Measuring Welfare
CS: difference between WTP and amount paid
EV: income required at old prices to maintain new utility
CV: income required at new prices to maintain old utility
Quasilinear Preferences
Demand for nonlinear good independent of m – no income
effect except for low incomes – indifference curve vertical shift
EV=CV=∆CS – aggregate indirect utility = sum of indirect utilities
k 1 ∂C k
M comes from fact consumer owns firm: m=π =Σ pk y −C ( y , … y ) ⇒ = pk
∂y
1 k
u=u ( x , … x )+ π −Σ k p k ⇒ in eqbm consumption = production and m=π
u=u ( x1 , … , x k ) −C ( x 1 , … , x k ) ie benefit – cost so MB= p=MC ie P-efficient
Effect of Tax (not lump sum)
Wedge between consumer and producer price prevents profitable
trades so DWL
Raises revenue for government
Δ p< 0 , Δ x< 0
Δp p
u' ( x ) =p ⇒ u'' ( x )== <0 recall ε D = Δ x p >0
Δ x x εD Δp x
ΔC C
' ''
C ( x )= p ⇒C ( x )= = > 0 recall ε s= Δ x p > 0
Δ x xεs Δp x
'' −pΔx '' p Δx
Δ p+ τ= Δ x u ( x )= ; Δ p=Δ x C ( x )=
x εD x εs
Δ xτ −1 τ 2 εD εs
DWL=
2
=
2 p
px () (
ε s−ε D )
=tax ⋅ sales ⋅ constant
Increasing in: square of tax, sales, elasticities
Burden depends on who has relatively more inelastic curve
Optimal Commodity Taxation
k
Raise revenue, min DWL: min Σ k DW Lk s . t . Σ k τ k x ≥ G
τi/ pi ε j
Assume: linear D, constant MC, XED=0, no lump sum tax ⇒ = ⇒ tax inelastic
τ j / p j εi
goods more, but all goods in proportion to required revenue. Optimal taxes regressive
Monopolist Inefficiency
−1
Constant MC⇒ ε s=∞, mark up of μ ⇒ DWL= μΔx
2
¿ x
p ( 1+ε D )
¿ ∗¿
¿∗¿
¿ −1 p −1 ¿∗¿ ε ¿
¿∗¿= p + μ= ⇒ DWL= Δ x= p ¿¿ ¿
εD 2 εD 2
p
As ε D evaluated at p¿∗¿, x
¿∗¿¿
¿
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Σ ( Bt −Ct )
NPV =
( 1+r )t
Can't value at market prices as gen eq effects, non-marginal changes of p and q, market
failure / shadow prices, non-market valuations
General Equilibrium Effects
Project will directly affect some quantities (inputs), and indirectly affect all others
U =u ( x1 , … , x k ) −Σ p k x k + Σ p k y k −C ( y 1 ,… , y k )
, Add in-depth VCG notes
k k k k
dU ∂u d x dx dy ∂C d y
=Σ k −Σ +Σ −Σ k
d pk ∂x d p k d p k d pk ∂ y d pk
∂u ∂C
dU =Σ ( y k −x k ) d p k + Σ
k k
∂x
k(− pk d x k −Σ
∂y )k (
− pk d y k = Δ p + Δ q
)
Price change: if y =x just a transfer, no ∆W – do not value unless i) social value of income
different for gainers / losers (depends on W ( u ) ) ii) if y k ≠ x k then terms of trade effect: gain if
price increase on exported good (Stolper-Samuelson)
Quantity change: if perfect economy ie u' = p=c ' then no social value – ignore gen eq
effect in other markets; if imperfect, positive social value to expanding for u' >c ' , positive
value to contracting if u' <c ' - need to know valuations and quantity changes
Market Failure and Shadow Prices
Monopoly: p> MC ⇒ MC is resource cost, p−MC is transfer to monopolist, not real RC
Unemployed labour: if unemployed people, shadow price is op. cost of employing worker; if
otherwise employed, shadow price = wage = VMPL in other job; if unemployed, w=0? Or
value of leisure foregone?
General principle: identify opportunity cost
Non-Marginal Changes
Project increases output by non-marginal amount x ' → x' ' ⇒ p' → p' '
'' '' ' ( p' − p' ' ) ( x ' ' −x ' )
B = social value of extra output: p ( x −x ) + ie Δ TR+ Δ CS
2
Commercial decisions do not account for ∆CS – very small for marginal changes
Social Discount Rate
' '
Value of marginal consumption today ¿ u ( xt ) e ⇒−log u ( x t ) + ρt [ ]
−ρt
' '' ''
d −1 ∂ u ( x t ) dx −u ( x t ) dx −u ( x t ) dx 1
= ' + ρ= ' + ρ= ' xt ⋅ +ρ
dt u ( xt ) ∂ x dt Time u (Rate dtMU of
x t )at which uElasticity
( x t ) of dt Consumption
xt
preference consumption falls MU of growth rate
consumption
Social Discount Rate
''
−u ( xt ) dx 1
r= '
xt ⋅ +ρ
u ( xt ) dt x t
''
−u ( x t )
'
xt : determines how fast MU falls: prefer equality over space and time
u ( xt )
dx 1
: less weight on future generations if they are much richer: C growing fast
dt x t
ρ : impatience, extinction probability, generational bias
Externalities
Action of an agent directly affects utility of another. Pecuniary externalities relate to prices
and do matter with frictions, but don’t exist under perfect competition
Taxonomy:
Rival Non-Rival
Excludable Private Good Club Good
Non-Excludable Commons Good Public Good
Consider: scale, scope, time, distribution, reversibility
Pure Public Goods Model
x , y are public and private goods, u=v i ( x ) + y i s .t . M i ≥ x + y i
MRS=v 'i ( x )=M Bi ( x )=1
Under-provision
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