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Eliminative materialism
- Eliminative materialism is a physicalist position and thus argues that
everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical
- Eliminative materialism says that mental states can't be reduced to brain
states, because common-sense, “folk-psychological” mental states do not
exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken
- Instead, language about “folk-psychological” mental states must be
eliminated
- Elimination is not the same as reduction
- With reduction the propositions on both sides of the reduction are true: the
concepts being reduced both refer to (or pick out) something in reality
- With elimination, mental concepts are being removed (eliminated) from our
mature scientific theories, and so any propositions including them are false,
or they rest on assumptions that are false: these mental concepts fail to refer
to something in reality.
- Folk psychology (challenged by eliminative materialism) is (a) an ‘untutored’
or ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of
others) which (b) involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states
with certain features (ie semantic, intentional, causal, phenomenal) and (c)
enables people to explain and predict human behaviour.
- Because of (b) and (c), folk-psychology is viewed by eliminative materialism as
a theory of mind
- So, folk-psychology is an empirical theory (it postulates ‘mental states’, such
as ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’, to explain and predict behaviour), but
, - (a) It has too many explanatory failures: folk-psychology cannot offer
(scientifically) satisfactory explanations of mental illness, creative
imagination, pre-linguistic learning, or memory.
- (b) It shows no/little signs of growth/promise of future development: folk
psychology is ‘stagnant’ and ‘infertile’. There hasn’t been any growth and
development for thousands of years
- (c) It does not cohere with other empirical (scientific) theories such as particle
physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic chemistry, evolutionary
theory, physiology, and neuroscience.
- So, analogous to how other widely utilised empirical ‘folk’ theories/concepts
(e.g phlogiston, elan vital, caloric) were eliminated from our discussion, so
should our common-sense, “folk-psychological” understanding of mental
states
Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other
considerations
- I know, through introspection, that my mind and its mental states exist. I
have direct awareness of my mind and these mental states.
- This knowledge survives the radical doubt (e.g. the ‘evil demon’ hypothesis)
- So, introspective knowledge about my own existence and the existence of
“folk-psychological” mental states is indubitable because “I think therefore I
am”
- However, radical doubt (e.g. the ‘evil demon’ hypothesis) renders the claims
of science dubitable.
- So, introspective self-knowledge about the existence of my “inner” mental
states is pretheoretical and so cannot even be thought of as being a theory
that could be compared with (and thus rejected in favour of) the competing
eliminativist theory.
- Hence any claims that might be supported by science (e.g. those made by the
eliminative materialist) will not cast doubt over my knowledge of my mind
and its mental states.
- The absolute certainty that I have that my mind and its mental states exist
means that I can reject, with equivalent certainty, the claims made by
eliminative materialists.
, - So, eliminative materialism is false
Folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best
hypothesis)
- This argument is typically treated as abductive where it is intended that, if
the premises are true, then we have good reason to accept the conclusion as
the most plausible explanation, even though it is not guaranteed with
certainty
- We enjoy a great deal of success when we use common sense
folk-psychology to explain and predict the actions of other people
- For example, in forensic psychology, folk-psychological mental states have
excellent predictive success in predicting offenders’ future behaviour by
using their beliefs, desires, intentions, and motivations to anticipate whether
they are likely to re-offend.
- Similarly, in cognitive behavioural therapy, folk-psychological mental states
have excellent explanatory success in explaining a person’s behaviour by
identifying how their beliefs and thoughts contribute to their emotions and
actions.
- The hypothesis that there are minds and mental states of the kinds posited
by folk-psychology best explains this success.
- Therefore, it is probable/likely that there are minds and mental states of the
kinds posited by folk-psychology
- The issue posed by the success of folk-psychology in predicting and
explaining is that this supports the hypothesis that our “folk-psychological”
view about mental states is (at least in part or to some extent) true, as
opposed to being radically mistaken (as eliminative materialism claims).
- So, eliminative materialism is false
The articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting
- This argument against eliminative materialism is that it is self-refuting in the
sense that it cannot be adequately articulated without (at least implicit)
contradiction.
, - The eliminative materialist asserts that folk psychology is false.
- Assertions are the expressions of belief
- So, the eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false
- According to folk psychology, belief is a mental state: there are such things as
beliefs
- Therefore, the eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine
mental state: there are (and can be) no such things as belief
- But this claim is internally contradictory
- So, eliminative materialism is not a valid theory of the mind
Issue Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority
over other considerations
Integration This objection attacks the truth of the claim that “folk-psychological”
mental states do not exist
Weighting This is prima facie a fatal objection as it attacks the most
fundamental ontological claim made by the eliminative materialist.
Moreover, it does not merely show that there is sufficient proof that
mental properties could exist or that the opposite explanation is
implausible - it establishes the existence of mental states with
“certainty”
So, if successful, this would be a fatal criticism
Counter 1 Appeals to what is obvious have always been problematic in the
history of ideas. For instance, consider the question: “isn’t it just
obvious that the sun moves round the Earth?” This was argued
because our perceptual evidence made the conclusion seem
infallible and obvious. And yet the sun does not move around the
Earth. Analogously, Descartes took it as obvious that there can be no
thoughts without a thinker, so he was certain that he was a thinking
substance. And yet there are good reasons to believe that there are
, no substances whose essence it is to think, and many philosophers
have argued, along with Buddhists, that there is no ‘self’. So,
analogously, my ‘mental states’ may not be what they appear to be.
So, introspective knowledge about my own existence is not
indubitable just because it seems intuitively certain. So, my intuitive
view about the existence of my mental states should not take
priority over other considerations as
Integration This counter attacks the truth of the premise that “introspective
knowledge about my own existence and the existence of
“folk-psychological” mental states is indubitable”
Success Is this a valid analogy? Descartes might insist that knowledge of his
own mental states and existence is unique because it is derived
from introspection rather than perception of an external world (and
inference from that perception). Our intuitive certainty about the
sun rotating around the Earth was not warranted because the
deceptive nature of that sense experience made it fallible. But
Descartes could insist that our introspection is not deceptive in the
same way due to it being so direct and immediate.
A stronger response, therefore, will not deny the intuitive sense of
certainty we have in feeling that we possess a mental life. Instead, it
will explain how eliminative materialism is compatible with that.
Counter 2 In her later reflections, Patricia Churchland has clarified that the
term "eliminative" can be misleading. She prefers to frame her
position as revisionary materialism. The Churchlands do not deny
that we feel we possess a mental life. They accept that that feeling is
intuitively certain. They accept that the phenomena we describe as
‘thinking’ occur, just as we experience pain, but they deny that folk
psychology provides the correct explanation of their nature.
Thinking is not necessarily defined by ‘intentionality’ in the way folk
psychology understands it, nor is pain a matter of qualia, as folk
psychology implies. Instead, they argue that neuroscience will
provide the true account of what these phenomena actually are.
This would lead to a revolution in our mental concepts. However, we
would not stop experiencing pain simply because we came to
understand it in neurophysiological terms.
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3/
Eliminative materialism
- Eliminative materialism is a physicalist position and thus argues that
everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical
- Eliminative materialism says that mental states can't be reduced to brain
states, because common-sense, “folk-psychological” mental states do not
exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken
- Instead, language about “folk-psychological” mental states must be
eliminated
- Elimination is not the same as reduction
- With reduction the propositions on both sides of the reduction are true: the
concepts being reduced both refer to (or pick out) something in reality
- With elimination, mental concepts are being removed (eliminated) from our
mature scientific theories, and so any propositions including them are false,
or they rest on assumptions that are false: these mental concepts fail to refer
to something in reality.
- Folk psychology (challenged by eliminative materialism) is (a) an ‘untutored’
or ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of
others) which (b) involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states
with certain features (ie semantic, intentional, causal, phenomenal) and (c)
enables people to explain and predict human behaviour.
- Because of (b) and (c), folk-psychology is viewed by eliminative materialism as
a theory of mind
- So, folk-psychology is an empirical theory (it postulates ‘mental states’, such
as ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’, to explain and predict behaviour), but
, - (a) It has too many explanatory failures: folk-psychology cannot offer
(scientifically) satisfactory explanations of mental illness, creative
imagination, pre-linguistic learning, or memory.
- (b) It shows no/little signs of growth/promise of future development: folk
psychology is ‘stagnant’ and ‘infertile’. There hasn’t been any growth and
development for thousands of years
- (c) It does not cohere with other empirical (scientific) theories such as particle
physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic chemistry, evolutionary
theory, physiology, and neuroscience.
- So, analogous to how other widely utilised empirical ‘folk’ theories/concepts
(e.g phlogiston, elan vital, caloric) were eliminated from our discussion, so
should our common-sense, “folk-psychological” understanding of mental
states
Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other
considerations
- I know, through introspection, that my mind and its mental states exist. I
have direct awareness of my mind and these mental states.
- This knowledge survives the radical doubt (e.g. the ‘evil demon’ hypothesis)
- So, introspective knowledge about my own existence and the existence of
“folk-psychological” mental states is indubitable because “I think therefore I
am”
- However, radical doubt (e.g. the ‘evil demon’ hypothesis) renders the claims
of science dubitable.
- So, introspective self-knowledge about the existence of my “inner” mental
states is pretheoretical and so cannot even be thought of as being a theory
that could be compared with (and thus rejected in favour of) the competing
eliminativist theory.
- Hence any claims that might be supported by science (e.g. those made by the
eliminative materialist) will not cast doubt over my knowledge of my mind
and its mental states.
- The absolute certainty that I have that my mind and its mental states exist
means that I can reject, with equivalent certainty, the claims made by
eliminative materialists.
, - So, eliminative materialism is false
Folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best
hypothesis)
- This argument is typically treated as abductive where it is intended that, if
the premises are true, then we have good reason to accept the conclusion as
the most plausible explanation, even though it is not guaranteed with
certainty
- We enjoy a great deal of success when we use common sense
folk-psychology to explain and predict the actions of other people
- For example, in forensic psychology, folk-psychological mental states have
excellent predictive success in predicting offenders’ future behaviour by
using their beliefs, desires, intentions, and motivations to anticipate whether
they are likely to re-offend.
- Similarly, in cognitive behavioural therapy, folk-psychological mental states
have excellent explanatory success in explaining a person’s behaviour by
identifying how their beliefs and thoughts contribute to their emotions and
actions.
- The hypothesis that there are minds and mental states of the kinds posited
by folk-psychology best explains this success.
- Therefore, it is probable/likely that there are minds and mental states of the
kinds posited by folk-psychology
- The issue posed by the success of folk-psychology in predicting and
explaining is that this supports the hypothesis that our “folk-psychological”
view about mental states is (at least in part or to some extent) true, as
opposed to being radically mistaken (as eliminative materialism claims).
- So, eliminative materialism is false
The articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting
- This argument against eliminative materialism is that it is self-refuting in the
sense that it cannot be adequately articulated without (at least implicit)
contradiction.
, - The eliminative materialist asserts that folk psychology is false.
- Assertions are the expressions of belief
- So, the eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false
- According to folk psychology, belief is a mental state: there are such things as
beliefs
- Therefore, the eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine
mental state: there are (and can be) no such things as belief
- But this claim is internally contradictory
- So, eliminative materialism is not a valid theory of the mind
Issue Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority
over other considerations
Integration This objection attacks the truth of the claim that “folk-psychological”
mental states do not exist
Weighting This is prima facie a fatal objection as it attacks the most
fundamental ontological claim made by the eliminative materialist.
Moreover, it does not merely show that there is sufficient proof that
mental properties could exist or that the opposite explanation is
implausible - it establishes the existence of mental states with
“certainty”
So, if successful, this would be a fatal criticism
Counter 1 Appeals to what is obvious have always been problematic in the
history of ideas. For instance, consider the question: “isn’t it just
obvious that the sun moves round the Earth?” This was argued
because our perceptual evidence made the conclusion seem
infallible and obvious. And yet the sun does not move around the
Earth. Analogously, Descartes took it as obvious that there can be no
thoughts without a thinker, so he was certain that he was a thinking
substance. And yet there are good reasons to believe that there are
, no substances whose essence it is to think, and many philosophers
have argued, along with Buddhists, that there is no ‘self’. So,
analogously, my ‘mental states’ may not be what they appear to be.
So, introspective knowledge about my own existence is not
indubitable just because it seems intuitively certain. So, my intuitive
view about the existence of my mental states should not take
priority over other considerations as
Integration This counter attacks the truth of the premise that “introspective
knowledge about my own existence and the existence of
“folk-psychological” mental states is indubitable”
Success Is this a valid analogy? Descartes might insist that knowledge of his
own mental states and existence is unique because it is derived
from introspection rather than perception of an external world (and
inference from that perception). Our intuitive certainty about the
sun rotating around the Earth was not warranted because the
deceptive nature of that sense experience made it fallible. But
Descartes could insist that our introspection is not deceptive in the
same way due to it being so direct and immediate.
A stronger response, therefore, will not deny the intuitive sense of
certainty we have in feeling that we possess a mental life. Instead, it
will explain how eliminative materialism is compatible with that.
Counter 2 In her later reflections, Patricia Churchland has clarified that the
term "eliminative" can be misleading. She prefers to frame her
position as revisionary materialism. The Churchlands do not deny
that we feel we possess a mental life. They accept that that feeling is
intuitively certain. They accept that the phenomena we describe as
‘thinking’ occur, just as we experience pain, but they deny that folk
psychology provides the correct explanation of their nature.
Thinking is not necessarily defined by ‘intentionality’ in the way folk
psychology understands it, nor is pain a matter of qualia, as folk
psychology implies. Instead, they argue that neuroscience will
provide the true account of what these phenomena actually are.
This would lead to a revolution in our mental concepts. However, we
would not stop experiencing pain simply because we came to
understand it in neurophysiological terms.
