the trial court, noting that the label “habitual drunkard”
was assigned without establishing that Manning had ever been convicted of an alcohol-related offense, thus
the label punished a status (alcoholism) rather than a criminal behavior resulting in either arrest or
conviction.
2. As we saw in this chapter, there is considerable disagreement among federal courts, including within the
U.S. Supreme Court, on sentence enhancements under the ACCA for possessing weapons as a convicted
felon with three or more “crimes of violence.” Assume a defendant has three prior convictions related to
assaults. All the assault convictions were felonies. The defendant was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of a federal statute. The prosecution sought a five-year sentence
enhancement under the ACCA. One of the three prior assault convictions was for “reckless aggravated
assault.” Can that conviction meet the requirement of being a “crime of violence”? What argument can you
make that it isn’t such a crime? See Borden v. U.S., 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) for the U.S. Supreme Court’s
opinion on those arguments. As you review that case, answer these questions: What does the Court mean
by its reference to “the elements clause? What is the “categorical approach” the Court cites as the basis for
defining crimes of violence?
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 1
accessible website, in whole or in part.
,Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 1: Criminal Law: Purposes, Scope, and Sources
Solution:
The U.S. Congress has decided that career criminals with a history of convictions for violent crimes pose a
greater threat to society than convicted felons who lack this history. In response to this concern, the Career
Armed Criminal Act (ACCA) was passed in 1984. This Act increased the punishment for persons who
were felons convicted of possession of a firearm, a federal offense, if the person had been convicted of
three previous “violent felonies.” The Act lists certain crimes as violent, such as murder, robbery, or rape,
and in its residual clause defines “violent felony” to include any crime that has a “serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” The question of whether a conviction of “reckless aggravated assault” can meet
the requirements for a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA hinges on whether the offense can be
defined as a “crime of violence.”
In the Borden ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to address the vague nature of the phrase “violent
felony” as expressed in the ACCA. Borden was sentenced under the ACCA for a crime categorized as
reckless. To decide whether an offense satisfies the elements clause, the courts use a categorical approach,
which focuses not on the facts of a particular case but on whether the elements of the statute of conviction
meet the federal standard. In the Borden case, the Court sought to ascertain whether the Virginia law
necessarily involves the defendant’s “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.” If the criminalized act does not involve that level of force, the state law does not meet
the federal standards for ACCA. In the Court’s ruling, it argued, “Borden argued that this offense is not a
violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause because a mental state of recklessness suffices for
conviction. In his view, only purposeful or knowing conduct satisfies the clause’s demand for the use of
force “against the person of another.” The district court disagreed, holding that reckless offenses qualify as
violent felonies and sentencing Borden as a career offender. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
of the district court, the Supreme Court reversed it. The Court found that under the elements clause,
allowing a mens rea standard of recklessness means the crime fails to meet the standards established in the
ACCA. Recklessness and negligence are two categories of mens rea which imply a reduced level of
culpability.
3. Homelessness in our cities is a national problem, not limited to large metropolitan areas like New York
City, Los Angeles, Houston, or San Francisco. This case involves the city of Boise, Idaho. Boise wished to
prevent homeless people from using public areas, such as campgrounds, as places to sleep. To accomplish
that purpose, Boise passed an ordinance making it a criminal violation to sleep in public places, even if city
or private shelters for the homeless were full at the time. Various homeless persons appealed their
convictions to the federal courts in Idaho. The case ultimately was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. That court held that the city ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, made binding on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. What was the basis for the
court’s conclusion? Was this a “status” crime, like being a drug addict in the case of Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), discussed in this chapter? Or was the crime the “conduct” of sleeping in
the public campgrounds, like the public drunkenness “conduct” in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968),
discussed in the text with Robinson? How did the Ninth Circuit Court distinguish this case from Powell?
Are you convinced? Is it wrong for a city to try to keep public campgrounds, intended for the use of all
citizens as campgrounds, free from homeless users? See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir.
2019). Is this case overruled by City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 144 S.Ct. 2202 (2024)?
Solution:
This question asks students for their personal opinions on the rulings in Robinson, Powell, and Martin v.
Boise, so answers may vary. A student may write something like this: In Martin v. Boise the court
considered an ordinance passed by the city of Boise making it a violation to sleep in a public place, even if
the city’s private shelters were full. Whether or not it is wrong for Boise to prohibit homeless individuals
from using the city’s public campgrounds was not the issue addressed in the Martin case; rather, the court
considered whether the statute was directed at a behavior (sleeping in a public place) or a status
(homelessness).
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 2
accessible website, in whole or in part.
,Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 1: Criminal Law: Purposes, Scope, and Sources
In Robinson v. California, the Court ruled that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to arrest and
convict an individual for a status, such as drug addiction or homelessness, with no act requirement. In the
case of Powell v. Texas, the Court made an important distinction. The defendant in the Powell case was an
alcoholic with nearly a hundred arrests for public intoxication. His arrests were for an act (public
drunkenness), not for a status (alcoholism).
Using that lens, the Court found that Boise’s statute could not be enforced if the city’s homeless shelters
were full, leaving the homeless with no option but to sleep in public areas. Lack of shelter space left the
defendants “involuntarily homeless,” which is a status. Thus, the ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The City of Grants Pass v. Johnson ruling overturns
Martin, as it asserts that the enforcement of laws regulating camping on public property does not violate the
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court asserts that this issue is
mismatched to the case as the Eighth Amendment focuses specifically on punishment for convictions, not
on whether a state or local government can criminalize a behavior.
4. Some, a few, states still have common law crimes. North Carolina is one of them. In State v. Lancaster, 895
S.E.2d 337 (2023), the defendant was convicted of violating the common law crime of “going armed to the
terror of the public.” The defendant was standing in the parking lot of an apartment complex, firing a
handgun in the air, and yelling obscenities. Some of the people living in the apartment complex saw and
heard the defendant, and they called the police. Based on these facts, the defendant was charged and
convicted of various charges, including the common law charge. On that charge, the defendant contended
one of the elements of the offense was conduct on a public highway and that because his actions took place
in a parking lot, the charge was not proved. The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. It said that
reviewing the history of the “going armed to the terror of the public” crime, the elements of the crime were
not limited to taking actions on a public highway. Any public place satisfies the crime’s elements, the Court
said and affirmed the conviction. How did the Court “find” the elements of the crime? In a statute, the
elements are there for all to see and understand. How is someone in North Carolina going to see and
understand the elements of this common law crime? Is that difficulty similar to the difficulty created when
criminal statutes are too vague or overbroad? In what way? Did the defendant in Lancaster raise those
questions? Should he have?
Solution:
This question asks students for their personal opinions, so answers may vary. A student may write
something like this: The Court interpreted the common law crime of “going armed to the terror of the
public” by ascertaining the origins and intent of the original common law. In Lancaster’s appeal, he argued
that this act did not meet the common law definition of the crime: …the accused (1) went about armed with
an unusual and dangerous weapon, (2) in a public place, (3) for the purpose of terrifying and alarming the
peaceful people, and (4) in a manner that would naturally terrify and alarm the peaceful people. Lancaster
chose to challenge the “public place” portion of the common law, arguing he was on private property. The
Court disagreed and upheld Lancaster’s conviction based on its original intent rather than the technical
nature of the language. Lancaster does not raise the issue of whether the statute, with its historical language
(later interpreted/expanded by the Court), is overbroad or void for vagueness. These would have been
reasonable issues to raise given the nature of this case, given that it is the Court’s interpretation of the
common law that it is critical, and that reasoning is not stated explicitly in statutory law for citizens to read
and understand.
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 3
accessible website, in whole or in part.
, Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 2: Jurisdiction
Solution and Answer Guide
GARDNER & ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 14E, 2026, 9780357935507;
CHAPTER 2: JURISDICTION
CASE ANALYSIS AND WRITING EXERCISES
1. A member of the U.S. Congress representing Nebraska was being investigated by the FBI concerning
illegal campaign contributions. The FBI received information that the Congressman received illegal
campaign contributions from a foreign national. The FBI interviewed the Congressman in his offices in
Nebraska and Washington D.C. In response to questions about knowledge of the illegal contributions, the
Congressman denied such knowledge. Subsequently, when it became apparent the Congressman knew
about the contributions, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 with obstructing a federal investigation by
making false statements to the FBI. The Congressman was tried and convicted in California Federal
District Court. He appealed, alleging the trial was invalid because it was held in the wrong district. Should
the Congressman’s conviction be reversed? Determine both the jurisdiction of the California Federal Court
to hear the case and the proper venue under the U.S. Constitution. See United States v. Fortenberry, 2023
WL 8885105.
Solution:
In this case, the Congressman was interviewed at his residences in Nebraska and Washington, D.C.
regarding illegal campaign contributions. In United States v. Fortenberry, the federal government alleged
that the illegal campaign contributions from a foreign national took place in the Central District of
California, giving this district proper jurisdiction (reasoning that the district with jurisdiction over the crime
is the district in which the crime occurred). The location of the defendant’s residence and place of work are
irrelevant. However, at the end of the investigation, the Congressman was charged with making false
statements during the interviews in Nebraska and Washington, in violation of Section 1001, but he was not
charged with receiving illegal campaign contributions in California. The Congressman was convicted in the
Central District of California, but he appealed, claiming the case was heard in the wrong jurisdiction. The
Court recognizes that jurisdiction is a significant issue, directly pertaining to a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Congress did not expressly designate the venue of a
Section 1001 offense, and so the “locus delicti,” the location of the crime, “must be determined from the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” In this case, the criminal
behavior is making a false statement, which did not occur within the jurisdiction of the California District
Court. Therefore, jurisdiction belongs to whichever location the Congressman occupied at the time he made
false statements.
2. Yellowstone National Park is located mostly in Wyoming, with a small part in Idaho and Montana. In
United States v. Harris, 10 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2021) a group of campers were camping in the park.
Another camper joined the group, conversations got heated, and the new person pulled a pistol from his
jacket and brandished it in a threatening manner at the group. The camper then left the group. The next day
the camper was arrested by park police and ultimately charged in Wyoming Federal Court with violation of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502, “threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon” against another person. Does the
United States have jurisdiction over a crime committed in Wyoming? If so, why? Can the defendant be
convicted under a Wyoming statute in Federal Court? Why or why not?
Solution:
Federal enclaves are lands that are federally owned and controlled. As a National Park, Yellowstone can be
considered a federal enclave and thus falls under the jurisdiction of federal law. That said, Congress passed
the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) in 1948, which permits federal enclaves to adopt the laws of the state
where the enclave is located, specifically when the behavior in question is not addressed in federal law. In
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 1
accessible website, in whole or in part.
Solution and Answer Guide
GARDNER & ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 14E, 2026, 9780357935507;
CHAPTER 1: CRIMINAL LAW: PURPOSES, SCOPE, AND SOURCES
CASE ANALYSIS AND WRITING EXERCISES
1. Virginia has a statute aimed at persons addicted to alcohol. Under the statute, persons who have been
classified as “habitual drunkards” in a civil interdiction proceeding can be prohibited from obtaining,
buying, or using alcohol. Once designated a “habitual drunkard,” a person can be charged with a criminal
violation for possessing or using alcohol. The crime carries a jail sentence of up to one year. A homeless
alcoholic is charged with violation of the statute by possessing alcohol. Can Virginia pass such a law under
its police power? If so, is the statute susceptible to any constitutional claims? What claims, and how should
they be resolved? See Manning v. Caldwell for City of Roanoke, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). Note the
posture of the case and how it ended up being heard by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
Solution:
Criminal laws are an essential part of the criminal justice system, ideally protecting the safety of the
community while preserving the constitutional rights provided to citizens. The inherent power of every
state and local government (as provided in the Tenth Amendment) to enact laws is known as its police
power; that power is limited by the principle of legality and the provisions of the United States
Constitution.
While a state may regulate the use of alcohol, it cannot create a law that punishes a status, such as alcohol
addiction.
Virginia, under its police power, can make the argument that they are prohibiting behavior (purchasing,
obtaining, or using alcohol) rather than criminalizing the addiction itself. A criminal law that punishes
alcoholism, with no act requirement, constitutes a status crime. The Supreme Court has held that a state law
that criminalizes a status inflicts “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Under this reasoning, an individual can be punished for an
act (drinking and driving, public drunkenness, etc.) but not for an addiction (alcoholism).
Virginia’s statute was subject to constitutional claims in Manning v. Caldwell for the City of Roanoke. In
this case the defendant made the argument that the statute prohibited the behaviors of those “who have
shown themselves to be a habitual drunkard” without ever defining how that status was to be assigned. In
the Manning case, the Court reversed and remanded the trial court, noting that the label “habitual drunkard”
was assigned without establishing that Manning had ever been convicted of an alcohol-related offense, thus
the label punished a status (alcoholism) rather than a criminal behavior resulting in either arrest or
conviction.
2. As we saw in this chapter, there is considerable disagreement among federal courts, including within the
U.S. Supreme Court, on sentence enhancements under the ACCA for possessing weapons as a convicted
felon with three or more “crimes of violence.” Assume a defendant has three prior convictions related to
assaults. All the assault convictions were felonies. The defendant was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of a federal statute. The prosecution sought a five-year sentence
enhancement under the ACCA. One of the three prior assault convictions was for “reckless aggravated
assault.” Can that conviction meet the requirement of being a “crime of violence”? What argument can you
make that it isn’t such a crime? See Borden v. U.S., 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) for the U.S. Supreme Court’s
opinion on those arguments. As you review that case, answer these questions: What does the Court mean
by its reference to “the elements clause? What is the “categorical approach” the Court cites as the basis for
defining crimes of violence?
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 1
accessible website, in whole or in part.
,Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 1: Criminal Law: Purposes, Scope, and Sources
Solution:
The U.S. Congress has decided that career criminals with a history of convictions for violent crimes pose a
greater threat to society than convicted felons who lack this history. In response to this concern, the Career
Armed Criminal Act (ACCA) was passed in 1984. This Act increased the punishment for persons who
were felons convicted of possession of a firearm, a federal offense, if the person had been convicted of
three previous “violent felonies.” The Act lists certain crimes as violent, such as murder, robbery, or rape,
and in its residual clause defines “violent felony” to include any crime that has a “serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” The question of whether a conviction of “reckless aggravated assault” can meet
the requirements for a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA hinges on whether the offense can be
defined as a “crime of violence.”
In the Borden ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to address the vague nature of the phrase “violent
felony” as expressed in the ACCA. Borden was sentenced under the ACCA for a crime categorized as
reckless. To decide whether an offense satisfies the elements clause, the courts use a categorical approach,
which focuses not on the facts of a particular case but on whether the elements of the statute of conviction
meet the federal standard. In the Borden case, the Court sought to ascertain whether the Virginia law
necessarily involves the defendant’s “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.” If the criminalized act does not involve that level of force, the state law does not meet
the federal standards for ACCA. In the Court’s ruling, it argued, “Borden argued that this offense is not a
violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause because a mental state of recklessness suffices for
conviction. In his view, only purposeful or knowing conduct satisfies the clause’s demand for the use of
force “against the person of another.” The district court disagreed, holding that reckless offenses qualify as
violent felonies and sentencing Borden as a career offender. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
of the district court, the Supreme Court reversed it. The Court found that under the elements clause,
allowing a mens rea standard of recklessness means the crime fails to meet the standards established in the
ACCA. Recklessness and negligence are two categories of mens rea which imply a reduced level of
culpability.
3. Homelessness in our cities is a national problem, not limited to large metropolitan areas like New York
City, Los Angeles, Houston, or San Francisco. This case involves the city of Boise, Idaho. Boise wished to
prevent homeless people from using public areas, such as campgrounds, as places to sleep. To accomplish
that purpose, Boise passed an ordinance making it a criminal violation to sleep in public places, even if city
or private shelters for the homeless were full at the time. Various homeless persons appealed their
convictions to the federal courts in Idaho. The case ultimately was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. That court held that the city ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, made binding on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. What was the basis for the
court’s conclusion? Was this a “status” crime, like being a drug addict in the case of Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), discussed in this chapter? Or was the crime the “conduct” of sleeping in
the public campgrounds, like the public drunkenness “conduct” in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968),
discussed in the text with Robinson? How did the Ninth Circuit Court distinguish this case from Powell?
Are you convinced? Is it wrong for a city to try to keep public campgrounds, intended for the use of all
citizens as campgrounds, free from homeless users? See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir.
2019). Is this case overruled by City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 144 S.Ct. 2202 (2024)?
Solution:
This question asks students for their personal opinions on the rulings in Robinson, Powell, and Martin v.
Boise, so answers may vary. A student may write something like this: In Martin v. Boise the court
considered an ordinance passed by the city of Boise making it a violation to sleep in a public place, even if
the city’s private shelters were full. Whether or not it is wrong for Boise to prohibit homeless individuals
from using the city’s public campgrounds was not the issue addressed in the Martin case; rather, the court
considered whether the statute was directed at a behavior (sleeping in a public place) or a status
(homelessness).
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 2
accessible website, in whole or in part.
,Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 1: Criminal Law: Purposes, Scope, and Sources
In Robinson v. California, the Court ruled that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to arrest and
convict an individual for a status, such as drug addiction or homelessness, with no act requirement. In the
case of Powell v. Texas, the Court made an important distinction. The defendant in the Powell case was an
alcoholic with nearly a hundred arrests for public intoxication. His arrests were for an act (public
drunkenness), not for a status (alcoholism).
Using that lens, the Court found that Boise’s statute could not be enforced if the city’s homeless shelters
were full, leaving the homeless with no option but to sleep in public areas. Lack of shelter space left the
defendants “involuntarily homeless,” which is a status. Thus, the ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The City of Grants Pass v. Johnson ruling overturns
Martin, as it asserts that the enforcement of laws regulating camping on public property does not violate the
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court asserts that this issue is
mismatched to the case as the Eighth Amendment focuses specifically on punishment for convictions, not
on whether a state or local government can criminalize a behavior.
4. Some, a few, states still have common law crimes. North Carolina is one of them. In State v. Lancaster, 895
S.E.2d 337 (2023), the defendant was convicted of violating the common law crime of “going armed to the
terror of the public.” The defendant was standing in the parking lot of an apartment complex, firing a
handgun in the air, and yelling obscenities. Some of the people living in the apartment complex saw and
heard the defendant, and they called the police. Based on these facts, the defendant was charged and
convicted of various charges, including the common law charge. On that charge, the defendant contended
one of the elements of the offense was conduct on a public highway and that because his actions took place
in a parking lot, the charge was not proved. The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. It said that
reviewing the history of the “going armed to the terror of the public” crime, the elements of the crime were
not limited to taking actions on a public highway. Any public place satisfies the crime’s elements, the Court
said and affirmed the conviction. How did the Court “find” the elements of the crime? In a statute, the
elements are there for all to see and understand. How is someone in North Carolina going to see and
understand the elements of this common law crime? Is that difficulty similar to the difficulty created when
criminal statutes are too vague or overbroad? In what way? Did the defendant in Lancaster raise those
questions? Should he have?
Solution:
This question asks students for their personal opinions, so answers may vary. A student may write
something like this: The Court interpreted the common law crime of “going armed to the terror of the
public” by ascertaining the origins and intent of the original common law. In Lancaster’s appeal, he argued
that this act did not meet the common law definition of the crime: …the accused (1) went about armed with
an unusual and dangerous weapon, (2) in a public place, (3) for the purpose of terrifying and alarming the
peaceful people, and (4) in a manner that would naturally terrify and alarm the peaceful people. Lancaster
chose to challenge the “public place” portion of the common law, arguing he was on private property. The
Court disagreed and upheld Lancaster’s conviction based on its original intent rather than the technical
nature of the language. Lancaster does not raise the issue of whether the statute, with its historical language
(later interpreted/expanded by the Court), is overbroad or void for vagueness. These would have been
reasonable issues to raise given the nature of this case, given that it is the Court’s interpretation of the
common law that it is critical, and that reasoning is not stated explicitly in statutory law for citizens to read
and understand.
© 2026 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly 3
accessible website, in whole or in part.
, Solution and Answer Guide: Gardner & Anderson, Criminal Law 14e, 2026, 9780357935507; Chapter 2: Jurisdiction
Solution and Answer Guide
GARDNER & ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 14E, 2026, 9780357935507;
CHAPTER 2: JURISDICTION
CASE ANALYSIS AND WRITING EXERCISES
1. A member of the U.S. Congress representing Nebraska was being investigated by the FBI concerning
illegal campaign contributions. The FBI received information that the Congressman received illegal
campaign contributions from a foreign national. The FBI interviewed the Congressman in his offices in
Nebraska and Washington D.C. In response to questions about knowledge of the illegal contributions, the
Congressman denied such knowledge. Subsequently, when it became apparent the Congressman knew
about the contributions, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 with obstructing a federal investigation by
making false statements to the FBI. The Congressman was tried and convicted in California Federal
District Court. He appealed, alleging the trial was invalid because it was held in the wrong district. Should
the Congressman’s conviction be reversed? Determine both the jurisdiction of the California Federal Court
to hear the case and the proper venue under the U.S. Constitution. See United States v. Fortenberry, 2023
WL 8885105.
Solution:
In this case, the Congressman was interviewed at his residences in Nebraska and Washington, D.C.
regarding illegal campaign contributions. In United States v. Fortenberry, the federal government alleged
that the illegal campaign contributions from a foreign national took place in the Central District of
California, giving this district proper jurisdiction (reasoning that the district with jurisdiction over the crime
is the district in which the crime occurred). The location of the defendant’s residence and place of work are
irrelevant. However, at the end of the investigation, the Congressman was charged with making false
statements during the interviews in Nebraska and Washington, in violation of Section 1001, but he was not
charged with receiving illegal campaign contributions in California. The Congressman was convicted in the
Central District of California, but he appealed, claiming the case was heard in the wrong jurisdiction. The
Court recognizes that jurisdiction is a significant issue, directly pertaining to a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Congress did not expressly designate the venue of a
Section 1001 offense, and so the “locus delicti,” the location of the crime, “must be determined from the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” In this case, the criminal
behavior is making a false statement, which did not occur within the jurisdiction of the California District
Court. Therefore, jurisdiction belongs to whichever location the Congressman occupied at the time he made
false statements.
2. Yellowstone National Park is located mostly in Wyoming, with a small part in Idaho and Montana. In
United States v. Harris, 10 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2021) a group of campers were camping in the park.
Another camper joined the group, conversations got heated, and the new person pulled a pistol from his
jacket and brandished it in a threatening manner at the group. The camper then left the group. The next day
the camper was arrested by park police and ultimately charged in Wyoming Federal Court with violation of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502, “threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon” against another person. Does the
United States have jurisdiction over a crime committed in Wyoming? If so, why? Can the defendant be
convicted under a Wyoming statute in Federal Court? Why or why not?
Solution:
Federal enclaves are lands that are federally owned and controlled. As a National Park, Yellowstone can be
considered a federal enclave and thus falls under the jurisdiction of federal law. That said, Congress passed
the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) in 1948, which permits federal enclaves to adopt the laws of the state
where the enclave is located, specifically when the behavior in question is not addressed in federal law. In
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