Annotated Bibliography: Morgan Clelland
The topic that I have chosen for my annotated bibliography is the Battle of
Midway that took place from June 2-4 of 1942. I chose this because this is one of the
most significant battles of World War II, my favorite part of American history.
1. Axelrod, Alan. The Real History of World War II: A
New Look at the Past . New York, New York: Sturling
Publishing Co., Inc., 2008, p 218-222. Print.
This part focuses on the main reason of why the Japanese wanted to take Midway
and on the main reason of why the assault failed. The Japanese leaders at first were
against the Midway plan of Admiral Yamamoto. They said that it required too many
resources. This conflict was dropped after the bombings of Tokyo and other cites by B-25
bombers on April 18, 1942. The Japanese thought that the bombers could not have come
from an aircraft carrier as they were, but from Midway. This would be the primary
motivation in attacking Midway. This battle would fail for the main reason of dividing
the fleet between an Aleutian diversion and a Midway attack. The Japanese had superior
forces at Midway which was upset by the Americans being aware of the Japanese plan.
However, they still could have had a major advantage if they had just put all forces at
Midway. This would be the main reason of their defeat.
This is a very useful source on Midway. It gave a credible portrayal of Midway. It
would provide excellent support for a paper. A good thing about this source is that it
clearly explained why the Japanese went after Midway. The other sources just say that
the Japanese leaders eventually withdrew their dissent without giving the reason for
doing so.
2. Antill,
Peter D. "The Battle of Midway: Turning Point in
the Pacifi c Campaign 3 - 7 June 1942." The Battle of
Midway. 19 Dec 2002. Peter D. Antill, Web. 19 Nov 2009.
<http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_midwaylong.h
tml>.
This article focuses on how the failure of Japanese intelligence at Midway would
contribute to an American victory. The first error was that the Japanese high command
refused to listen to suggestions from its intelligence analysts that there was a possibility
that the Americans had broken the Japanese code and could be aware of the Japanese
intent to attack Midway. This was largely ignored not because of intelligence to suggest
otherwise, but because the Japanese command viewed America as an inferior enemy with
little power. This was a result of the fact that the Japanese had largely up to that point
quick and easy victories over American holdings. It was even ignored when proved in
pre-planning by war scenarios put forth by analysts that showed up to three of the carriers
of the task force could easily be sunk if American carriers were to attack with no
preparation for such an event. A second error committed was that decoded American
messages that indicated the Americans were aware of a major operation and were
responding in kind were largely ignored as well. Seventy-two of the 180 transmissions
,received from Pearl Harbor before the Battle of Midway were marked as urgent. This
suggested that the Americans were expecting some great event to happen and were
responding since so many urgent messages were being sent. However, the information
this time was not left alone because of low respect of American capabilities by Japanese
leaders, but because the analysts were under the impression that the same information
must already have been received by Japanese leaders in the battle groups being organized
in the Pacific for Midway even though they were equipped with low ability deciphering
equipment that did not function well. A third error was that the invasion force being
sighted by American search planes as it approached Midway on the day of the attack was
not furthered to the attack force. This was done to maintain the strict order of radio
silence so that American planes would not be able to determine the location of Japanese
ships. This was carried out with the intent to protect the location of the attack force.
However, the attack force was not too far a distance from the invasion force and would
launch its attack close to Midway. This would assure that the Americans would be able to
find the attack force soon after this. Therefore, the Japanese attack force was unaware
that the element of surprise had been lost and would not be able to respond until the time
the American planes attacked, which by then was too late.
This source was an outstanding one on the Battle of Midway. It also gave a very
reliable impression as it matched the book sources that were researched and it included a
bibliography of its own. It would definitely be useful in a research paper. One great thing
that about this source was it approached intelligence from a different angle. Rather than
come at it from the significance of American intelligence success in the battle, it took a
different view and approached it from the significance of Japanese intelligence blunders
at the battle.
3. Burke, Craig. "The Principle of the objective: Nagumo
VS Spruance at Midway." The Battle of Midway . 07 Nov
2000. Chris Hawkinson, Web. 19 Nov
2009.<http://www.centuryinter.net/midway/objective.ht
ml>
This article focuses on how the Japanese might have been able to achieve victory
if they had just focused on their main objective in the battle and observe normal battle
strategies. There were two objectives that were trying to be achieved. The primary
objective was to destroy the American fleet and the secondary objective was to take
Midway. However, Nagumo in command of the attack fleet would switch these
objectives around, resulting in great disaster. Nagumo at first sent out most of the planes
from his carriers to attack Midway on the morning of June 4. Even though American
ships had not been sighted yet, this went against the principle objective that was ordered
to be maintained at all times by taking the majority of planes away from the ships for the
secondary target of Midway while leaving few planes behind for the primary objective of
destroying American ships when sighted. This was ordered to strictly be followed no
matter what since it was hard to tell when any American ships might arrive. It would not
matter much at that moment, but would prove to be crucial soon. It would prove to be
crucial when the planes would return to be refueled for a second strike on Midway. The
problem of this was with so many planes needing to be refueled at once, there would be
, very little opportunity to repel any attacks. At the very least, it would have been prudent
to launch a sudden strike with the small amount of planes they did have ready because of
the superior skill of the Japanese pilots would have been able to compensate for less
plans. Nagumo did not want to risk this and had every plane come in to be refueled and
rearmed so that one massive attack could be launched at once. This led to be a great
problem when the Americans launched an attack of their own at that moment that
resulted in not just the sinking of three carriers, but all of the planes with them. The same
fate would befall the fourth carrier, but not before it launched an attack of its own with
fifteen dive bombers that demonstrated what could have happened to every American
carrier if the Japanese had just launched the small amount of ready planes from each
carrier rather waiting for all of them to be ready by sinking the Yorktown. Thus, it is
demonstrated here how the Japanese were able to help bring in their own defeat by not
sticking to the main objective of destroying the American fleet.
This source was a very good source for Midway. Its credibility is convincing
by the bibliography listed with the article of books that after being looked at have shown
themselves to be reliable as well. This would make great use in a research paper.
However, there was one small thing that could be viewed as not accurate. This source is
under the impression that the separate attacks by the American torpedo and dive bombers
were coordinated attacks when many other sources have proven that to be false. Also, one
notable part about this source was it further clarified how the Japanese decisions at
Midway led to defeat that could easily have been avoided if plans had just been given
simple adjustments.
4. Fisher, Clayton. "THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY, 4-6 JUNE
1942." (2006): Print.
This is a journal account of the Battle of Midway by Commander Clayton Fisher.
In this, he writes about the actions that he and his dive bomber squadron took place in.
And unlike the other groups on board the Hornet, this group had previous battle
experience. The first mission that they would go on is a mission on the morning of June 4
to search for and attack the Japanese fleet. The pilots were hyper and excited to get a
crack at the Japanese fleet as they took off. Very little problems would occur on this
flight except that ice forming on their masks at 14,000 feet made it harder to breathe.
There also was the problem that they never found the Japanese ships and had to turn
back. In the return back, Fisher would be the only one to successfully make it back to the
Hornet. The rest had to ditch in the ocean or land on Midway and then later be returned to
the Hornet. The next action that the squadron would take place in is in the afternoon of
June 4 against the Hiryu after it had attacked the Yorktown. They made it there
successfully and would proceed to attack a cruiser escort near the carrier as the carrier
was dead and burning in the water. No hits would be claimed for this attack. However,
the planes themselves were almost hit as B-17 bombers mistakenly dropped their bombs
through the squadron formation and luckily missed the planes, but unfortunately their
targets as well. On the return trip to the Hornet, many pilots were spotted in the water that
had been shot down. The positions of them were reported and they were later rescued
thanks to the pilots keeping an eye out as they went back. The final tasks of the battle
group after this would be to conduct mop up operations after the main part of the battle.
The topic that I have chosen for my annotated bibliography is the Battle of
Midway that took place from June 2-4 of 1942. I chose this because this is one of the
most significant battles of World War II, my favorite part of American history.
1. Axelrod, Alan. The Real History of World War II: A
New Look at the Past . New York, New York: Sturling
Publishing Co., Inc., 2008, p 218-222. Print.
This part focuses on the main reason of why the Japanese wanted to take Midway
and on the main reason of why the assault failed. The Japanese leaders at first were
against the Midway plan of Admiral Yamamoto. They said that it required too many
resources. This conflict was dropped after the bombings of Tokyo and other cites by B-25
bombers on April 18, 1942. The Japanese thought that the bombers could not have come
from an aircraft carrier as they were, but from Midway. This would be the primary
motivation in attacking Midway. This battle would fail for the main reason of dividing
the fleet between an Aleutian diversion and a Midway attack. The Japanese had superior
forces at Midway which was upset by the Americans being aware of the Japanese plan.
However, they still could have had a major advantage if they had just put all forces at
Midway. This would be the main reason of their defeat.
This is a very useful source on Midway. It gave a credible portrayal of Midway. It
would provide excellent support for a paper. A good thing about this source is that it
clearly explained why the Japanese went after Midway. The other sources just say that
the Japanese leaders eventually withdrew their dissent without giving the reason for
doing so.
2. Antill,
Peter D. "The Battle of Midway: Turning Point in
the Pacifi c Campaign 3 - 7 June 1942." The Battle of
Midway. 19 Dec 2002. Peter D. Antill, Web. 19 Nov 2009.
<http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_midwaylong.h
tml>.
This article focuses on how the failure of Japanese intelligence at Midway would
contribute to an American victory. The first error was that the Japanese high command
refused to listen to suggestions from its intelligence analysts that there was a possibility
that the Americans had broken the Japanese code and could be aware of the Japanese
intent to attack Midway. This was largely ignored not because of intelligence to suggest
otherwise, but because the Japanese command viewed America as an inferior enemy with
little power. This was a result of the fact that the Japanese had largely up to that point
quick and easy victories over American holdings. It was even ignored when proved in
pre-planning by war scenarios put forth by analysts that showed up to three of the carriers
of the task force could easily be sunk if American carriers were to attack with no
preparation for such an event. A second error committed was that decoded American
messages that indicated the Americans were aware of a major operation and were
responding in kind were largely ignored as well. Seventy-two of the 180 transmissions
,received from Pearl Harbor before the Battle of Midway were marked as urgent. This
suggested that the Americans were expecting some great event to happen and were
responding since so many urgent messages were being sent. However, the information
this time was not left alone because of low respect of American capabilities by Japanese
leaders, but because the analysts were under the impression that the same information
must already have been received by Japanese leaders in the battle groups being organized
in the Pacific for Midway even though they were equipped with low ability deciphering
equipment that did not function well. A third error was that the invasion force being
sighted by American search planes as it approached Midway on the day of the attack was
not furthered to the attack force. This was done to maintain the strict order of radio
silence so that American planes would not be able to determine the location of Japanese
ships. This was carried out with the intent to protect the location of the attack force.
However, the attack force was not too far a distance from the invasion force and would
launch its attack close to Midway. This would assure that the Americans would be able to
find the attack force soon after this. Therefore, the Japanese attack force was unaware
that the element of surprise had been lost and would not be able to respond until the time
the American planes attacked, which by then was too late.
This source was an outstanding one on the Battle of Midway. It also gave a very
reliable impression as it matched the book sources that were researched and it included a
bibliography of its own. It would definitely be useful in a research paper. One great thing
that about this source was it approached intelligence from a different angle. Rather than
come at it from the significance of American intelligence success in the battle, it took a
different view and approached it from the significance of Japanese intelligence blunders
at the battle.
3. Burke, Craig. "The Principle of the objective: Nagumo
VS Spruance at Midway." The Battle of Midway . 07 Nov
2000. Chris Hawkinson, Web. 19 Nov
2009.<http://www.centuryinter.net/midway/objective.ht
ml>
This article focuses on how the Japanese might have been able to achieve victory
if they had just focused on their main objective in the battle and observe normal battle
strategies. There were two objectives that were trying to be achieved. The primary
objective was to destroy the American fleet and the secondary objective was to take
Midway. However, Nagumo in command of the attack fleet would switch these
objectives around, resulting in great disaster. Nagumo at first sent out most of the planes
from his carriers to attack Midway on the morning of June 4. Even though American
ships had not been sighted yet, this went against the principle objective that was ordered
to be maintained at all times by taking the majority of planes away from the ships for the
secondary target of Midway while leaving few planes behind for the primary objective of
destroying American ships when sighted. This was ordered to strictly be followed no
matter what since it was hard to tell when any American ships might arrive. It would not
matter much at that moment, but would prove to be crucial soon. It would prove to be
crucial when the planes would return to be refueled for a second strike on Midway. The
problem of this was with so many planes needing to be refueled at once, there would be
, very little opportunity to repel any attacks. At the very least, it would have been prudent
to launch a sudden strike with the small amount of planes they did have ready because of
the superior skill of the Japanese pilots would have been able to compensate for less
plans. Nagumo did not want to risk this and had every plane come in to be refueled and
rearmed so that one massive attack could be launched at once. This led to be a great
problem when the Americans launched an attack of their own at that moment that
resulted in not just the sinking of three carriers, but all of the planes with them. The same
fate would befall the fourth carrier, but not before it launched an attack of its own with
fifteen dive bombers that demonstrated what could have happened to every American
carrier if the Japanese had just launched the small amount of ready planes from each
carrier rather waiting for all of them to be ready by sinking the Yorktown. Thus, it is
demonstrated here how the Japanese were able to help bring in their own defeat by not
sticking to the main objective of destroying the American fleet.
This source was a very good source for Midway. Its credibility is convincing
by the bibliography listed with the article of books that after being looked at have shown
themselves to be reliable as well. This would make great use in a research paper.
However, there was one small thing that could be viewed as not accurate. This source is
under the impression that the separate attacks by the American torpedo and dive bombers
were coordinated attacks when many other sources have proven that to be false. Also, one
notable part about this source was it further clarified how the Japanese decisions at
Midway led to defeat that could easily have been avoided if plans had just been given
simple adjustments.
4. Fisher, Clayton. "THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY, 4-6 JUNE
1942." (2006): Print.
This is a journal account of the Battle of Midway by Commander Clayton Fisher.
In this, he writes about the actions that he and his dive bomber squadron took place in.
And unlike the other groups on board the Hornet, this group had previous battle
experience. The first mission that they would go on is a mission on the morning of June 4
to search for and attack the Japanese fleet. The pilots were hyper and excited to get a
crack at the Japanese fleet as they took off. Very little problems would occur on this
flight except that ice forming on their masks at 14,000 feet made it harder to breathe.
There also was the problem that they never found the Japanese ships and had to turn
back. In the return back, Fisher would be the only one to successfully make it back to the
Hornet. The rest had to ditch in the ocean or land on Midway and then later be returned to
the Hornet. The next action that the squadron would take place in is in the afternoon of
June 4 against the Hiryu after it had attacked the Yorktown. They made it there
successfully and would proceed to attack a cruiser escort near the carrier as the carrier
was dead and burning in the water. No hits would be claimed for this attack. However,
the planes themselves were almost hit as B-17 bombers mistakenly dropped their bombs
through the squadron formation and luckily missed the planes, but unfortunately their
targets as well. On the return trip to the Hornet, many pilots were spotted in the water that
had been shot down. The positions of them were reported and they were later rescued
thanks to the pilots keeping an eye out as they went back. The final tasks of the battle
group after this would be to conduct mop up operations after the main part of the battle.
