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Functionalism
- Functionalism argues that mental states are best defined as functional
entities (like eyes or tin-openers) rather than compositional entities (like salt
or diamonds). Mental states are not to be analysed in terms of their ontology
- Their defining feature is their causal role in relation to a causal network of
environmental inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states.
- Functionalists therefore claim that all mental states are functional states - if
two things are functionally identical (they have all the same inputs and
outputs) then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same
mental and phenomenal properties).
- Mental and phenomenal states are reducible to their functional role - mental
states can be fully explained with by their functional role because they are
nothing “over and above it”
- Mental states are multiply realisable: multiple functionally identical
(functionally isomorphic) set-ups could realise a particular mental state.
- Functionalism is neutral on the traditional ontological question of ‘substance’
(the dualism v physicalism debate), but functionalists tend to be physicalists.
Issue of the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted
qualia)
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental states
that are introspectively accessible.
- Functional duplicates are individuals for whom the same inputs lead to the
same outputs and thus who have the same mental states according to
functionalism
, - It is conceivable that two functional duplicates could have inverted qualia
with respect to each other
- For example, when seeing a tomato Jim experiences the colour qualia that
Jeff would experience when seeing a banana, and vice versa
- If something is conceivable then it is metaphysically possible
- Therefore, this ‘inversion scenario’ is metaphysically possible
- If the ‘inversion scenario’ is metaphysically possible, then functional states
are not phenomenal states as functional duplicates can have different
qualitative experiences despite being functionally identical
- But functionalism claims that all mental states are functional states - if two
things are functionally identical (they have all the same inputs and outputs)
then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same mental
and phenomenal properties)
- So, functionalism is false because it is an incomplete theory of mind
Issue of the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned
Block’s China thought experiment)
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental states
that are introspectively accessible.
- Functional duplicates are individuals for whom the same inputs lead to the
same outputs and thus whom have the same mental states according to
functionalism
- It is conceivable to imagine a functional duplicate called a China Brain. This is
where every person in China is given a radio and assigned a specific role in a
huge communication network. The billion people, along with satellites and an
artificial body, work together to imitate the activity of a single human brain
for one hour.
- The China Brain is a brain that is functionally identical to a human mind (it
has all the same inputs and outputs) but lacks qualia
- If something is conceivable then it is logically/metaphysically possible
- So, consideration of the China thought experiment shows that it is possible
for two functional duplicates to differ mentally such that one (the human)
has qualia while the other (the population of China) does not.
, - So, if the ‘China Brain’ is possible, then functional properties are not
phenomenal properties as functional duplicates can have different
qualitative experiences despite being functionally identical
- But functionalism claims that all mental states are functional states - if two
things are functionally identical (they have all the same inputs and outputs)
then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same mental
and phenomenal properties)
- So, functionalism is false because it is an incomplete theory of mind
Issue that the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts (no
amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia).
- P1: If functionalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the functional
facts about colour perception (knowledge of the causal network of
environmental inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states) would
be to have complete knowledge of all the mental facts involved in colour
perception
- P2: Mary has propositional knowledge of all the functional facts involved in
colour perception before her release
- “Mary is a brilliant scientist who…is forced to investigate the world
from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor”
- P3: When Mary sees colour (eg a red rose), she learns new propositional
knowledge
- She learns the phenomenal fact of “what it is like” for both herself and
other people to see red
- She learns truths about qualia which are not deducible from functional
facts - Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of
mental states that are introspectively accessible
- P4: Mary learns a new fact so not all mental facts can be functional facts
(since Mary already knew all of these)
- C1: Therefore, there are non-functional facts about human colour vision
which are not reducible to functional facts
- P5: Non-functional facts are facts about non-functional phenomenal
properties which are not reducible to functional properties
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3/
Functionalism
- Functionalism argues that mental states are best defined as functional
entities (like eyes or tin-openers) rather than compositional entities (like salt
or diamonds). Mental states are not to be analysed in terms of their ontology
- Their defining feature is their causal role in relation to a causal network of
environmental inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states.
- Functionalists therefore claim that all mental states are functional states - if
two things are functionally identical (they have all the same inputs and
outputs) then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same
mental and phenomenal properties).
- Mental and phenomenal states are reducible to their functional role - mental
states can be fully explained with by their functional role because they are
nothing “over and above it”
- Mental states are multiply realisable: multiple functionally identical
(functionally isomorphic) set-ups could realise a particular mental state.
- Functionalism is neutral on the traditional ontological question of ‘substance’
(the dualism v physicalism debate), but functionalists tend to be physicalists.
Issue of the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted
qualia)
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental states
that are introspectively accessible.
- Functional duplicates are individuals for whom the same inputs lead to the
same outputs and thus who have the same mental states according to
functionalism
, - It is conceivable that two functional duplicates could have inverted qualia
with respect to each other
- For example, when seeing a tomato Jim experiences the colour qualia that
Jeff would experience when seeing a banana, and vice versa
- If something is conceivable then it is metaphysically possible
- Therefore, this ‘inversion scenario’ is metaphysically possible
- If the ‘inversion scenario’ is metaphysically possible, then functional states
are not phenomenal states as functional duplicates can have different
qualitative experiences despite being functionally identical
- But functionalism claims that all mental states are functional states - if two
things are functionally identical (they have all the same inputs and outputs)
then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same mental
and phenomenal properties)
- So, functionalism is false because it is an incomplete theory of mind
Issue of the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned
Block’s China thought experiment)
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental states
that are introspectively accessible.
- Functional duplicates are individuals for whom the same inputs lead to the
same outputs and thus whom have the same mental states according to
functionalism
- It is conceivable to imagine a functional duplicate called a China Brain. This is
where every person in China is given a radio and assigned a specific role in a
huge communication network. The billion people, along with satellites and an
artificial body, work together to imitate the activity of a single human brain
for one hour.
- The China Brain is a brain that is functionally identical to a human mind (it
has all the same inputs and outputs) but lacks qualia
- If something is conceivable then it is logically/metaphysically possible
- So, consideration of the China thought experiment shows that it is possible
for two functional duplicates to differ mentally such that one (the human)
has qualia while the other (the population of China) does not.
, - So, if the ‘China Brain’ is possible, then functional properties are not
phenomenal properties as functional duplicates can have different
qualitative experiences despite being functionally identical
- But functionalism claims that all mental states are functional states - if two
things are functionally identical (they have all the same inputs and outputs)
then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same mental
and phenomenal properties)
- So, functionalism is false because it is an incomplete theory of mind
Issue that the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts (no
amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia).
- P1: If functionalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the functional
facts about colour perception (knowledge of the causal network of
environmental inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states) would
be to have complete knowledge of all the mental facts involved in colour
perception
- P2: Mary has propositional knowledge of all the functional facts involved in
colour perception before her release
- “Mary is a brilliant scientist who…is forced to investigate the world
from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor”
- P3: When Mary sees colour (eg a red rose), she learns new propositional
knowledge
- She learns the phenomenal fact of “what it is like” for both herself and
other people to see red
- She learns truths about qualia which are not deducible from functional
facts - Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of
mental states that are introspectively accessible
- P4: Mary learns a new fact so not all mental facts can be functional facts
(since Mary already knew all of these)
- C1: Therefore, there are non-functional facts about human colour vision
which are not reducible to functional facts
- P5: Non-functional facts are facts about non-functional phenomenal
properties which are not reducible to functional properties
