SPĒD SFPC: ALL AREAS UPDATED ACTUAL
QUESTIONS AND CORRECT ANSWERS
Question:
1. Principle incident/ events required to be reported to DoD counterintelligence (CI) organizations
Answer:
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, cyber
Question:
2. Indicators of insider threats
Answer:
1. Failure to report overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
2. Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access outside the job scope
3. Engaging in classified conversations without a need to know
4. Working hours inconsistent with job assignment or insistence on working in private
5. Exploitable behavior traits
6. Repeated security violations
7. Attempting to enter areas not granted access to
8. Unexplainable affluence/living above one's means
9. Anomalies (adversary taking actions which indicate they are knowledgeable to information)
10. Illegal downloads of information/files
Question:
3. Elements that should be considered in identifying Critical Program Information
Answer:
Elements which if compromised could:
1. cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness,
2. shorten the expected combat-effective life of the system
3. reduce technological advantage
4. significantly alter program direction; or
5. enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverseengineer the technology or capability.
Question:
4. asset, threat, vulnerability, risk, countermeasures
Answer:
Elements that a security professional should consider when assessing and managing risks to DoD
assets
Question:
5. The three categories of Special Access Programs
Answer:
acquisition, intelligence, and operations and support
Question:
6. Three different types of threats to classified information
Answer:
Insider Threat, Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIE) and Cybersecurity Threat
,Question:
7. The concept of an insider threat
Answer:
An employee who may represent a threat to national security. These threats encompass potential
espionage, violent acts against the Government or the nation, and unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, including the vast amounts of classified data available on interconnected United States
Government computer networks and systems.
Question:
8. The purpose of the Foreign Visitor Program
Answer:
To track and approve access by a foreign entity to information that is classified; and to approve access
by a foreign entity to information that is unclassified, related to a U.S. Government contract, or plant
visits covered by ITAR.
Question:
9. Special Access Program
Answer:
A program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and
access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification
level.
Question:
10. Enhanced security requirements for protecting Special Access Program (SAP) information
Answer:
Within Personnel Security:
• Access Rosters;
• Billet Structures (if required);
• Indoctrination Agreement;
• Clearance based on an appropriate investigation completed within the last 5 years;
• Individual must materially contribute to the program in addition to having the need to know;
• All individuals with access to SAP are subject to a random counterintelligence scope polygraph
examination;
• Polygraph examination, if approved by the DepSecDef, may be used as a mandatory access
determination;
• Tier review process;
• Personnel must have a Secret or Top Secret clearance;
• SF-86 must be current within one year;
• Limited Access;
• Waivers required for foreign cohabitants, spouses, and immediate family members. Within Industrial
Security: The SecDef or DepSecDef can approve a carve-out provision to relieve Defense Security
Service of industrial security oversight responsibilities. Within Physical Security:
• Access Control;
• Maintain a SAP Facility;
• Access Roster;
• All SAPs must have an unclassified nickname/ Codeword (optional). Within Information Security:
• The use of HVSACO;
• Transmission requirements (order of precedence).
, Question:
11. Responsibilities of the Government SAP Security Officer/Contractor Program Security Officer
(GSSO/ CPSO)
Answer:
From Revision 1 Department of Defense Overprint to the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual Supplement - 1 April 2004:
• Possess a personnel clearance and Program access at least equal to the highest level of Program
classified information involved.
• Provide security administration and management for his/her organization.
• Ensure personnel processed for access to a SAP meet the prerequisite personnel clearance and/or
investigative requirements specified.
• Ensure adequate secure storage and work spaces.
• Ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the NISPOM, its supplement, and the Overprint.
• When required, establish and oversee a classified material control program for each SAP.
• When required, conduct an annual inventory of accountable classified material.
• When required, establish a SAPF.
• Establish and oversee a visitor control program.
• Monitor reproduction and/or duplication and destruction capability of SAP information
• Ensure adherence to special communications capabilities within the SAPF.
• Provide for initial Program indoctrination of employees after their access is approved; rebrief and
debrief personnel as required.
• Establish and oversee specialized procedures for the transmission of SAP material to and from
Program elements
• When required, ensure contractual specific security requirements such as TEMPEST Automated
Information System (AIS), and Operations Security (OPSEC) are accomplished.
• Establish security training and briefings specifically tailored to the unique requirements of the SAP.
Question:
12. The four Cognizant Security Agencies (CSAs)
Answer:
Department of Defense (DoD), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Department of Energy (DoE),
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Question:
13. Cognizant Security Agencies (CSA)s' role in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).
Answer:
Establish an industrial security program to safeguard classified information under its jurisdiction.
Question:
14. Critical Program Information in DoD
QUESTIONS AND CORRECT ANSWERS
Question:
1. Principle incident/ events required to be reported to DoD counterintelligence (CI) organizations
Answer:
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, cyber
Question:
2. Indicators of insider threats
Answer:
1. Failure to report overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
2. Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access outside the job scope
3. Engaging in classified conversations without a need to know
4. Working hours inconsistent with job assignment or insistence on working in private
5. Exploitable behavior traits
6. Repeated security violations
7. Attempting to enter areas not granted access to
8. Unexplainable affluence/living above one's means
9. Anomalies (adversary taking actions which indicate they are knowledgeable to information)
10. Illegal downloads of information/files
Question:
3. Elements that should be considered in identifying Critical Program Information
Answer:
Elements which if compromised could:
1. cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness,
2. shorten the expected combat-effective life of the system
3. reduce technological advantage
4. significantly alter program direction; or
5. enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverseengineer the technology or capability.
Question:
4. asset, threat, vulnerability, risk, countermeasures
Answer:
Elements that a security professional should consider when assessing and managing risks to DoD
assets
Question:
5. The three categories of Special Access Programs
Answer:
acquisition, intelligence, and operations and support
Question:
6. Three different types of threats to classified information
Answer:
Insider Threat, Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIE) and Cybersecurity Threat
,Question:
7. The concept of an insider threat
Answer:
An employee who may represent a threat to national security. These threats encompass potential
espionage, violent acts against the Government or the nation, and unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, including the vast amounts of classified data available on interconnected United States
Government computer networks and systems.
Question:
8. The purpose of the Foreign Visitor Program
Answer:
To track and approve access by a foreign entity to information that is classified; and to approve access
by a foreign entity to information that is unclassified, related to a U.S. Government contract, or plant
visits covered by ITAR.
Question:
9. Special Access Program
Answer:
A program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and
access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification
level.
Question:
10. Enhanced security requirements for protecting Special Access Program (SAP) information
Answer:
Within Personnel Security:
• Access Rosters;
• Billet Structures (if required);
• Indoctrination Agreement;
• Clearance based on an appropriate investigation completed within the last 5 years;
• Individual must materially contribute to the program in addition to having the need to know;
• All individuals with access to SAP are subject to a random counterintelligence scope polygraph
examination;
• Polygraph examination, if approved by the DepSecDef, may be used as a mandatory access
determination;
• Tier review process;
• Personnel must have a Secret or Top Secret clearance;
• SF-86 must be current within one year;
• Limited Access;
• Waivers required for foreign cohabitants, spouses, and immediate family members. Within Industrial
Security: The SecDef or DepSecDef can approve a carve-out provision to relieve Defense Security
Service of industrial security oversight responsibilities. Within Physical Security:
• Access Control;
• Maintain a SAP Facility;
• Access Roster;
• All SAPs must have an unclassified nickname/ Codeword (optional). Within Information Security:
• The use of HVSACO;
• Transmission requirements (order of precedence).
, Question:
11. Responsibilities of the Government SAP Security Officer/Contractor Program Security Officer
(GSSO/ CPSO)
Answer:
From Revision 1 Department of Defense Overprint to the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual Supplement - 1 April 2004:
• Possess a personnel clearance and Program access at least equal to the highest level of Program
classified information involved.
• Provide security administration and management for his/her organization.
• Ensure personnel processed for access to a SAP meet the prerequisite personnel clearance and/or
investigative requirements specified.
• Ensure adequate secure storage and work spaces.
• Ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the NISPOM, its supplement, and the Overprint.
• When required, establish and oversee a classified material control program for each SAP.
• When required, conduct an annual inventory of accountable classified material.
• When required, establish a SAPF.
• Establish and oversee a visitor control program.
• Monitor reproduction and/or duplication and destruction capability of SAP information
• Ensure adherence to special communications capabilities within the SAPF.
• Provide for initial Program indoctrination of employees after their access is approved; rebrief and
debrief personnel as required.
• Establish and oversee specialized procedures for the transmission of SAP material to and from
Program elements
• When required, ensure contractual specific security requirements such as TEMPEST Automated
Information System (AIS), and Operations Security (OPSEC) are accomplished.
• Establish security training and briefings specifically tailored to the unique requirements of the SAP.
Question:
12. The four Cognizant Security Agencies (CSAs)
Answer:
Department of Defense (DoD), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Department of Energy (DoE),
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Question:
13. Cognizant Security Agencies (CSA)s' role in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).
Answer:
Establish an industrial security program to safeguard classified information under its jurisdiction.
Question:
14. Critical Program Information in DoD
